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Abstract
The greatest concentration of regionalism in international trade today can be found in the 
Asian Pacific region, and the number of international trade agreements in that region is 
still rising. In the general literature on regionalism, some proponents claim that 
regionalism can be a test-site for developing countries to enhancing their institutional 
capacity, before they actively engage in future trade liberalising agreements. Could the 
institutional enhancement explain the rise of regionalism in the Asian region? This claim, 
however, remains empirically untested. This thesis aims to examine this claim by 
observing the effects inter-regional trade agreements have on developing countries, 
especially on provisions that eliminate regulatory barriers to trade, and how those 
provisions may enhance institutional capacity to tackle future trade agreements with 
regulatory barriers to trade. More importantly, the thesis examines whether those 
improvements contribute to developments of their own intra-regional trade agreements. 
The case study countries chosen are Singapore and Thailand because they have 
spearheaded the most trade agreements in the region.
The thesis examines the effects of regionalism on domestic institutions both at the 
macro level -  general institutions involved with trade policy making, and the micro level 
-  specific institutions involved with the regulatory aspect of trade. To obtain a more 
comprehensive account of institutional development, the micro level includes two types 
of institutions: one on the development of trade facilitation, representing trade in goods; 
the other on the movement of persons, representing trade in services. Overall, 
developments at the macro and micro levels -  improvements in negotiating capacity, 
moderate progress in governmental cooperation, creation of new governmental agencies, 
greater involvement of the business community and inputs from civil society -have all 
contributed to building the case study countries’ institutional capacity. This in turn 
allowed them similarly to improve regulatory barriers to trade in their own intra-regional 
trade agreements, illustrating how trade agreements enhance developing countries’ 
domestic institutions to engage in future trade agreements.
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1 Chapter I 
Introduction
Trade is the natural enemy o f all violent passions. Trade loves moderation, delights in 
compromise, and is most careful to avoid anger. It is patient, supple, and insinuating, only 
resorting to extreme measures in cases o f absolute necessity. Trade makes men independent 
o f  one another and gives them a high idea o f their personal importance: it leads them to want 
to manage their own affairs and teaches them to succeed therein. Hence it makes them
inclined to liberty but disinclined to revolution. 
Alexis de Tocqueville {Democracy in America)
1.1 Stating the Research Question:
The recent history of the Asian region1 paints a picture of countries supporting 
multilateral free trade. They have strong faith in the multilateral trading system because 
the global trading system has provided them with rapid economic growth and 
development. In 1993 the World Bank dubbed this success story as the ‘East Asian 
Miracle’. Consequently, Asian countries found little need to diverge from multilateral 
trade policies. As a result, while most of the world has undergone multiple waves of 
PTA, most Asian countries appeared to be shielded from such phenomenon. The notable 
exceptions were the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asian Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). Despite various declarations of creating a regional free 
trade area, such rhetoric and ideas had never been put into practice. However, in the past 
decade the canvas has suddenly changed.
1.1.1 Setting the Scene:
Recently there has been a worldwide resurrection of Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs). In 1990, only 30 PTAs were notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
however, by 2004, this number rose to 2292 PTAs (World Bank, 2005). Interestingly, in 
contrast to the 1960s, the recent waves of PTAs no longer employ import substitution
1 I refer the Asian region -the main region under exam ination in this thesis- to include East and Southeast 
Asian region. This is predom inately because the greatest concentration o f  trade agreem ents in the Asian  
region can be found in the East and Southeast Asian region. Thus, I have excluded the Central, South, and 
W est Asian region.
2 Prior to the EU enlargem ent, there were 285 PTAs in total.
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policies, instead, they replicate the success stories of export-led growth policies 
(Sampson, 2003b). It is argued that PTAs today attempt to facilitate their members’ 
participation rather than withdrawing from trade (Sachs & Warner, 1995).
The general literature also refers this phenomenon as regionalism. However, 
contemporary trade agreements are not bound within one region. Consequently, I refer 
them as Preferential Trade Agreements.3 Specifically, I define PTAs as trade agreements 
between two or more countries, unbounded by geographical constraints, aim to increase 
trade in goods and services by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.4 
Regionalism, on the other hand, is much broader, it includes economic, political, social 
and cultural aspects, and goes far beyond free trade. Under regionalism, the political 
ambition of establishing regional coherence and security are the primary motivation that 
fuses them together (Buzan, 1998; Bjom Hettne, 2005; Bjom Hettne & Soderbaum, 
2000).
The global rise in PTAs can be observed in Figure 1 (Fiorentino, Verdeja, & 
Toqueboeuf, 2007), where the Asian region was no exception. Prior to the late 1990s the 
Asian region resembled an island shielded from the waves of PTAs. This shield was 
composed of a number of factors, such as the heterogeneity of the region5 and the 
region’s economic success resulting from multilateral free trade that kept Asian countries 
aligned with globalisation and the multilateral trading system (Yamazawa, 2004). 
However, those factors slowly faded away, and were overtaken by other pressing matters.
3 1 do not refer trade agreem ents as Free Trade Agreem ents (FT A s), as com m only known, because these 
trade agreements do not lead to the liberalisation o f  free trade, in the strictest sense; instead they liberalise 
trade preferentially am ongst partners and sectors. M oreover, in the econ om ics literature, PTAs 
encom passes wider range o f  agreem ents, from FTA s to Custom s U nions.
4 Consequently, agreem ents that elim inate trade barriers, such as the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced 
Econom ic Relationship, is considered a PTA. H ow ever, agreem ents that on ly  prom ote cooperation and do 
not elim inate trade barriers, such as the Thailand-Singapore Civil Service Exchange Programme are not 
considered PTAs.
5 The social and econom ic heterogeneity o f  the region made it difficu lt for Asian countries to find a 
com mon ground to foster an environm ent for regional integration. For further details, see Yam azawa  
(2004).
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Figure 1: Increase in P T A s
The Asian region’s first sign o f resentment against the multilateral trading system 
came when the WTO failed to push further multilateral liberalisation in agricultural trade. 
In response, several developing countries created a united lobbying front for agricultural 
liberalisation. As a result, for the first time, many Asian economies benefited from the 
regionalism card (Desker, 2004; p .9).
The second sign o f discontent came during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, 
which caused considerable economic and social detrimental effects to the region. The 
financial crisis highlighted the inadequate support from its regional ally, the United 
States. Some scholars believed the financial crisis presented an opportunity for the US, in 
league with the IMF, to deploy conditionality attached to financial assistance packages in 
an attempt to recast Asian economies in the US mould (W ade & Veneroso, 1998). 
Moreover, some Asian states felt they were both let down and put upon by the W est 
during the financial crisis (Higgot, 1998; Ravenhill, 2002). Consequently, several elites 
in the region committed to a New Millennium resolution that “never again” will they 
enter this dark pit o f financial crisis (Bergsten, 2000; p.4). The financial crisis, therefore, 
provided the region with the motivation encouraging Asian economies to come together 
in regional arrangements that would exclude the US, and attempt to redress its balance of 
power in the region.
Accordingly, the Asian financial crisis and the worldwide rise o f  PTAs were the 
main contributing factors prompting the Asian region to join the PTA bandwagon in the
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late 1990s. At the time o f the Asian financial crisis, the region was host to just a small 
handful o f PTA projects. Several countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea 
had never engaged in any form o f preferential trade agreements were to become the main 
instigators o f  the rising number o f  PTA projects in the region (Lloyd, 2002). Prior to 
1997, there were just two preferential trade agreements in the Asian region. In 2003, 
almost 50 PTAs were under negotiation or signed (Baldwin, 2000; Dent, 2006a). This 
rising number can be seen in Figure 2 (W orld Bank, 2005), making the Asian region the 
w orld’s fastest growing concentration o f PTAs, and the num ber still continues to rise 
(Dent, 2003b). Singapore leads with the most number o f the PTAs successfully 
concluded, with Thailand coming a distant second.
Moreover, contemporary PTAs have broaden its coverage to include other trade 
related issues such as investment, services, rules o f  origin, harmonisation o f  rules and 
standards, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement m echanisms, as well as 
tariff measures. According to the then Singaporean Senior Minister, Goh Chok Tong, a 
large part o f  PTAs in Asia is represented by such ‘New Age FTA s’. M oreover, amongst 
scholars, the proliferation o f bilateral PTAs in the Asian has become an important 
defining feature o f the region’s international political economy (Dent, 2003a, 2006a; Lee, 
2004; Lloyd, 2002; Ravenhill, 2003; J. J. Schott & Goodrich, 2004).
A s ia /P a c ific : RTAs' s ta tus  a s  o f O c to b e r 2003
: •
in Force Signed/Neg. Proposed
□  Partial Scope
■  Customs Umon
□  FTA
Figure 2: R T A s in the A sian  R eg ion
Previously, traditional literature on regionalism focused on the welfare effects, 
calculating the trade creation versus trade diversion. However, some scholars believe that 
contemporary PTAs are different and cannot be analysed with such existing tools 
(Burfisher, Robinson, & Thierfelder, 2003; Ethier, 1998). Scholars believe that m odem 
PTAs contain several interesting characteristics, such as predom inantly being between
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developed and developing countries (Ethier, 1998), they are sometimes referred as cross- 
regional or ‘inter-regional PTAs’. Moreover, recently there has been an increasing 
number of ‘intra-regional PTAs’, some of which are trade agreements between 
developing countries, as well.
The traditional discussions on PTAs generally revolved around ‘shallow 
integration’, meaning the liberalisation of trade through tariff reduction. However, 
Contemporary PTAs are generally undergoing ‘deeper integration,’ or the elimination of 
regulatory barrier to trade, such as the sanitary standards for agricultural produce. Since 
regulation often hinders firms from obtaining the appropriate resource. Regulatory 
reform may help introduce or enhance international competition by opening markets, 
leading to more intense competition (Shelton, 1997, pp. 301-306). Moreover, regulatory 
barriers do not generate any economic revenue, they simply waste economic resources 
and directly constrain productivity (World Bank, 2005, pp. 92-93). Thus, contemporary 
PTAs are considered superior.
Moreover, the inclusion of deeper integration provisions is very visible amongst 
trade agreements between developed and developing countries. However, more 
importantly, some of the deeper integration provisions goes deeper than the multilateral 
level, these are sometimes referred as WTO-plus trade agreements (Sampson & 
Woolcock, 2003). Nevertheless, there are concerns whether, through trade liberalisation 
developing countries are forced to adopt regulatory reforms and norms from developed 
countries, which might not be best suited for developing countries. (Collier, 2006; Weiss, 
Thurbon, & Mathews, 2004).
Traditionally, PTAs between developing countries do not contain deeper 
integration (Ethier, 1998). This is, however, slowly changing; a handful of PTAs between 
developing countries have attempted to incorporate behind border barriers. Why have 
they suddenly decided to tackle regulatory barriers? It is too simplistic to argue that, until 
now, they were uninterested in these issues. In fact there have been cries amongst 
academics and business elites in Asia to resolve such barriers to trade (Jayasuriya, 2003; 
Keidanren, 2000; Nesadurai, 2003; Ravenhill, 2003). Perhaps an analysis of the internal 
dynamics within developing countries is required in order to explain this recent 
phenomenon.
From the domestic perspective, when countries negotiate trade agreements that 
eliminate behind border barriers, the negotiating party must believe their trade partners 
have the institutional capacity to make credible commitments (Ravenhill, 2003, p. 304).
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However, Asian countries have limited experience with deeper integration, which could 
prevent them from participating in regulatory agreements. Some scholars believe bilateral 
and regional cooperation will not run smoothly if domestic institutions do not have the 
capacity to commit to deeper integration (Hamilton-Hart, 2003). Consequently, the 
ability to negotiate, undertake, and commit to the obligations under a trade agreement 
crucially depends on domestic institutional capacity. This requires an examination of 
domestic institutional capacity.
Many Asian states have climbed on board the new regionalism bandwagon. They 
can be divided into two groups: the first are industrialised economies seeking to expand 
their market beyond trade in goods, this includes Singapore. The second group are the 
advanced developing countries with coherent trade policies, but which still rely on 
agricultural trade, a prime example is Thailand. Currently, both Singapore and Thailand 
are eager to move forward and sign more PTAs. More importantly, they have signed 
several PTAs with deeper integration provisions. Why have these countries been able to 
move forward with comprehensive deeper integration PTAs? Has their engagement in 
bilateral PTAs with developed countries contributed to their willingness to consider 
comprehensive PTAs, especially in their own intra-regional PTAs?
In the literature, proponents believe PTAs can be testing-sites or pilot projects for 
exploring complex trade issues, preparing developing countries’ awareness and domestic 
institutions before they embark on future liberalisation projects (Sen, 2006; World Bank, 
2005). This could explain recent developments in Asian PTAs? Perhaps after signing 
PTAs, some Asian countries discovered lessons from inter-regional PTAs to embrace 
liberalisation. This leads us to ponder whether bilateral PTAs have eroded some of the 
problems of insufficient institutional capacity, mentioned above. The idea that PTAs can 
become a testing-site, however, remains empirically untested. What are the variables 
involved and what are their dynamics? A dissection of the domestic sub-unit or domestic 
level of Asian states is required, in order to understand the current dynamics of 
regionalism in the Asian region.
1.1.2 The Research Questions:
The above questions can be subsumed into the main question of this thesis. What are the 
reinforcing relationships between preferential trade agreements and domestic 
institutional capacity related to trade? To answer this, Singapore and Thailand have 
been selected as the two main case study countries. The main rationale for choosing the
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two Southeast Asian states will be discussed later, however, one of chief reasons is 
because they have spearheaded the largest number of PTAs in the Asian region, 
providing more observations.
As mentioned above, nowadays PTAs are becoming more comprehensive, 
encompassing a wide range of trade related issues, and they aim to eliminate behind 
border barriers to trade. Why has there been this sudden change? Why were Asian 
countries unable to tackle these problems before?
One of the possible explanations could be the weak institutional capacity, and 
being unable to commit to regulatory polices. Unlike tariff barriers, once removed tariffs 
can no longer be used as an instrument. Regulatory barriers, on the other hand, require 
continuous enforcement (Hamilton-Hart, 2003). Furthermore, regulatory policies also 
require greater involvement and communication between bureaucratic agencies. As a 
result, weak institutional capacities and the inability to commit towards regulatory 
policies does not foster the necessary environment for deeper integration.
Consequently, in this thesis, I define institutional capacity related to trade as the 
ability of a country to independently formulate and organise complex trade policies and 
operations, whether they are tariff or regulatory barriers, in a coherent fashion (OECD, 
2001; Prowse, 2002, pp. 1238-1240). This definition will be further elaborated in chapter 
two.
However, in order to answer the main question of the thesis, there are also three 
sets of interrelated questions which need to be addressed. The interrelated questions act 
as a guideline; by responding to each interrelated questions, they will lead towards 
answering the main research question. In other words, the main question of the thesis will 
act as a thread that ties all the interrelated questions together, aiming to uncover the 
relationship that may exist between PTAs and domestic institutional capacity.
The first interrelated question, refers to the sub-unit or domestic level: How do 
PTAs with comprehensive agreements influence the domestic system? Would the signing 
and the negotiations of comprehensive bilateral PTAs between developed and developing 
countries, such as the Australia-Thailand FT A, enhance developing countries’ domestic 
institutional capabilities and commit towards deeper liberalisation provisions? When 
signing PTAs with developed countries, this thesis assumes that developed countries will 
impose stringent provisions, such that weaker states will be compelled to accept the 
stringent provisions of the trade agreement. This would allow developed countries to 
influence developing countries’ domestic systems. In other words, PTAs could encourage
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governments to initiate domestic economic reforms. The thesis will aim to isolate the 
channels by which deeper regulatory provisions influence domestic institutional capacity. 
Moreover, the changes bought about by PTAs that nurture domestic institutional capacity 
could also bring spillover effects to the non-trade functions of a state.
The second question deals with the bilateral level, asking: Why have Singapore 
and Thailand been able to completed their PTAs, especially their intra-regional PTAs? 
This question becomes more striking when one compares Singapore and Thailand with 
their Southeast Asian neighbours. How did these two states, both with limited deeper 
integration experiences, manage to complete a comprehensive trade agreement on their 
own? Can the change in their behaviour be attributed to their active engagement in inter­
regional PTAs? Also, can this also be attributed to their domestic institutions? Do inter­
regional PTAs assist their domestic institutions to understand the rules of the game and 
influence their own deeper integration. It is argued that, through legal provisions, PTAs 
encourage the commitment and the locking-in of trade reforms, this was especially the 
case when Mexico signed the WTO-plus provisions of the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) (Frankel, 1996, p. 216; Sen, 2006; Tomell & Esquivel, 1997; World 
Bank, 2005, p. 7). However, PTAs could also go beyond merely locking-in reforms, and 
foster an environment for further liberalisation and adopting WTO-plus provisions.
The third question refers to the regional and multilateral dimension of this 
research. If inter-regional PTAs lead towards more intra-regional projects amongst Asian 
nations: Could this lead towards an Asian regional PTA Approach? Some scholars argue 
there is no such thing as Asian regionalism, but they believe one should exist 
(Katzenstein, 2000).6 Would the engagement of inter-regional PTAs, that influence the 
development of domestic institutional capacity, assist in the development of Asian 
regionalism. Understandably it is still early days, but the seeds of deeper liberalisation 
have just been planted in Asian intra-regional PTAs. Furthermore, if such an approach 
existed, what implications would it have for the multilateral trading system? Would the 
Asian approach further complicate the picture for the global trading system?7
In sum, there are several works explaining how bilateral trade arrangements foster 
the environment at the domestic level to support or undermine regional and multilateral
6 Katsenstein (2005) distinguished Asian Regionalism  in different areas, however, he has not distinguished 
Asian R egionalism  in trade related matters.
7 The latter question also leads towards another interesting question. I f  countries enhanced their dom estic  
institutions to tackle regulatory barriers to trade, could these developm ents becom e a catalyst enhancing the 
pace o f  multilateral trade liberalisation? Unfortunately, due to lack o f  empirical evidence w e were unable to 
discuss such findings.
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trade liberalisation (Mansfield & Milner, 1999, p. 604). This thesis aims to explore this 
question, through domestic institutions as an intermediary. Simultaneously, the thesis 
shall also aim to examine three interrelated questions: Firstly, how do comprehensive 
PTAs influence domestic institutional towards international trade policies? Secondly, 
would the change in domestic institutions lead towards greater trade liberalisation in their 
intra-regional agreements? Finally, what are the implications for future trade 
negotiations: bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally? This process will be explained in 
the hypothesis below.
1.1.3 The Hypothesis
The main hypothesis focuses on the interaction between PTAs and domestic 
institutional capacity. When developing countries conduct comprehensive inter-regional 
PTAs with deeper integration, they are forced to find ways to tackle these barriers. 
Specifically, it is assumed that developed countries will impose their norms and 
regulation on developing countries, who are enforced to adopt those regulatory 
provisions, which would lead to regulatory reforms. Moreover, those provisions will be 
rooted in the state’s system, influencing developing countries’ domestic institutions, such 
as assisting developing countries to enhance domestic institutional efficiency related to 
trade. Simultaneously, the imposed provisions could also assist Asian states to create 
their own positions on regulatory barriers at the intra-regional level, and possibly become 
a catalyst for enhancing the pace of multilateral trade liberalisation. This in turn reveals 
the reciprocal relationship between PTAs and domestic institutions. This is elaborated in 
Figure 3 below.
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M ultilateral Level:
WTO
Intra-regional PTAs:
Early Harvest Programmes
Domestic Capacity
PTAs reinforcing institutions
Inter-regional PTAs:
USSFTA
JTEPA
Bilateral reinforcing regional PTAs 
and multilateral level
Figure 3: Hypothesis
Moreover, the general hypothesis above can be separated into the three 
assum ptions corresponding to the three interrelated questions above. The first question 
concerns the state, illustrated as Q1 on the diagram. When developing countries, such as 
Southeast Asian states, engage in PTAs, which include deeper liberalisation provisions, 
their domestic institutional capacity gains awareness and experience through trade 
negotiations, leading to other institutional systems and capacities, especially those related 
to trade.
The second interrelated question refers to intra-regional PTAs, is illustrated in 
Q2. W hen inter-regional PTAs influenced domestic capacity, they should create either 
positive or negative spillover effects. The spillover effects should encourage states to 
engage in more PTAs, including intra-regional PTAs. Consequently, some Asian states 
have been able to move forward in their intra-regional PTAs, especially on regulatory 
barriers, which have hardly been touched before.
The third interrelated question, Q3, deals with the rise o f Asian Regional PTA, 
and its impact on the multilateral level. Some observers believe bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral trade liberalisation frameworks are complementary and mutually reinforcing 
(Chirathivat & M allikamas, 2004; Liang, 2005). Hence, both inter-regional and intra- 
regional trade agreem ents will create a feedback that enhances dom estic capabilities and
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experience to engage in other trade agreements, including the multilateral level. Thus 
ensuring regionalism is compatible with the multilateral system.
Overall, once the three assumptions are tied together, they should become the 
guide for answering the main research question. What makes these questions interesting 
and relevant is how the findings can generate a better understanding of the relationship 
between PTAs and the multilateral trading system.
The economics literature on PTAs argues that any form of liberalisation is 
considered beneficial. Economic theory contends that liberalisation through international 
trade will lead to more intense competition between firms and this gives those firms 
opportunities to compete and leam from the best business practice in the global market. 
This allowing consumers to benefit from cheaper products. Moreover, PTAs that deal 
with deeper integration are superior to PTAs that tackle shallow integration because the 
costs of institutional obstacles, informal barriers, and sub-optimal regulatory scales are 
often higher than the costs associated with shallow barriers.
Consequently, contemporary PTAs that liberalise trade generally also undertakes 
the task of eliminating regulatory barriers to trade, which leads to regulatory reform. 
There are concerns whether these reform are necessary or whether they are good for 
developing countries? There are cases where regulatory reform through liberalisation 
does not necessary lead to more competition, such as the case of intellectual property 
rights provisions which protects the right of the inventory, rather than the consumer. 
Nonetheless, the regulation were created to protect some groups, and this indirectly 
protects the consumers by ensuring that the product will exists, and the general public as 
a whole. There will be further discussion on this topic in the concluding chapter o f this 
thesis. Nevertheless, it must be understood that this thesis does not aim to argue that 
liberalisation is a good, rather it merely infers that liberalisation leads to greater 
competition, which could lead to providing consumers with greater choice. The thesis 
does not place any value judgement on liberalisation. Moreover, the main aim of this 
thesis is to focus on the process of PTAs and how it may enhance domestic institutions.
The general literature on PTAs and Regionalism still remains inconclusive. This 
research aims to contribute to the discussion by providing an alternative understanding of 
the reinforcing relationship between PTAs and domestic institutions. However, 
institutional capacity is not the single variable that determines international trade policy, 
but it is a key ingredient that should not be left out in the analysis. Moreover, this thesis 
aims to provide an alternative explanation for the recent developments in the Asian
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region, elaborating how Singapore and Thailand cope in a world with a multiplying 
number of PTAs. As a result, explaining how states evolve and adapt themselves to the 
ever-changing climate of the global trading system.
1.2 Research Method:
The thesis will adopt a qualitative case study approach involving a study of a sequence of 
events and processes in order to identify the relationship between historical events. The 
aim is to build an account for deeper integration in the Asian region, and how it 
influences states’ ability to formulate international trade policy. This requires a detailed 
knowledge of the sequence of events within the region, as well as the domestic political 
economy of the studied period.
The analysis employs documentary research as well as semi-structured interviews 
as sources of empirical material. Primary and secondary sources will be used to build a 
narrative of events within the region. The primary sources will come from official 
statements and the trade agreements will also be employed to present the outcome of 
these process. The composition of the teams of negotiators will also be used to identify 
the interconnectedness and cooperation required between the actors. All the above will be 
used in combination with the elite interviews, which are key to providing behind-the- 
scenes knowledge of the negotiations, bargaining and decision making process.8 
Moreover, they should provide crucial information with regard to the position of national 
governments, how the decisions were reached through negotiations and bargaining 
between ministries and how they have changed as the number of PTAs has increased.
1.2.1 Case Study Approach: Why Singaporean and Thai PTAs?
The empirical focus will be on the two Southeast Asian countries with the most advanced 
PTA policy, namely Singapore and Thailand. Their individual strategies and experiences 
in PTA policy during the specific period, and how this may influence the domestic 
institutional system in Singapore and Thailand, will be examined.
These countries were not chosen randomly, but because they share some common 
features and also have some differences. Both Singapore and Thailand have a fairly
8 Primary sources are material com piled by participants or first-hand eyew itness evidence o f  the event in 
question. This includes diaries, m emoirs, m inutes, court records, memoranda, letters, and interviews. 
Secondary sources are the published material based on primary sources, these are: treaties, agreem ents, 
press releases, governm ent white papers, official publications, and parliamentary debates (Burgess, 1990)
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coherent international trade policy compared with other developing countries. Most 
importantly, they have completed the greatest number of bilateral PTAs in the Southeast 
Asian region, and they have both signed PTA agreements with Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand. Singapore has already completed an agreement with the USA, whereas Thailand 
is cautiously negotiating an agreement with the USA. This exhibits their eagerness to 
liberalise trade at a faster rate than the current international system can offer them. 
Singapore may have instigated the PTA fashion in Southeast Asian, but this small island 
country crucially depends on international trade to survive. Thailand, on the other hand, 
may not rely on international trade as a life-support machine, but like Singapore, does 
require international trade as a means to achieving economic growth and development. 
Nevertheless, both countries yearn to engage in PTAs.
Both Singapore and Thailand are latecomers to new regionalism, they have only 
begun to engage in deeper integration recently. This is in contrast with the major regional 
trading blocs of North America and Europe, which have a longer history and 
sophistication in their PTAs. On the other hand, this provides us with an opportunity to 
examine how latecomers complete complex PTAs. Moreover, other Asian economies are 
closely observing both countries in the hope of duplicating their agreements. 
Furthermore, at the regional level, both Singapore and Thailand have conducted the 
Accelerated Early Harvest Programme with China, and the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced 
Economic Relationship (STEER). These intra-regional PTAs could instigate paths that 
may foster the environment for Asian regional economic integration.
Even though Singapore and Thailand lie in the same continent, they also have a 
number of significant differences. Singapore was the original Asian Tiger with a “robust 
state capacity”, unlike the second generation Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), such 
as Thailand (Weiss, 1997, pp. 4-5). There is also a difference in the natural resource 
endowments; Singapore, for example, has virtually no natural resources. For economists, 
this could explain the divergence in the quality and type o f PTA agreements. 
Consequently Singaporean PTAs may attempt to focus more on trade in services; 
whereas Thailand, a more agriculture-based economy, is centred towards gaining greater 
agricultural market access. More importantly, there also exist some differences in their 
political and social structures as well. To illustrate, Thailand has a reasonably mobile 
civil society, which also appears to be gaining momentum; whereas Singapore’s civil 
society is almost non-existent.
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There may be several areas of differences between Singapore and Thailand, but 
the fact that they have chosen to employ PTAs as their current trade liberalisation 
strategy should provide certain commonalities, one of which might be the relationship 
PTAs have with domestic institutional capabilities.
More importantly, from a methodological standpoint, when the two dissimilar 
countries are used for comparative case study, and when similarities can be drawn out 
from the study, those similarities will provide a more powerful generalisation result 
(Odell, 2001). Consequently, adopting the Singapore-Thailand comparison could extract 
some rich similarities and differences from the mixture of evolving international trade 
policy in the Asian region.
1.2.2 Which Horizontal Policy Areas?
The key aim of this research is to elicit how deeper regulatory provisions in PTAs may 
influence a government’s international trade capacity. However, due to time constraints, 
and the need for in depth analysis, two horizontal policy areas have been chosen.
Firstly, Facilitating Trade; generally, when countries choose to liberalise trade, 
one of the first areas to be negotiated are agreements that allow goods to enter countries 
more easily. It must be understood that the term “facilitating trade” as used in this thesis 
does not follow the narrow definition of customs procedures, instead it follows a wider 
definition, which will be elaborated on in chapter five. Trade facilitating measures which 
both Singapore and Thailand have employed include; changes in customs procedures, 
changes in Rules of Origins (ROO), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs).
The second policy area which will be placed under the microscope is the 
temporary movement of persons and the recognition of professional qualifications. 
Interestingly, both Thailand and Singapore have placed much emphasis on the movement 
of persons and they have signed some Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for 
professionals. Understandably the types of professional services Singapore and Thailand 
aim to liberalise will differ, due to the difference in their service sectors. Nevertheless, 
the adoption of MRAs for professionals is an example of service trade which Singapore 
and Thailand are moving in the same direction, both at the bilateral and regional level. 
Moreover, this is an example that can be utilised for comparison, especially when the 
literature on service trade in Southeast Asia is scarce.
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1.2.3 Delimitation and Time Period
The time period for this research was 1997-2006; this time period was chosen because 
Asian countries engaged in PTAs after the Asian Financial Crisis, which caused the 
initial peak in the proliferation of PTAs for both Singapore and Thailand. The cut-off 
period o f2006 was chosen because on 19 September 2006, a military junta overthrew the 
elected Thai government, which could possibly lead to a change in foreign and trade 
policy. Nevertheless* prior to that point, both Singapore and Thailand had concluded 
several important PTAs.9 Furthermore, there is also the international dimension to 
consider. This research aims to observe whether PTAs have influenced the case study 
countries’ willingness for participation at the multilateral level. As a result, this study 
will also include some documentary evidence on multilateral trade, such as the 
developments from the Hong Kong Ministerial at the end of 2005.10
1.2.4 Timeline Comparison Approach
We are unable to define what is the most efficient institution, in absolute terms, but it is 
possible to compare the relative efficiency and the reduction of transaction costs at a 
given time.11 Given this approach, we can observe and compare institutional changes 
prior the PTA era and during the peak of PTAs in the case study countries.
Consequently, this research will adopt a timeline comparison approach. 
Comparing the key dates of the negotiation and the signing of PTAs with domestic 
institutional development after those key dates. In other words, when comparing certain 
domestic institutional developments, they should be compared with the signed PTAs, and 
examine whether these domestic developments were inspired by previous PTAs that have 
tackled similar regulatory barriers to trade.
However, as will be revealed, the timeline approach does not always provide a 
direct causal link between PTAs and newly developed domestic institutions. There are a 
number of reasons why the two may simply be coincidences, such as political delays in
9 Certain agreem ents were signed later, such as JTEPA on 3 April 2007 , how ever, the negotiations was 
already finalised by late 2006; the agreem ent was not changed, but it w as stalled due to the military 
governm ent. A s a consequence, I consider this agreem ent to be com pleted before the end o f  2006 , and I 
have included it in the case study, despite the signing date.
10 Unfortunately, there is limited empirical evidence from the multilateral level, g iven the lim ited progress 
o f  the Doha D evelopm ent Round.
11 An exam ple w ould be observing how  the U K  overtook several countries at sim ilar stages o f  
developm ent in the eighteenth century. The reason for this can be traced through their different econom ic  
performance and institutions that supported the industrial revolution. Thus it is possib le to compare 
institutions over a given tim e frame. For more details, see Shin (2003).
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establishing domestic developments, resulting in a coincidence of establishment in the 
same time period after the PTA. Nonetheless, these problems can be revealed through 
cross-referencing in the elite interviews and documentary research.
1.2.5 Interviews
Two sets of interviews were conducted, the first was between July and September 2005, 
and the second between December 2005 and September 2006. The interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured way. Instead of a rigid questionnaire, an aide-memoire 
was used and referred to during the interviews. In some cases, if further clarification from 
interviews was required, it were obtained either through electronic mail or telephone.
A total of 22 separate interviews were conducted with 18 individuals in the two 
case study countries. The individuals interviewed were selected for their elite status. 
Elites are essentially individuals or groups who hold, or have held, a privileged position 
in society and thus are more likely to assert a strong influence on political outcomes than 
members of the general public (Richards, 1996). Thus, from the nature of this research 
most of the interviewees are trade negotiators and key members in the trade delegations, 
senior officials in government such as permanent secretaries or their deputies, as well as 
heads of government departments, agencies and research institutes. Interviews with 
middle-level officials were also conducted because they are an equally valuable source of 
information, as these individuals generally have detailed knowledge of the governmental 
and inter-governmental operational workings and process. Interviews with scholars and 
non-governmental organisations were also conducted because they provided valuable 
local knowledge, particularly about the political and business dynamics that helps in the 
interpretation of the events.
All of the interviews were recorded by note taken, instead of tape recorded. This 
is not considered a disadvantage because taping could result in interviewees being less 
forthcoming in the information they provide if they knew their remarks were being 
recorded (Richards, 1996).
The reliability of information was also a problem in interviews, interviewees tend 
to present their own personal, subjective view of events. In general, information and 
interpretations of events collected from one interview was crossed-referenced with 
information obtained from other interviews on the same event. In particular, the cross- 
referencing of interviews across countries proved to be helpful in revealing the personal 
or national biases of the interviewees. Nevertheless, some biases may themselves be
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useful or even vital to the study as they indicate national differences in the way events are 
perceived.12
1.2.6 Documentary Research
Documentary evidence predominantly came from primary and secondary sources, mainly 
from domestic governmental agencies representing international and regional interests 
from the two case study countries. Documentary evidence from other domestic agencies 
involved in the negotiating process was also sought. Only materials written in English 
and Thai were accessed, this included official documents issued by other governments 
that were translated into English. Some of the documents, such as official press 
statements of annual meetings and copies of the signed preferential trade agreements 
themselves were obtained from the case studied countries. Some official documents 
relating to international and regional economic polices were also recovered from regional 
and international organisations, such as ASEAN and the WTO, respectively.
Scholarly papers on economic regionalism, multilateral trade, deeper integration, 
and on the Asian region were also consulted for empirical information, additional insight 
on Asian regionalism, and how it relates to international political economy in general.
Finally, newspapers were also valuable resources when creating an account of 
current developments in the region. Both daily newspapers (national, regional, and 
international) and weekly news journals were consulted. Nevertheless, the key concern 
regarding newspaper sources is their accuracy. Consequently, when possible, newspaper 
coverage of items was cross-referenced across a range of other newspapers from different 
countries and international sources to minimise the possibility of biases that may occur in 
news stories presented.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis has been broken down into eight chapters. The first chapter lays out the 
research question, the hypothesis, the significance of the study, and the methodology of 
this thesis. The second chapter provides a comprehensive account of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing literature on PTAs and on domestic institutions; the chapter 
will attempt to fuse the two sets of literature and formulate a conceptual framework to 
analyse the underlying question of this thesis. The third chapter empirically traces
12 The list o f  undisclosed interview ees is in Appendix A.
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Singapore and Thailand’s recent PTA projects, from ambitious regional PTAs, such as 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and APEC to becoming spearheads in the proliferation 
of bilateral PTAs in the region. The chapter will also provide an account of the PTAs the 
two states have undertaken, as well as explaining the political and economic motivations 
behind the signed PTAs.
The following section explores the impact of inter-regional PTAs on Singapore 
and Thailand’s domestic institutions. Rodrik (2000) suggests there is a need to 
distinguish between institutions that operate at the macro-economic level and those at the 
micro-economic level. The macro-economic level is changes made to trade policy in 
general. The micro-economic addresses the smooth running of the market such as 
property rights and regulations. As a result, the fourth chapter will focus on the macro 
part, and provide a comparison of the changes that have directly occurred to trade policy 
in general. The chapter will focus on the structural and procedural changes that have 
occurred to the domestic agencies directly involved with international trade policy 
making. However, the chapter also points out the difficulties in distinguishing whether 
the changes PTAs have induced certain trade policies or whether they have been 
motivated by other domestic political forces. The fifth and sixth chapters will be the 
micro section, providing a clearer picture of how changes in domestic trade policies have 
been motivated, influenced by PTAs. Specifically, chapter five will focus on provisions 
related to facilitating trade, and the domestic institutions related to facilitating trade, such 
as customs procedures, TBT, and SPS. Chapter six examines changes that relate to the 
movement of persons and professional qualifications.
Chapter seven focuses on the impact and the implications of inter-regional PTAs. 
In light of the findings in the previous chapters, this chapter examines whether the 
changes brought by inter-regional PTAs will influence the case studied countries’ 
attitudes towards deeper liberalisation, especially in their own intra-regional PTAs. The 
chapter aims to ask which provisions on trade facilitation and movement of persons have 
been adopted at the intra-regional level? Where did the inspiration for those provisions 
come from? Overall, the chapter aims to argue that the interaction with cross-regional 
PTAs has enhanced these countries’ domestic institutional trade capabilities to engage in 
deeper liberalisation polices at the intra-regional level.
The eighth and concluding chapter discusses the extent to which the research 
questions were answered, and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical 
framework and the methodology. Furthermore, it attempts to conceptualise a model for
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Asian Regional PTAs. The chapter shall conclude by discussing the implications of the 
findings, which can be interpreted as both a building and stumbling bloc for the 
multilateral trading system.
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2 Chapter II 
Preferential Trade Agreem ents & Dom estic 
Institutional Capacity- Building Conceptual
Frameworks
One o f the best ways to understand how the international economy works 
is to start looking at what happens inside nations.
Paul Krugman
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a 
regular administration ofjustice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the 
possession o f their property, in which the faith o f contracts is not supported by law, and in 
which the authority o f the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the 
payment o f debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, 
can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree o f confidence in the
justice o f government. 
Adam Smith {The Wealth o f Nations)
2.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter discussed the current dynamics of PTAs within the Asian region, 
and the research question. Previously, several PTAs in the region were based on shallow 
integration, however, that is no longer the case. Currently, the Asian region has been late 
comers to contemporary comprehensive PTAs, sometimes referred in the literature as 
“New Regionalism”, and the region appears to be making up for lost time. A similar 
analogy can also be made on the literature on PTAs. The theoretical literature on PTAs 
may have begun over half a century ago, dominated by economists applying neo-classical 
economic theories, but only recently, with the emergence of comprehensive PTAs, the 
theoretical literature on New Regionalism begun to break through. Modem literature on 
PTAs is no longer confined to the discipline of economics, other disciplines, such as 
political science and legal studies have been equally insightful.
31
This chapter attempts to draw out the contemporary theoretical literature and 
discussions on PTAs, provide a critical examination of those studies, and build a 
conceptual framework posed by the question in the first chapter. The first section will 
outline the literature on PTAs, beginning with traditional “Old Regionalism” arguments. 
This chapter will argue that the literature from Old Regionalism may appear to provide 
elegant solutions, however, they no longer apply to the current dynamics of 
comprehensive PTAs. The second section exposes the limited discussion on how the 
domestic level interacts with PTAs. The section will suggest a need to understand the 
domestic actors and proposes to integrate the literature on domestic institutions with that 
on PTAs. Consequently, the final section will construct a conceptual framework that 
emphasises the relationship between domestic institutional capacity and PTAs. 
Furthermore, the chapter will end by providing two analytical frameworks: one for 
analysing how domestic institutional variables interact with the recent rise of PTAs; and 
the second for analysing the implications of the first analytical framework, or the 
domestic level, on regionalism as well as the multilateral system.
2.2 Conceptualising Modern PTAs
Since the end of World War II, the global economic system has undergone multiple 
waves of PTAs (J. N. Bhagwati, 1991, 1993). During the first wave, in the 1950s and 
1960s, most PTAs were concentrated in developing countries, with the exception of the 
EEC.13 Moreover, Bhagwati (1991) claimed these PTAs were constructed to extend their 
import substitution and protectionist policies behind the curtain of regionalism. The 
second wave occurred during the 1980s, when the United States was unable to steer the 
multilateral trade talks into more liberal waters, resulting in a gradual change in US trade 
policy towards more bilateral trade agreements with its neighbours, most notably the 
establishment of NAFTA. Zoellick described the US’s pursuit of PTAs as a strategy to 
achieve short term economic goals which help break the logjam in the multilateral 
negotiations (in Burfisher et al., 2003, p. 2). This sudden change of direction has caused 
some countries to pursue similar navigational change. Some scholars, notably 
economists, were alarmed that multilateral trade was manoeuvring further away from the 
utopian goal of global free trade, causing economists to re-examine the merits of such 
agreements (Winters, 1996). This section shall examine the literature on PTAs from the
13 The first ever PTA notified to the G ATT was the Treaty o f  Rom e on 24 April 1957.
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traditional debates of Old Regionalism, which deals with traditional trade barriers, to 
New Regionalism.
2.2.1 Old Regionalism: Static Effects on Individual Countries
The pioneering work on PTAs, was conducted over half a century ago by Jacob Viner 
(1950). When assessing the effects of trade blocs, in the static analysis, a comparison of 
the costs and benefits is required. The benefits, trade creation, occur when supplies from 
a low-cost trading partner are able to displace high-cost domestic producers. On the 
contrary, trade diversion occurs as the removal o f barriers between the PTA partners 
allows the less competitive members of the PTA to undercut a more competitive outsider, 
allowing the less competitive insider to capture the competitive outsider’s market. In 
short, most economists view trade creation and terms-of-trade gains as welfare 
enhancing, and trade diversion and terms-of-trade losses as potentially damaging. 
However, it is extremely difficult to draw strong conclusions about the desirability of 
forming PTAs from welfare analysis alone. Both theoretical and empirical findings will 
result in ambiguous conclusions.
Since Viner’s seminal paper, the neoclassical economic framework still remains 
an integral part of literature today. A review of this literature by Frankel concludes that 
“there is no shortage of economic models and arguments in which regional trading 
arrangements can undermine multilateral liberalisation” (1996, p. 216).
The varying theoretical models have inspired a long lasting debate on the merits 
of PTAs. Opponents believe PTAs are policies pursed by the stronger states, and the 
weak ones are sidelined from the global trading system (Pelagidis & Papasotiriou, 2002). 
In contrast, some economists argue that PTAs can also be trade creating. They contend 
that as long as trade liberalisation occurs, it does not matter whether it takes place at the 
bilateral or multilateral level. The benefit o f trade liberalisation, even at the bilateral 
level, brings about openness to global trade and investment, which plays a vital role in 
countries’ development and economic growth. Some PTAs are now perceived as 
mechanisms that enhance multilateral trade participation (Sachs & Warner, 1995). 
Proponents of PTAs argue that the actual picture may appear to be complex, however, on 
balance regional and global trading arrangements could be compatible with one another 
(Oye, 1992).
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2.2.2 Old Regionalism: Dynamic Multilateral Implications
Currently, the number of PTAs are rising exponentially, causing much concerns amongst 
certain groups of practitioners and academics. The then Director General of the WTO, 
Supachai Panitchpakdi, expressed anxieties over the current situation as “a la carte 
regionalism”, referring to the assortment of PTAs that can create inconsistency and 
discrimination for the whole global trading system, diverting attention from the 
multilateral trading system (SECO, 2004). From a legal viewpoint, PTAs obstruct the 
cornerstone of the multilateral trading system, namely the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
principle, by which the lowest tariff applicable to one member must be similarly applied 
to all other members of the WTO. PTAs, on the other hand, can evade the MFN 
requirement of the WTO agreements by applying positive discrimination to goods and 
services to a limited number of countries, rather than all countries. Accordingly, critics 
challenge the merits of permitting PTAs to bypass MFN, under article XXIV of the 
GATT and Article V of GATS.
One such example is the hub-and-spoke argument. The theory argues that larger 
markets will sign individual trade agreements with a wide range of peripheral countries 
among which market access remains restricted. Such trade agreements can marginalise 
the weaker economics, which become spokes. The hub, however, enjoys improved access 
to all of the spokes. As a consequence, overall the hub-and-spoke merely benefits the hub 
(R. J. Wonnacott, 1996). Is it possible to apply this theory to the Asian region, however, 
given the multiplying number of PTAs it is difficult identify the a hub in the region. 
Nevertheless, this will be discussed again in the concluding chapter.
The basic question underlying most research and debates on PTAs was ignited by 
Bhagwati’s (1991) dynamic query on PTAs: whether PTAs were building blocs or 
stumbling blocs for the multilateral trade system? This statement has now become part of 
an ongoing debate on whether PTAs help or hurt the prospects of continuing global 
liberalisation. Under Bhagwati and Panagariya’s (1996) criteria, building blocs were 
defined as trade agreements that accelerate multilateral negotiations, by going deeper and 
expanding faster than multilateralism, and creating successful experience with reform. 
Building blocs also widens membership until the bloc covers the entire global free trade. 
In contrast, stumbling blocs are the opposite, they create or entrench trade diversion and 
protectionism, and they are closed to expansion.
To date, most of the literature on building versus stumbling blocs still applies the 
Vinerian framework. One theory argues that when global tariffs are set non-
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cooperatively, PTAs have a tendency to become stumbling blocs. Krugman (1991a) 
postulated that global welfare depends on the number of PTAs in the world system. 
When there are many small blocs, PTAs will set low external tariffs due to their limited 
market power. As the number of blocs declines, they will seek their optimal tariff and set 
their tariffs high, tending to increase trade diversion relative to trade creation. However, 
when there is the single one bloc, trade diversion is eliminated and the world has 
achieved free trade on a multilateral basis.
However, Krugman’s (1991 a) work also faces criticism. Generally, large blocs do 
not appear to be motivated by the exercise of market power, nor are their tariffs rising 
such that it excludes other members. An example would be APEC, which claims to 
neutralise the diversionary aspects of PTAs, while encouraging the absorption of third 
parties into growing blocs and simultaneously continuing the overall reduction of trade 
barriers thought multinational negotiations. Unfortunately, this theoretical concept, also 
known as open regionalism (Bergsten, 1997), has raised many question marks on its 
validity outside the Asian region.
Contemporary theories by international economists have focused on “New Trade 
Theory”, which goes beyond efficiency gains from resource allocation according to 
comparative advantage theory. New trade theory adopts various characteristics, such as 
the importance of geographical distances, technological transfer and pro-competition 
polices from imports allowing potential for economies of scale. This provides an 
additional source of growth and welfare gains from expanded trade. However, new trade 
theory still depends on the welfare effects of trade creation and trade diversion.
One o f the pioneering fathers of new trade theory, Paul Krugman (1991b), 
observed that even without PTAs a disproportionate share of international trade has 
already occurred; we can observe that trade takes place predominantly within a region. 
Krugman believes this is chiefly due to transportation costs. By stressing the importance 
of transportation and communication costs we have a strong tendency for countries to 
trade with their neighbours. If this is the case, the gains from intra-trade creation within 
regional blocs are likely to outweigh any possible losses from inter-trade diversion 
because there is less to be diverted in terms of distance. Krugman thus concludes that 
trade follows the natural lines dictated by proximity, and the formation of regional 
trading blocs is constructive; referring to these blocs as “natural free trade areas”14 in
14 The term “natural free trade area” w as first coined by W onnacott and Lutz (1989)
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contrast to unnatural free trading blocs, which are PTAs between countries from different 
continents.
New trade theory appears to explain why there is a rise in intra-regional PTAs in 
the Asian region, reinforcing the idea that proximity is a key factor for PTAs. 
Nevertheless, there appear to be limitations in the theories as well. Firstly, several Asian 
countries are negotiating PTAs with the US, which should be construed as unnatural 
trading blocs. The second shortfall lies in the limited explanations of their empirical 
findings.
2.2.3 Limited Empirical Findings o f Old Regionalism
Despite various theories of international trade, from both neoclassical and new trade 
theories, most of the empirical findings have been unsuccessful in providing any decisive 
evidence on the global menace of PTAs, or otherwise. Some international economists 
have invested considerable time in quantifying the welfare effects of PTAs. More 
innovative methods include the application of Newtonian physics to international 
economics, this fashionable tool is also known as the gravity model; which postulates 
that trade occurs more between larger and adjacent countries (Frankel, Stein, & Wei, 
1996; Van Hoa, 2003a). Nevertheless, these models are criticised because of their weak 
theoretical foundation and the estimated coefficients sometimes capture influences of 
unrelated effects that occur simultaneously with the PTA (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 
2003). Furthermore, most empirical findings with the gravity model have found mixed 
results on the effects of trade creation and trade diversion (Frankel et al., 1996), the same 
problems also occur when analysing PTAs in the Asian region (Gilbert, Scollay, & Bora, 
2001; Van Hoa, 2003b).
An alternative empirical approach is the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model, which observes the long run effects by including price analysis to evaluate the 
welfare, or terms-of-trade, effects. CGE models allow for controlled simulations of the 
effects of trade reforms, through the impact of PTAs, thus eliminating problems affecting 
the Gravity model.15 Nevertheless, CGE results are still inconclusive. Schiff and Winters 
(2003) criticises the use of CGE models on the grounds that they are mainly used for 
counterfactual simulations, not forecasts. Furthermore, CGE models overstate the terms- 
of-trade benefit from PTAs because the models use the assumption that products are
15 M oreover, the inclusion o f  both terms o f  trade effects and trade allow s CGE m odels to generate welfare  
outcom es, an intrinsic feature o f  econom ic theories (J. N. Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996, p. 54)
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differentiated by country of origin, giving each country some degree of market power. 
This inaccurate feature focuses only on the terms-of-trade members gain at the expense 
of non-members (Schiff & Winters, 2003).
Overall, the various theoretical models highlight the significant effects of PTAs, 
however, we are unable to obtain a generic conclusion from theory alone. This is mainly 
due to the inherent neo-classical economic assumption on welfare and terms-of-trade 
effects. Moreover, the empirical evidence has also been, at best, inconclusive. There is 
little evidence that the world economy is devolving into exclusive regional blocs. 
Moreover, it appears that both PTAs and multilateral trade are expanding simultaneously 
without undermining each other (Vayrynen, 2003, p. 33). More importantly, neo-classical 
economic models have heavily relied upon the Vinerian framework and the terms-of- 
trade effect, which does not capture the entire picture of PTAs. More importantly, it is 
unable to answer the question of this thesis. Perhaps the time is ripe to depart from the 
Old Regionalism framework.
2.2.4 New Regionalism
During the 1980s, while most academics were predominantly preoccupied with 
traditional debates about the global welfare effects of PTAs, some scholars such as 
Lawrence (1992) and Ethier (1998) attempted to analyse PTAs differently. Ethier(1998) 
was one of the first scholars to characterise fully contemporary PTAs. Instead of treating 
the proliferation of PTAs as exogenous, Ethier examined them and outlined the following 
features o f ‘New Regionalism’. Firstly, modem PTAs included one or more developing 
countries linking up with at least one developed country. Secondly, when developing 
countries are admitted into a trade agreement, they typically undergo significant 
unilateral reform. Ethier cites Mexico entering NAFTA or reforms undertaken by the 
new European Union (EU) members as examples. Thirdly, current PTAs seldom address 
only market access and trade barriers; the degree of trade liberalisation in terms of tariff 
barriers has generally been modest, however, new regionalism also incorporates elements 
of deeper economic integration. Fourthly, liberalisation has primarily been achieved by 
members from developing countries. Overall, Ethier (1998) focuses on the role of 
contemporary PTAs in reaching deeper integration. Furthermore, Ethier believes New 
Regionalism plays a transitory role in the reform process of PTA members before they 
begin to liberalise and integrate fully into the global economy (1998, p. 1161).
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The above stylised facts note the high correlation between new regionalism and 
deeper integration. However, why have countries begun to emphasise deeper integration? 
In order to understand, we must look at recent developments of the global system. The 
WTO’s undisputable achievement has been its ability to negotiate a virtually worldwide 
free tariff.16 Baldwin (1970), however, described the successful reduction in tariff as the 
draining of a swamp, by lowering the water or tariff levels, we suddenly discover all the 
snags and stumps of regulatory and non-tariff barriers that still needed to be cleared 
away. Three decades later, Baldwin (2000) believes the stumps are not only visible, but 
they are also rising, with tighter regulations. The complications of tackling behind-border 
policies and the elimination of regulatory policies require the harmonisation of measures 
central to domestic economic policies and regulations. Consequently, it has been difficult 
for the WTO, or any international organisation, to confront such a complex and sensitive 
task (Feketekuty, 1998). Since these stumps have rarely been tackled at the multilateral 
level, some countries have begun to engage them at the preferential trade level instead. 
This includes the contemporary comprehensive PTAs in the Asian region.
One of the first scholars to write on deeper integration was Robert Lawrence. 
Embracing deeper integration, Lawrence believes, will reduce the costs in trade incurred 
from regulatory barriers to trade (Lawrence, 1995). Some scholars believe the 
liberalisation of regulatory barriers is more important than the liberalisation of tariffs 
because the cost of institutional obstacles, informal barriers and sub-optional regulatory 
schemes sometimes generate greater cost; although these costs may seem small, once 
they are aggregated they can accumulate to a large sum. Furthermore these barriers do 
not accumulate any economic revenue, instead they waste economic resources and 
constrain productivity. Consequently, when trade agreements, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, undertake the liberalisation of such barriers, the removal of these barriers 
would provide greater benefit for all the members.
However, there are still scholars who oppose the liberalisation of regulatory 
barriers by PTAs, and maintain the idea that any form of trade liberalisation should be 
resolved at the multilateral level. Bhagwati, Greenaway & Panagariya (1998) expressed 
their concerns with the “spaghetti bowl” effect analogy. They believe the proliferation of 
agreements will most likely create an overlapping of PTAs, causing inconsistencies
16 The average tariff in industrial countries was brought down from more than 40  per cent in 1947 to less  
than 5 per cent by the 1990s, and it is still declining. H ow ever, tariffs am ongst develop ing countries still 
remain high.
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between various elements o f  the agreements, such as different schedules for phasing out 
tariffs, different rules o f  origin, exclusions, conflicting standards, and differences in rules 
dealing with anti-dum ping and other regulations and policies, as expressed in Figure 4 
(W orld Bank, 2005, p. 39).
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Currently, it is disputable whether the spaghetti bowl argument (J. N. Bhagwati et 
al., 1998), postulated during the peak o f  Old Regionalism, can still be applied with 
contem porary PTAs. The Spaghetti phenom ena may not rely on traditional neo-classical 
economic welfare effects, however, scholars have responded to this theory. Dent (2003a) 
observed the rising num ber o f bilateral PTAs in the Asian region, and noted two points: 
Firstly, the substantive content o f  Asian PTAs go beyond traditional PTAs, they 
“carrying additional trade and investment facilitation and economic cooperation 
measures that seek to develop w ider collaborative links between economic agents from 
both states” (Dent, 2003a, p. 20). In other words, Asian PTAs carry elem ents o f  deeper 
integration. Secondly Asian PTAs exhibit the ability to m erge into new sub-regional or 
plurilateral arrangements. At First, there is a gradual expansion o f  bilateral PTAs within a 
specified region. The network o f PTAs will begin to expand and the differing PTAs will 
slowly merge, even with the higher cost o f  regulatory harmonisation. These features 
provide the basis for rationalising bilateral PTAs into a wider plurilateral agreem ent in
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which common rules and provisions that can be established between sub-regional groups, 
resulting in a need to network between these separate bilateral PTAs together, this is 
referred as “Lattice Regionalism”.17 In a subsequent paper Dent (2006a) elaborates the 
effects of lattice regionalism and discusses its positive and negative effects. He constructs 
the following dualistic conceptual framework: “Region-convergent bilateralism” which 
can make positive contributions to the development of regional PTA through the 
construction of bilateral PTAs. In contrast, “Region-divergent bilateralism” is how the 
increasing bilateral PTAs within a region can work against the development of 
regionalism. Ultimately, depending on the weight of these two factors, they will 
determine the speed and effects of lattice regionalism, thus warning of the long term 
prospect of lattice regionalism. However, Dent’s (2003a; Dent, 2006a) papers have been 
empirically untested.
Nevertheless, for now, lattice regionalism is seen as a response to the spaghetti 
analogy. The rising number of PTAs in the Asia region may cause inconsistency in rules, 
however, it also provides the basis for rationalising the inconsistent rules when merging 
into a common provision under a wider plurilateral agreement. In turn this process of 
crisscrossing agreements, growing from bilateral agreements to regional agreements, may 
provide the stepping stones leading towards multilateral economic integration.
Another response against the spaghetti effect calls for the need to rethink our 
understanding of the global trading system. The interaction between the bilateral, 
regional and the multilateral level is a complicated one, regulatory developments at the 
regional level might bring similar progress at the plurilateral or multilateral level. 
Bilateral PTAs have accomplished novel rulemaking developments beyond their 
multilateral obligations, thus setting an example of regulatory best practice, creating 
guidelines, not only for other preferential trade projects to emulate, but also setting the 
blueprints for the future multilateral trading rules. This suggest the multilateral trade is a 
multi-level process, with diverse interactions from the multilateral to the regional and 
bilateral levels. This multi-level process allows us to depart from the spaghetti bowl 
analogy18 (Woolcock, 2006).
17 Dent (1996) believes this theoretically bilateral-to-plurilateral progression o f  Asian Pacific PTA  
represents a unique evolutionary process o f  regional econom ic integration, contrary to the E U  experience  
o f  an institutionalised regional centre.
18 Consequently, W oolcock believed the global trading system  should be observed under the “lasagne” 
analogy, continuing the metaphor o f  Italian cuisine.
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More importantly, both Dent (2003a) and Woolcock’s (2003; 2006) arguments 
stem from the logic that PTAs, wherein members agree to move beyond their WTO 
commitments, could provide a demonstration effect that motivates future rounds of 
broader trade negotiations, whether under bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Such 
PTAs could be regarded as a testing ground or pilot project for exploring complex trade 
issues (Sen, 2006). As a result, allowing the possibility for comprehensive PTAs can 
provide a catalyst for enhancing the pace of multilateral trade liberalisation, since PTAs 
between like-minded trading partners create a domino effect on other non-members to try 
and liberalise faster.
To conclude this section, much ink has been spilt on PTAs, yet no conclusion has 
been reached on its merits. The economic arguments from opponents have been vast, but 
they generally revolve around one theme; namely, the preferential agreements will reduce 
welfare from the first best option which is multilateral free trade (J. N. Bhagwati & 
Panagariya, 1996).19 This section has outlined the concerns of attaching too much 
reliance on Old Regionalism and the neoclassical economic Vinerian framework. Under 
Old Regionalism, both theoretical and empirical works have found no convincing 
evidence that PTAs are trade creating or trade diverting. Moreover, the proliferation of 
PTAs has shown how powerless neo-classical economic arguments have been. Why has 
this been the case? As noted by Desker: “The genesis of the problem...is a conflict 
between the economic logic of free markets and the political logic of the state-based 
international system. While economists may seek the ideal solution, governments will 
focus on the politically attainable, even if it is a second best choice” (Desker, 2004, pp. 7- 
8). The terms-of-trade arguments may have an important place in theoretical models; 
there is, however, a consensus view that large countries or blocs do not appear to be 
motivated by the exercise of market power, nor are they raising tariffs barriers, they have 
moved to regulatory barriers instead. This has prompted several scholars to move beyond 
the neo-classical economic and Vinerian framework (Burfisher et al., 2003; Ethier, 
1998). As Lawrence contends, “the normal presumption about trade creation and 
diversion may not hold anymore” (1995, p. 32)
Current issues of international trade are dominated by behind-border barriers to 
trade, thus pushing international trade into the realms of New Regionalism. Nevertheless,
19 The proliferation o f  PT A s has provoked a highly vocal and at tim es bitter response from prominent 
econom ists, such as Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Kruger (1999). For exam ple, Bhagwati suggests 
that “PTAs are ... indeed a gigantic step backwards” (J. N . Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996, p. 54).
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new regionalism has also struggled to provide a better understanding of PTAs, including 
the proliferation of comprehensive PTAs in the Asian region. Perhaps this is because new 
regionalism is so attached to deeper integration, and non-tariff barriers to trade are 
usually attached to domestic regulatory programmes that are linked to the domestic 
norms and practice of societies.
Most studies on PTAs, with some notable exceptions, have generally neglected 
domestic factors; they have merely treated the state as a black box in their analysis, and 
simplistically regarded the state actors as given, and driven by exogenous forces. Breslin 
& Higgot (2000), among others, demand a marriage between the disciplinary approaches 
of PTAs and the richer empirical work on specific historical and political contexts within 
the domestic arena, to be taken seriously (Nesadurai, 2003). For the purpose of this 
research, it may be appropriate to open this black box.
With this note, perhaps the study of PTAs should be conducted under the lens of 
international political economy, since the procedures of establishing regulatory issues is a 
political agenda. From the bargaining on regulatory barriers to trade between negotiating 
partners to the bargaining power of interest groups and bureaucratic agencies at the 
domestic level, these are all related to rule-making, and the struggle for power outside of 
as well as within states, resulting in a world where domestic interactions can influence 
the multilateral level. Consequently, we should perhaps refocus towards examining the 
domestic level instead.
2.3 Conceptualising Domestic Interactions
The preceding section, illustrated the limitations in the literature on PTAs, chiefly 
because a majority of the literature is focused on events after the negotiations. Moreover, 
interestingly the literature on PTAs shows limited attention to the domestic level, and the 
domestic process involved in international trade policy making. This section will outline 
the literature on PTAs and the domestic level, thus departing from the state-centric 
framework that has confined the study of regionalism.
The section begins with the general analysis of domestic interaction on PTAs. 
This is followed by a discussion of the impact from interest groups, however, there are 
drawbacks. As a result, domestic analysis is concentrated on institutions instead. The 
final part of this section focuses on the links between institutions and regulatory barriers
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to trade. Overall this section aims to merge the literature on domestic institutions with the 
literature on new regionalism.
2.3.1 PTAs and Domestic Variables
Ever since Putman’s (1988) seminal paper on two-level game, there has been interest in 
and attempts at understanding the dynamics between the international and national levels; 
the literature on PTAs has been no exception to this. Some economists argue that PTA 
projects are a result of imprudent myopic politicians seeking attention. Due to the short 
life cycle of politicians in office, Bhagwati (1992) believes politicians hastily sign PTAs 
as a sign of having accomplished something, which may satisfy their ultimate political 
objective of getting re-elected. On a related topic, Bhagwati et al. (1998) also postulated 
the CNN theory of PTAs, suggesting that politicians are willing to conclude trade 
agreements because, at the multilateral level, the media and attention are focused on the 
major key players; in contrast, at the bilateral level, smaller states can have their 15 
minutes of fame because it is negotiated with smaller group. In short, Bhagwati argues 
that policy makers entering PTAs do not consider the consequences of signing weak 
PTAs. Nevertheless, these arguments are too simplistic, there are other crucial actors at 
the domestic level that need to be considered. More importantly, this being the case, why 
have Asian countries been able to sign comprehensive PTAs?
2.3.2 Role o f Interest Groups
The arguments above missed the crucial point that politicians are not the sole actors at 
the domestic level. Recently, there have been substantial research studies elaborating the 
interplay between the domestic level and the adoption of a PTA, from both the economic 
and political science perspectives (Gourevitch, 1996). The general framework was 
established in Solingen’s (1998) book, breaking away from the state-centric approach, 
emphasising the importance of domestic coalitions and the grand strategies pursued with 
other states. The coalitional approach stresses the importance of domestic structures and 
policies, and how this influences states’ foreign policy. By exploring domestic factors, 
Solingen postulated two competing groups: The statist-nationalist, who prefer economic 
protection and political conflict; and the liberal-internationalist coalitions, who desire 
economic cooperation and political accommodation. The strength of the coalitions rest on 
whether regional PTA is cooperative or conflicting, and on the distributional effects of
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participation in the world market. More significantly, the model stresses the importance 
of domestic coalitions, to be equally important as the regional dimension.
Other scholars also emphasise the importance of vested interests and lobbying for 
understanding PTAs. Grossman & Helpman (1995) argue that whether a country chooses 
to enter a trade agreement is determined by how much influence different interest groups 
have and how much the government is concerned about voters’ welfare. They argued that 
the political viability of a PTA often depends on the amount of discrimination the PTA 
yields. Trade agreements that divert trade will benefit certain interest groups while 
consumers bear the cost. If these interest groups have more political bargaining power 
than other segments of society, it is highly likely that the PTA will become trade 
diverting, rather than trade creating. Moreover, the reason why many PTAs do not cover 
politically sensitive industries is because governments can increase the domestic support 
for the PTA if the sensitive sectors are excluded from the trade agreement. Consequently, 
Grossman & Helpman (1995) explains why PTAs ultimately result in a socially 
undesirable outcome.
Other authors provide similar explanations for Asian nations. Ravenhill (2003) 
observed that the limited liberalisation of the sensitive agricultural sectors in Japan can 
be fully attributed to the powerful Japanese farm lobby. Accordingly Ravenhill refers to 
this as liberalising without pain, liberalising sectors with competitive edge. Nevertheless, 
most of these papers fail to discuss the other side of the coin, what about the business 
groups that desire to compete and export abroad?
Consequently, there has been other research on domestic actors which have lead 
to further liberalisation in the Asian region. Remaining with interest groups, Bowles and 
Mac Lean (1996) emphasised the growing influence of interest groups amongst business 
elites, which helped fashion a domestic coalition that removed government opposition 
towards AFTA. Similarly Stubbs (2000) argued that elites with protectionist interests 
used to be in power amongst Southeast Asian states, however, there was a sudden shift of 
power that placed technocrats with more outward looking economic liberalisation 
policies in power.
More contemporary works include Nesadurai’s (2003) inter-link between regional 
PTAs and domestic interaction. She combined the developmental state theory of state 
intervention that promotes developmental agendas and endorses trade liberalisation with 
open regionalism, thus conceptualising ‘Developmental Regionalism’. Interestingly, her 
analysis offers useful understanding for the relationships between political elites and
44
emerging domestic business groups in ASEAN, which interact and decide to engage in 
deeper regional integration. Nesadurai’s (2003) work offers a compelling insight into 
how domestic interaction enters into the decision of AFTA commitments. However, it 
does not fully account for how external forces, such as inter-regional PTAs, can also 
influence internal variables at the domestic level.
The importance of interest groups can also influence the multilateral outcome as 
well. Baldwin’s (1999) Domino theory postulates that governments of countries outside a 
PTA will receive massive lobbying from local businesses to gain access to PTA 
membership. The momentum will favour the pro-liberalisation forces because they are 
adversely affected by trade or investment diversion. This process will occur in every 
country excluded from the PTA until every country is a member of the larger free trade 
bloc, when there are no PTAs. The domino theory could possibly explain the rising 
momentum of Asian PTAs.
However, there are some limitations on the literature of interest groups. Firstly, 
due to the high degree of sectoral diversification within businesses, it is often problematic 
to visualise a clear picture of what policies firms are willing to support (Hamilton-Hart, 
2003). Secondly, there is a lack of empirical evidence specifying, ex post, which interest 
groups are truly influencing policy changes. It is unclear which domestic groups support 
PTAs, whose interests these trade agreements serve, and why particular groups prefer 
bilateral to multilateral liberalisation. For example, it is difficult to distinguish which 
interest groups, or whether any interest group at all, has actually influenced the recent 
corporate and financial reforms in Southeast Asia countries (Haggard, 2000). This is 
more complicated for certain Asian countries, such as Singapore. Thirdly, very few 
papers have tested whether, once in place, PTAs foster domestic support for broader, 
multilateral trade liberalisation or whether they undermine such support (Mansfield & 
Milner, 1999, p. 604).
2.3.3 Role o f  Institutions
In the literature on PTAs, most of the domestic analysis has predominantly emphasised 
the role of interest and lobby groups. In contrast, the literature on domestic institutions 
has been at best scarce. Nevertheless, due to the limitations of interest group analysis, 
there have been calls by a number of scholars to adopt an approach that analyses the role 
of domestic institutions instead. Rodrik argues “institutions have received increasing 
attention... as it has become clear that property rights, appropriate regulatory structure,
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quality and independence of the judiciary, and bureaucratic capacity could not be taken 
for granted in many settings and that they were of utmost importance to initiating and 
sustaining economic growth” (2003, p. 7).
Furthermore, advocates argue that institutions have greater importance than 
interest groups because political institutions can exclude certain interest groups from 
influencing policies. Political institutions are able to constrain individual and interest 
groups’ behaviour by rendering some choices unviable, precluding a particular course of 
action, and restraining certain patterns of resource allocation (Shepsle, 1989). From an 
extreme perspective, some might argue that institutions do not just constrain options, they 
establish the very criteria by which agents and interest groups may discover their 
preference (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). As a result, domestic institutions may provide 
equal, if not more insightful, analysis.20
What are domestic institutions? There are several definitions of institutions. 
Sometimes they are broadly referred to as the formal and informal rules that shape the 
nature and extent of human interaction (North, 1990). Williamson argues that under 
neoclassical economics, it is assumed that organisations of economic activity, such as 
firms, are characterised as production functions with a motive of profit maximisation 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 199). He believes we should depart from such assumptions 
because institutions have a distinct dynamic of their own. Consequently, this thesis will 
adopt a more practical approach:
Institutions are a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and 
shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people will do. In so constraining behaviour, 
institutions may be reflected in the appearance of certain behavioural 
regularities or norms.
(Lin & Nugent, 1995, pp. 2306-2307).
Thus, a few scholars have emphasised the importance of domestic institutions instead of 
interest groups because the weight on domestic interest can be marginalised. Such 
authors rigorously highlight the significance of the state and government capacity being
20 Som e scholars advocate the significance o f  studying both dom estic institutions and interests in the field  
o f  international political econom y. G ourevitch (1996), for exam ple, argues that both perspectives allow ed  
previous authors to provide insightful accounts o f  the interwar years.
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the key ingredient that provides the ability to implement and commit to relevant 
economic policies that lead towards economic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999). 
Some authors have also attempted to expand their theories through empirical research in 
the Asian region as well. It is believed, in the Asian region, that the influence of 
governmental institutions has been more pronounced, and sometimes more efficient than 
in most other developing countries (Tongzon, 2005). Moreover, others believe 
institutional features have been a significant factor in determining a country’s 
vulnerability to economic shocks, such as the Asian financial crisis (MacIntyre, 2001). 
On the whole, there are scholars who aim to bring the importance of domestic institutions 
into the analysis of international political economy.
2.3.4 Institutions and PTAs
A small number of scholars have attempted to advance the study of PTAs by emphasising 
the role of institutions. They believe, even if influential domestic actors oppose 
liberalisation altogether, institutional factors can sometimes create opportunities for 
policymakers to sidestep such opposition, by relying on regional or bilateral PTAs as an 
defence. For example, institutionalists argue that policymakers will sign PTAs, despite 
domestic opposition, because the PTAs were undertaken as a means of propagating 
protectionist barriers.21 Generally these scholars explain the importance of domestic 
actors and institutions that influence government strategies in pursuing international 
goals, including their international and regional goals (Gourevitch, 1996).
With respect to the Asian region, it is argued that economic integration within the 
region also depends on domestic interactions (Crouch, 1984). More importantly, the 
quality of the institutions sets the boundaries on how many Asian states are able to 
implement and commit to their bilateral or regional trade agreements. For example, 
Katzenstein (1997) argues that domestic interaction is a significant component of 
regional integration. In the Asian region, however, there are weak formal institutions, 
such as weak bureaucratic structure and ineffective state capacity. The weakness of 
formal institutions created a void for informal institutions, such as firms and markets, to 
fill the gap. In the absence of formal institutions, informal institutions -  through intra­
industry trade and investment -  have helped to create the necessary networks required for 
an alternative form of regional integration in the Asian region. For example, the Japanese
21 See Eichengreen & Frankel (1995) for further details.
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government has found it difficult to conduct bilateral cooperation with its partners, 
however, it has been much easier for Japanese MNCs to enter. As a result, the Japanese 
government rely on its MNCs to forge bilateral alliances.
Doner (1997) supports Katzenstein’s argument. He believes there is an 
institutional lag in state-to-state arrangements that finds difficulties in catching up with 
rapid East Asian expansion of intra-industry firms. However, Doner still emphasises the 
importance of formal institutions. There are limitations to how much informal institutions 
can achieve, without formal institutions. Formal institutions, such as the Japanese 
government, can provide both technical and financial assistance to their neighbours to 
develop both formal and informal institutional capacity.
More importantly, when discussing contemporary PTAs with deeper integration 
provisions, it must be remembered that only formal institutions have the authority to 
negotiate, eliminate, and implement regulatory policies. Informal institutions do not have 
direct access to the decision making process of regulatory integration. Generally, only 
states, with formal domestic institutions, may tackle and resolve the problems raised by 
regulatory barriers to trade.
2.3.5 Institutions and PTAs with Regulatory Barriers to Trade
Hamilton-Hart (2003) provides an alternative argument on why there is a limited number 
of Asian regional projects. She emphasises the importance of institutions that may foster 
the requirements needed for regional PTA in the Asian region. She stresses the 
significance of government capacity to implement its own policies in a reasonably 
consistent and rule-abiding way. More importantly, she elaborates her argument by 
emphasising regulatory issues. Previous trade liberalisation polices for ASEAN states 
merely dealt with the reduction of tariffs and subsidies, a freeze o f previous government 
activities. The mentioned policies may be difficult to adopt, but once adopted, they 
remain in effect until a new policy is announced.
Nowadays, Asian countries have adopted deeper integration. Trade liberalisation 
polices, such as financial regulation, are more demanding upon states because they 
require continuous enforcement; they demand involvement from government authorities 
for as long as they are in operation. The failure to implement and enforce such regulatory 
policies affects their capacity to implement effective cooperation projects with other 
states or any form of regional integration commitments (Ravenhill, 2003, p. 304).
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Some observers maintain the feasibility of creating a regional agreement depends 
on members having relatively similar economic or political institutions. If trade 
liberalisation requires harmonisation, then the more homogeneous are members’ national 
institutions, the easier it may be for them to agree on common regional policies and 
institutions (Mansfield & Milner, 1999, p. 607). However, the Asian region is an example 
of differing institutional capacity, given the heterogeneous social economic background. 
For Hamilton-Hart (2003), weak government capacity complicates the ability of states to 
commit their ambitious regional integration projects, thus providing an alternative 
explanation why formal cooperation maybe have been weak or ineffective, since the 
demanding regulatory policies within the region are unlikely to be implemented.
Nevertheless, one can find weaknesses in Hamilton-Hart’s (2003) paper. Firstly, 
the article is a predictor for possible future outcomes in the Southeast Asian region. 
Moreover, her research has not been empirically tested. One of the possible explanations 
could be, understandably, attributed to the insufficient number of case studies for such an 
analysis. However, the numbers of comprehensive new regionalism PTAs are beginning 
to emerge extensively. These PTAs contain alternative regulatory policies, which will 
crucially rely on their trade partner’s domestic institutions and regulatory trade 
provisions. Nevertheless, her influential paper stresses the need for understanding the 
complexities of domestic institutions within states, and how they affect the 
implementation of economic integration or cooperation in Asia.
2.3.6 Locking in Institutions and PTAs with Regulatory Barriers to Trade 
Conversely, some scholars also believe that PTAs can provide positive effects at the 
domestic level. It is believed that comprehensive PTAs involving deeper liberalisation 
beyond tariff reduction in goods and containing progressive liberalisation provisions can 
facilitate governments to initiate domestic economic reforms, which would otherwise be 
difficult to undertake at the multilateral level, such as services sector and investment 
liberalisation. These policy reforms, which are ‘locked-in’ through legal provisions of the 
PTA, should create a positive impact on their global competitiveness (Frankel, 1996, pp. 
216-217; Lawrence, 1992; J. Schott, 2003, p. 11; World Bank, 2005, p. 7). The best 
example was in the case of Mexico, which underwent several unilateral economic 
reforms, but used NAFTA to lock in the reforms in a manner that would be difficult to 
reverse. Thus, Mexico illustrates how institutional change and reform can completely 
bloc out certain interest groups.
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However, there are others who disagree with the locking-in argument (J. N. 
Bhagwati, 1993, pp. 25-26; Panagariya, 1996, 1999). Some believe the locked-in 
provisions could have been reached at the multilateral level as well. However, opponents 
fail to realise the practical difficulties of obtaining a general consensus for NTBs at the 
multilateral level.
Moreover, PTAs do not only provide lock-in mechanisms, which has been shown 
in the case of Mexico and other countries with deeper integration PTAs. Some provisions 
go beyond locking in. For example, the Mexico-US bilateral on countervailing duties was 
a steppingstone for Mexico’s GATT and NAFTA accessions. In other words, PTAs that 
contain attributes beyond WTO provisions can also provide more than just locking-in 
mechanisms for domestic institutions, it also allows the possibility to enhance domestic 
institutions (Frankel, 1996; Tomell & Esquivel, 1997).
Consequently, there are a great number of observers who have written extensively 
on new regionalism PTAs. They also discuss the possibilities of how signing PTAs could 
offer states the opportunities to build the necessary capacities before committing to the 
more important multilateral trade agreements (Dent, 2003b; Sen, 2006; Woolcock, 2006; 
World Bank, 2005). However, those hypotheses are still underdeveloped and empirically 
untested. The inclusion of domestic institutions into regulatory barriers to trade which 
influence the equation of economic integration is an area which needs to be examined. 
That will be the main theme for the rest of this chapter.
2.4 The Analytical Frameworks
Previous studies of PTAs have placed too great an emphasis on the trade agreement and 
not enough on trade policy linked to sensible economic development and institutional 
reform policies (World Bank, 2005, pp. 319-320). There are several schools of thought 
on why previous PTA studies have yielded inconsistent results. The previous section 
highlighted insufficient domestic social and economic conditions as possible hindrances 
to regional integration. This section aims to supplement such arguments by building two 
analytical frameworks that stress the relationship between domestic institutional capacity 
and PTAs, and how they reinforce each other towards greater economic integration. 
Moreover, the combination of the two frameworks permits an analysis from a two-level 
perspective. The first, institutional trade capacity, conceptualises the domestic
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mechanisms involved in PTAs. The second, deeper regional PTA integration, examines 
how domestic capacity and PTAs can influence regional PTA integration outcomes.
2.4.1 Institutional Trade Capacity:
This chapter has flagged domestic institutions as one of the key ingredients for states to 
commit and implement deeper regulatory integration policies. However, the ability of 
domestic institutions to design and carry out the planned strategy is a broad term which 
has not been formally conceptualised. This subsection does not claim to conceptualise the 
broad term, however, it would be difficult to understand the process involved in trade 
policy making unless the domestic mechanism that lies at the heart o f trade policy is 
understood. Thus, this subsection attempts to map out some of the key domestic 
institutional variables, with specific attention to trade policy making, which will be 
affected by deeper integration. As a result, the section shall attempt to conceptualise 
institutional trade capacity.
Interestingly, no formal conceptualisation of institutional capacity has emerged
99from the literature. Some have attempted to define this in terms of bureaucratic 
agencies with effective decision making power to decide the necessary tools for 
economic growth and development (Evans & Rauch, 1999). Others, such as Hamilton- 
Hart (2003), describe government capacity as the ability of a government to carry out its 
own declared policy in a reasonably consistent and rule-abiding way. Rodrik (1995) 
believes it is a public administrative agency with competent bureaucracy that gathers 
information, and provides advice and inducement, such as trade promotion incentives, to 
assist local firms to navigate through the changing world market. Overall, the above 
works fall under the Weberian school of thought, which emphasises bureaucratic 
organisation and deploying their own distinctive set of decision-making procedures; such 
a stance will also be adopted in this thesis, but limited to international trade policy 
making.
Consequently, as mentioned in chapter one, I define institutional trade capacity as 
the ability of a country independently to formulate and organise complex trade policies 
and operations, whether these related to tariff or regulatory barriers, in a coherent fashion 
(OECD, 2001; Prowse, 2002, pp. 1238-1240). This will be outlined in detail in the 
subsequent subsection, however, it includes the state’s ability to negotiate, coordinate,
22 With the exception o f  Dent (2006b), who form alises governm ental capacity into technocratic and 
institutional capacity.
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consult, implement, and create novel trade strategies. Furthermore, it must be clarified 
that the conceptualisation of domestic institutional trade capacity does not encompass 
economic growth, nor does it promote social matters, such as democracy and good 
governance. As a result, this thesis merely conceptualises the understanding of 
institutional capacity to formulate and engage in international trade policy making, and 
nothing else beyond this limitation.
2.4.1.1 The channels PTAs affect Domestic Institutional Trade Capacity 
This subsection attempts to analyse how PTAs infiltrate domestic institutional trade 
policy making within a state. The subsection aims to elaborate how PTAs can influence 
domestic institutions shedding some light on how PTAs may transform and formulate 
future trade policy. Once such task is completed, one can create an analytical framework.
It is assumed that trade negotiation is a top down approach; the policy maker 
adopts a stance on trade and the trade negotiating team must faithfully carry out such 
orders. In reality, however, not all planned trade policies can be implemented. Before an 
agreement can be concluded, they are heavily negotiated and internally and externally, 
after which it can be formalised into a trade agreement. Figure 5 aims to illustrate this 
complex web in a reduced generic form of the channels by which PTAs may influence 
the domestic mechanism. This model assumes first that PTAs will infiltrate the state 
mechanism, where the first point of contact would be through the trade negotiating 
committee. As a result, under the flows entering the state, a PTA first penetrates the trade 
system through the negotiation stage, which reports back to the relevant ministries as 
well as the policy making bodies, including politicians and high level bureaucrats. The 
interactions amongst these stages are more complex because more than one government 
body is involved in comprehensive trade negotiations, which leads to more bargaining 
and cooperation amongst government agencies. Furthermore, the interaction also 
involves other domestic non-governmental agents, such as the business community, and 
the NGOs. These agents are now becoming players to which the government needs to 
pay attention, especially when these groups hold more specific and reliable information 
from their industry and group.
This simplistic diagram also includes exogenous variables, such as the WTO, 
PTAs, or any trade agreement, which hold elements of WTO-plus. Following the same 
pattern as above, these exogenous variables, with regulatory provisions, may also create a 
lasting influence on the state and changes in domestic mechanisms.
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Bilateral and 
Regional PTAs
Flows into Foreign Policy Output Flows Entering the State
T rade Negotiations
Business
Com munity
NGOs
Relevant Ministries
Policy Making
WTO
W TO+ PTAs
Figure 5: State C apacity
The varying interactions inside the domestic mechanism will also change the 
nature o f  the top-down into a more complex process. Observing the interaction o f 
domestic mechanisms is analogous to the study o f  chemistry. If dom estic agencies are 
molecules, and trade agreem ents with regulatory W TO-plus provisions is the heat, when 
turning on the heat, one can observe molecules moving and interacting faster. There 
could be greater coordination, resulting in greater interaction between policy planning 
and various government agencies, and more com munication am ongst government and
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non-government agencies. Thus, a complex web is created in the process of trade policy 
making.
The interaction between government agencies and non-governmental agencies 
will also produce changes in government policies, especially on regulatory trade 
agreements, which leads to changes in domestic law; this entails greater need for 
communication between various actors in the policy structure. Furthermore, it also offers 
the agenda-setters clarity on whether the appropriate domestic institutions are facilitating 
trade agreements, or whether other forms of domestic institutions are required. This 
eliminates the transaction costs from trade, which are considered different from the 
transaction costs during the design stage (Khan, 1995). All of the above interaction 
creates a feedback which later transforms into the negotiated trade agreement which 
becomes the flow  into foreign policy output,
2.4.1.2 Institutional trade capacity framework
From the literature on regionalism, it is argued that strong and clean WTO-plus PTAs 
should reinforce domestic economic and institutional reforms to remove market 
distortions (Sally, 2006, pp. 307-308) however, such statements have never been 
empirically tested. To understand how PTAs with deeper regulatory provisions may 
influence the domestic mechanism, we must observe the channels and domestic variables 
affected by trade agreements. This subsection shall deconstruct the effects PTAs may 
have on the domestic institutional mechanism and construct a framework that observes 
the channels which PTAs infiltrate the domestic mechanism.
We now return to the literature on the locking-in effects of PTAs. Most 
proponents of regionalism believe deeper regulatory provisions in PTAs can provide 
beneficial effects, such as locking-in mechanisms for reform (J. Schott, 2003, p. 11; 
Tomell & Esquivel, 1997; World Bank, 2005, p. 7). Furthermore, some authors believe 
that liberalisation from PTAs, or from the multilateral track, goes beyond providing a 
locking-in mechanism; they believe PTAs can also enhance future domestic reforms as 
well (Birdsall & Lawrence, 1999; Frankel, 1996; Prowse, 2002). However, this is a 
concept that have hardly been contested, and it will prove to be a critical component for 
examining effects of PTAs on domestic institutional trade capacity.
For such an effect to arise, I assume that PTAs exhibit a circular rather than a 
linear chain of causation that affects domestic capacity. As elaborated in Figure 6, states 
signing PTAs with deeper integration should provide some positive spillover effects.
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These positive effects can assist countries towards building dom estic mechanisms that 
adopt further trade liberalisation in future trade agreements. Specifically, they create 
awareness, which m ay help countries adapt to domestic reforms required to meet the 
changes in those provisions. This in turn enhances the country’s dom estic mechanism as 
well as preparing the country to sign future, bilateral or m ultilateral, trade agreements 
which includes sim ilar W TO-plus provisions as well.
Circular Causality Forces: Forward Force
1. Negotiate & Sign
__ trade agreements with . . .
(
4. Country is able to sign 2. Awareness o f
future W TO+ provisions dom estic reforms. 1
\  3. Reforms enhances domestic )
mechanism for trade y
. liberalisation
e.g. negotiating team, creating
new regulatory agencies...etc
Figure 6: C ircular C ausal Forces: Forward Force.
Consequently, when observing the influence trade agreem ents have on domestic 
m echanisms, we not only observe the locking-in o f  domestic reforms at the institutional 
level. There is also a possibility for PTAs with W TO-plus provisions to exert changes on 
domestic institutions, which results in a positive effect that goes beyond locking in, they 
could lead towards further trade liberalisation.
However, it is not always necessarily the case that countries which sign PTAs will 
lead to more trade liberalisation. There is an equal possibility that trade liberalisation 
from PTAs could also lead to negative spillover effects on domestic mechanisms, leading 
to protectionism in future trade agreements instead. The diagram  on backward forces, 
under Figure 7, can be read as follows: the signing, or just negotiating, W TO-plus 
provisions could cause strenuous effects to domestic mechanisms, which comes in the
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form o f  overlapping domestic regulations, overstretching trade officials, for example. 
This in turn causes a weakening o f the domestic mechanism to adopt trade liberalisation, 
which could lead to countries adopting applying less liberalisation policies, either after 
the review process by policy makers, bureaucrats and trade negotiators, or from non­
governmental actors. Thus, the negative effect will result in countries having less desire 
to sign future trade agreements containing W TO-plus provisions.
Circular Causality Forces: Backward Force
1. Negotiating trade
agreements with WTO+ ««
1
4. Country is unable to sign 2. Awareness o f
future W TO+ provisions. domestic reforms.
I
3. Decides not to push for or J
attempts limited domestic 4 ^
institutional reform.
Figure 7: C ircular C ausal Forces: B ackw ard Force
The positive and negative circular-causality spillover effects on domestic 
institutional capacity can be described as two opposing forces: forward force and 
backward force. The former describes the spillover effects that could lead countries to 
adopt measures that further liberalise trade; whereas the latter spillover effects could 
result in countries adopting more protectionist measures. More importantly, these 
spillover effects can impose changes on domestic institutional capacity, and affect the 
outcome o f future bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
The forward and backward forces are sim ilar to D ent’s (2006a) regional 
convergent and divergent forces, however, I aim to provide a continuation o f D ent’s 
(2006a; 2006b) work by elaborating in greater detail on the positive and negative effects 
in the institutional trade capacity framework. Both forces will be considered in turn, 
when analysing the effects o f  PTAs with deeper regulatory provisions on the domestic 
mechanism. M oreover, Dent (2006b) separates domestic capacity into technocratic and 
institutional capacity, this is having sufficient technical trade expert, coherent trade 
policies, and a robust institutional arrangement. The institutional capacity framework, in
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this thesis, aims to further elaborate this observation to include technocratic and 
industrial capacity. In other words, the model observes both government and non­
governmental agents, where non-government agents are now playing an important role 
for trade negotiators to formalise trade policy. Consequently, institutional capacity 
framework is separated into five elements: trade negotiation, coordination, consultation 
with non-governmental sectors, establishing agencies to monitor and regulate trade, and 
formulating new trade strategies (Birdsall & Lawrence, 1999; OECD, 2001, 2005b; 
Prowse, 2002); all of which will be discussed in turn in the institutional trade capacity 
framework, in Table 1. Moreover, the forward and backward force captures the spillover 
effects of PTAs on domestic institutions; these impacts will determine the outcome of 
future trade agreements, including regional integration. In other words, the institutional 
trade capacity framework only explains the domestic dynamics. Nevertheless, the 
analysis here will be used in conjunction with the deeper regional PTA integration 
framework.
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Area of Im pact Influences Effects
Forward Forces
Effects
Backward Forces
Observe and M easure
Negotiating
Capacity
Comprehensive trade 
agreements will force a change 
in the composition of the trade 
negotiating teams, as well as 
recruiting negotiators from 
broader variety of background 
and experiences.
Experience of the trade 
negotiating team increases, the 
knowledge gained should pass 
on to future trade negotiations.
This could result in too many 
PTAs with too few qualified 
trade negotiators, resulting in 
an overstretch of human 
resources and limiting the use 
of valuable negotiators in other 
areas, such at the multilateral 
negotiations.
Measuring the number o f legal 
experts and the number of 
specialists from various 
agencies involved in the trade 
negotiations, which was not 
previously there, as well as 
observing their participation.
Coordination
Within ministries
Between ministries
Comprehensive PTAs require 
greater coordination of 
different departments within 
the ministry.
Comprehensive PTAs requires 
greater coordination between 
different government agencies.
Good coordination amongst 
government officials would 
lead towards a more detailed 
negotiating plan and outcome.
Greater coordination should 
lead to detailed position and a 
more synchronised unit, and 
create a better understanding of 
each other.
Bad coordination could result 
in greater confusion
Bad coordination could result 
in greater confusion and 
misunderstandings of the 
benefits of liberalisation.
Observe the creation of a 
department for coordination 
within ministries.
Observe how agencies 
coordinate, the creation of 
coordinating centres, or a fund 
for coordination.
Consultation
Academic institutions
Business society
Seeking inputs from 
academics.
Seeking advice from the 
business community
This will help formulate a 
better negotiating strategy
Advice from the business 
community will provide further 
information and create a better 
understanding of what the 
country can accomplish.
None
Industries which seek 
protection might provide 
negative information, or find 
other means o f hiding from 
liberalisation
Observing the number and 
variety of academics involved.
Measuring the number of 
business groups becoming 
involved, and their 
participation.
Area of Im pact Influences Effects
Forward Forces
Effects
Backward Forces
Observe and M easure
Non Profit agencies Seeking inputs from civil 
society
Input from these organisations 
could also help form a better 
position for the negotiating 
team. Moreover, they have a 
role in forcing transparency.
Certain NGOs could have a 
negative impression o f PTAs, 
they might favour 
protectionism and never desire 
to liberalise.
Measuring the number of 
NGOs involved in PTAs, and 
their participation.
Implementation
Judicial and legal 
system
After signing the trade 
agreement, the government 
must ensure that the judicial 
system will assist the 
implementation o f the 
agreement in a fair and 
impartial manner.
This should ensure that future 
trade agreements will accept 
the same benefits.
The new legally-binding 
provisions of the PTA might 
conflict with the existing 
domestic laws, causing a 
negative feedback towards 
liberalisation.
Observe changes in the legal 
texts.
Procedural and 
establishing new 
agencies.
Assisting the implementation 
of the agreement by 
streamlining procedures and 
creating a new department or a 
new government agencies for 
testing.
This should help to ensure a 
better response and reaction in 
future trade agreements.
The new governmental 
agencies could contradict or 
run an overlap with existing 
governmental agencies.
Observe the creation of 
regulatory agencies or 
procedures, which would not 
have existed prior to PTAs.
Creating New Trade 
Strategy
The negotiating o f PTAs may 
have forced these countries to 
create awareness of a new 
trade strategies, which may 
have not otherwise been 
conceived without PTAs.
The new strategy could help 
create a more coherent trade 
policy in general, and be 
utilised in future trade 
agreements.
The new strategy could end up 
becoming protectionist 
policies, that only liberalise a 
few sectors, and sets the scene 
for the county to adopt 
protectionist policies.
Observe the changes in 
government strategic policies, 
when announced.
Table 1: D om estic Institutional Trade Capacity Framework
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Negotiating Capacity:
As mentioned earlier, the front line that first interacts with PTAs are the trade negotiating 
teams. How negotiating trade agreements influences the trade negotiating team has 
already been mentioned above. Moreover, comprehensive PTAs can also change the 
negotiating team’s composition, encompassing a wider variety of talent. Each country 
should aim to develop a core group of trade analysts and negotiators, which comprises a 
variety of specialists from the varying fields of comprehensive trade negotiations. This 
includes the training of new trade negotiators and recruiting new talents from the private 
sector as well. The build up of specialists will be an important factor for enhancing trade 
capacity, and more importantly, human capital. Learning how to divide the negotiating 
teams and distributing the division of labour is one of the key elements for modem day 
negotiations.
The effects of constantly interacting in intensive trade negotiating should 
accelerate the learning curve of the negotiating team, the lessons leamt from the 
negotiations help to reshape and redefine the negotiating techniques of the domestic team 
for future trade negotiations. It must be remembered that the art o f negotiation is in actual 
fact the art of bargaining and persuasion, which is a skill that cannot be taught, but must 
be acquired from experience. Consequently, PTAs could result in forward force for the 
negotiating team because it is the best means of accumulating such experiences. All of 
the above will help negotiators leam the tricks of the trade, and build awareness of their 
own potential. However, we could equally end up with a backward force, where PTAs 
draws too many specialists away due to the country negotiating too many trade 
agreements; which may also affect their negotiating capacity at the multilateral level.
Coordination:
What naturally follows from the trade negotiation stage is the communication stage 
between trade negotiators and other government agencies. This has suddenly become a 
significant matter, thanks to the comprehensive nature of PTAs, which requires a greater 
need for governmental agencies to communicate. This will be very apparent for countries 
with weak institutional capacity because there are greater strains and demands amongst 
domestic agencies to formulate and implement trade policies effectively. The better the 
communication line the less complications will arise in formulating effective trade 
policies.
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Coordination comes in two forms. The first is coordination between departments 
within the single governmental agency. Naturally the government bodies which are 
responsible for the negotiations are different from the departments responsible for 
implementing such policies. For example, within the ministry responsible for agriculture, 
the department of agricultural economics is responsible for the negotiation, however, the 
department of local agriculture is responsible for communicating with local farmers and 
stakeholders. It is generally the case that the departments directly involved in the 
groundwork are usually in the supporting role, whereas the department representing the 
ministry is the coordinator and communicator of the government agencies.
Secondly, there is also coordination between governmental agencies. This is the 
most common concern with contemporary PTAs, since it is necessary for several 
ministries to become involved in international trade negotiations. This is very apparent 
prior to and during the negotiations, when each ministry must report back to their masters 
and coordinate amongst each other on the issues which they aim to negotiate and decide 
how best to achieve the planned goals. Generally there must also be a governmental 
agency, usually the ministry responsible for trade, as the main anchor to coordinate all 
the ministries to work harmoniously.
There are also post-negotiation concerns both within and between government 
agencies. Regarding post-negotiation, it is usually the case that unforeseeable problems, 
which were not predicted during the negotiations, will arise. As a result, there should also 
be coordination meetings after the negotiations are concluded. Firstly, the bureaucratic 
agencies should meet on a regular basis in order to follow up on the signed agreement, so 
the government may decide which areas require improvement in the agreement and 
future negotiations. Secondly, there should be regular meetings between the negotiators 
from both sides of the negotiating table, providing opportunities for both sides to discuss 
and improve on the signed trade agreement. More importantly, this also allows the 
possibility for the state to resolve problems without the use of a dispute settlement 
mechanism.
The lasting benefit of greater coordination, or the forward force, is greater 
understanding amongst government agencies. Generally, very few ministries fully 
appreciate the policies designed by other ministries. However, the constant 
communication between government departments creates an environment for government 
officials to understand each other and value the justification for implementing such 
policies, this is not confined to just trade policies, but with government policies in
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general. Furthermore, another positive affect of forming a stronger communication line 
between government agencies will result in creating a permanent link and familiarity for 
trade negotiators who understand each other’s position in future negotiations. However, 
there is also the possibility of backward force If the coordination process is not well 
designed, it could result in resources being overstretched and confusion arising out of the 
misinterpretation between government officials.
Consultation with Non-Governmental Agencies:
The deepening of regulatory provisions encourages the creation of new mechanisms for 
developing political and social consensus for the reforms themselves. A recent addition 
to the decision making process of international trade is the input from non-governmental 
agencies. One of the most common problems is the lack of accurate information. This is 
important especially before the negotiation commences, especially when there is 
asymmetric information favouring one side of the negotiating table. One of the more 
familiar forms of consultations has come from academics, often called upon to establish a 
fact-finding mission and assess the viability of formulating the trade agreement. There 
are concerns that information gathered during the preliminary round may be inaccurate or 
insufficient because it may have been rushed. Equally important is the assessment of the 
trade agreement once it has been signed.
Another form of consultation comes from the business community. This should 
be one of the most natural sources of valuable information, however, very few countries 
utilise information from the business sector effectively. It has been the case that most 
government agencies believe they have more accurate information of their own 
economies. However, it is becoming more accepted that the business community, 
specifically bigger corporations, holds the most accurate data of their own industry, and 
perhaps with more information than any government agency would care to comprehend. 
Thus, several countries are slowly recognising the importance of information, and the 
necessity to consult with the business community in order to accumulate accurate 
information on their own economy.
A more recent additional input for consultation is the non-profitmakingNGOs. In 
most countries the voices of NGOs are rarely heard, especially in international trade 
matters. Again, the problem of imperfect information resurfaces, which sometimes 
compels governments to listen to the voices of civil society. More importantly, 
international trade agreements now encompass a vast range of areas that affect the
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domestic way of life, from forcing inefficient local industries to relocate to changing the 
cost of health care policies. PTAs with a regulatory dimension will lead to a change in 
domestic laws, which causes the mobilisation of civil society. This adds an additional 
variable to the domestic institutional capacity. Nevertheless, all of this depends on the 
structure of civil society in that country, and whether the mobilisation of civil society is 
permitted.
The lasting positive effects of consultation not only bring changes during the 
negotiating, but the information from consultation also leads toward a better 
understanding of the country’s true economic capacity. Moreover, consultation also 
builds awareness post-negotiation by allowing feedback and comments from both the 
government and the non-government agencies. This is valuable especially during the 
review of each PTA, feedback from businesses will truly indicate whether PTAs have 
worked.
Likewise, voices from NGOs will push for greater transparency and allow the 
possibility for the process to be scrutinised. As governments recognise the distrust of the 
public over accepting trade agreements, they may attempt to invite business and civil 
society groups to participate in the negotiation process. The invitation should be seen as a 
means of allowing greater transparency, an element lacking in most developed countries. 
Initially the introduction of civil society was not welcomed, and its involvement and 
value remains to be seen:
...but its very creation marks a change from prior trade negotiations that 
did not deal with the kinds of domestic issues that modem agreements 
cover. In any event, the point is that the deep integration process, by 
encouraging domestic policy reform and bringing those reform issues to the 
international arena can inspire more open and democratic processes in 
countries where policy-making has traditionally been from the top down.
(Birdsall & Lawrence, 1999, p. 138).
Thus, consultation does not merely reduce asymmetric information, but also 
improves the process in negotiating trade agreements. Trade negotiations are conducted 
behind closed doors, in extreme cases they are conducted without the knowledge of the 
general public. Hence, consultation, should provide a channel that allows outsiders to 
become involved. Simultaneously, this also creates a catalyst for a more open decision
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making process. Furthermore, in this case the forwards forces will push various groups of 
society, both profit making and non-profit making groups, to understand, to prepare and 
participate in future liberalisation processes. Conversely not all consultation leads to 
greater liberalisation, backward force can also arise through resistance from the various 
groups that demand an end to the current and future liberalisation projects.
Implementation:
The most tangible indicator whether PTAs have truly influenced domestic institutions is 
when governments are required to change their domestic practices and systems in order 
to adapt to new regulatory provisions in PTAs. This comes in two broad forms, the first 
being the improvements in the legal system. This could include, through a stronger and 
more impartial judiciary, a reduction in the number of corrupt officials, or improvements 
in the performance of officials which ensures that only goods and services that comply 
with the agreement benefit from the signed treaty. It is generally the case that most 
developing countries are forced to import institutions and regulatory systems from 
developing countries. Because modem trade relations require a stable and predictable 
judicial system, the adoption of certain predictable legal requirements is seen as a stable 
form of conducting business.23
Secondly, improvements in the legal system must also be coupled with a stronger 
procedural system. The second category of the implementation variables, which are 
easier to observe, include streamlining bureaucratic and customs procedures to assist the 
smooth implementation of the trade agreements, and the creation of new institutions to 
track and monitor the quality of the goods and services. These agencies should be created 
to control the regulations which the government has committed to in trade agreements. 
Sometimes countries even import institutions and procedures from their trade partners, 
such as importing standards from the US Food and Drug Administration; whether this is 
the appropriate cause of action is another matter. Another example is the construction of 
an agency which simply reviews PTAs, an important activity which is missing in several 
countries. These procedures would not be required if the signed agreements were merely 
traditional trade agreements. However, with new types of trade agreements, come new 
types of government agencies, aimed at facilitating trade in a predictable manner.
23 N evertheless, it should be known that there are d ifficu lties in observing judicial im provem ents, which  
have changed as a result o f  PTAs. This is partly because judicial im provem ents from improved law  
enforcem ent are intangible and difficult to observe. Moreover, m ost o f  these agreements have recently been 
im plem ented, providing insufficient tim e to observe their benefits.
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The forward force of improving the legal and procedural measures ensures the 
trade agreements are functioning smoothly as anticipated for both trade partners. The 
spillover effect ensures that similar requirements, in future trade agreements, will receive 
similar treatment. For example, provisions on prudential banking regulation ensure that 
other trade partners will receive similar benefits, thus creating the foundations of the 
building bloc towards future multilateral trade agreements. Conversely backward forces 
could result in creating new agencies which may contradict some of the existing 
agencies, such as creating more red-tape, resulting in a negative feedback towards 
liberalisation in general. Moreover, there are concerns that developing countries will seek 
to adopt rules and institutions that may not be appropriate to their level of development 
or needs.
Creating New Trade Strategies:
By combining all of the above elements: more experience at the negotiating table, greater 
interaction amongst government agencies, and more accurate information from 
consultation, policy makers should have greater information and awareness of the 
capabilities in their own economies, and implement policies which better suit developing 
countries’ national interests. This provides the possibilities for policy makers to realise a 
new strategy for creating trade policy.
This will become apparent for countries that have never dealt with regulatory 
barriers to trade before. Countries with limited experience on these issues might simply 
ignore such issues, or erect barriers because they are uncertain of their affects. Only 
afterwards might policy makers realise the problems or benefits such regulatory 
provisions could bring. Thus, with greater information and coordination, this process 
could be hastened and immediately incorporate regulatory provisions into the trade 
agreement.
The forward effect will exemplify how states can learn from PTAs, and adopt the 
experiences from these PTAs and utilise them to their advantage by incorporating them 
into future trade agreements with other countries. The lessons learnt will create positions 
and approaches which were not known to them before. Birdsall and Lawrence refers to 
this as “rule making rather than rule taking”:
.. .over the long run, active participation in the negotiation and ongoing
monitoring of deep integration agreements can change the nature of the
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dialogue between developing and developed countries—making 
developing countries actors rather than spectators on the world scene and 
thus putting them in a much better position to assert their interests.
(1999, p. 139).
Furthermore, these lessons could reshape their trade strategies, and utilise these strategies 
in future trade negotiations. In other words, the forward force could push further 
liberalisation, whether at the bilateral, regional or multilateral. Conversely, the backward 
force would see countries hiding behind PTAs and adopting a strategy which would lead 
towards further protectionism.
To summarise, this section merely aims to explain the variables involved in 
observing both forward and backward forces. The significant variables by which PTAs 
could influence domestic mechanisms includes the negotiating team, coordination, 
consultation, implementing and establishing new agencies. By entering more complex 
trade agreements, the state should find means of going beyond the locking-in mechanism 
of PTAs and develop a more coherent structure and process for international policy 
making, which should also improve domestic institutional trade capacity. However, what 
implications would this have for regional integration?
2.4.2 Deeper Regional PTA Integration Framework: Dynamic Implications for  
Regional Integration
Armed with the knowledge on how the domestic mechanism operates, we are in a 
position to build an analytical framework that aims to test the hypothesis laid out in the 
first chapter. The dynamic effects of bilateral PTAs on domestic mechanisms and trade 
policy making is another area which this section aims to address.
The framework also incorporates some basic principles from the literature on 
PTAs and institutions mentioned above, which shall be illustrated in the matrix in Figure 
8. The vertical side indicates the strength of domestic institutions, these are the 
explanatory variables that may influence domestic institutional capacity. The horizontal 
dimension discusses the options states have for conducting bilateral PTAs. The left side 
of the horizontal axis allows states to sign agreements with deeper integration provisions, 
whereas the right hand side are states that have agreed on shallow integration
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provisions.24 This framework, consequently, yields four possible scenarios for intra- 
regional PTA integration, but they also have dynamic paths.
Inter-Regional (Bilateral) PTAs
Strong
Domestic
Institutional
Capacity
Weak
Figure 8: Deeper R egional PTA Integration Framework
The consequence of signing PTAs with deeper or shallow integration provisions 
varies according to the type of institutional capacity at the initial stage. In the top left 
comer, states with strong domestic institutions are able to sign PTAs that contain strong 
commitments, because they possess a high degree of government capacity to adopt and 
implement such provisions, reinforcing the possibilities of conducting a wider intra- 
regional agreement. For instance, due to the strong or deeper integration commitments 
from bilateral PTAs, countries have greater horizontal coordination that may not have 
existed before. Thus, bilateral PTAs have prepared the actors at the sub-state level to 
produce similar outcomes at the regional level.
The bottom right comer represents states entering weak PTAs, which will most 
likely result in states committing to weaker regional agreements as well. In other words, 
the combination of entering shallow PTAs and weak institutions provides states with 
little incentive to enhance their domestic institutional organisational enhancement. This 
provides the opportunity for the weaker institutions to resist change, resulting in little 
possibility of reaching deeper integration.
The two additional scenarios should provide more interesting outcomes. The top 
right box are states with strong domestic institutions, but they have signed bilateral PTAs 
with weak or shallow integration provisions. It should be safe to assume that thanks to
24 I have distinguished the two categories according to the quality o f  each chapter or provision, not 
according to the entire trade agreement.
Deeper Integration Shallow Integration
Deeper Regional 
Integration i! • -
Regional Integration
Regional Integration No Deeper Regional 
Integration
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their strong domestic institutional capabilities, regardless of the quality of PTA 
commitments, they have the abilities to engage in deeper regional PTA integration, if 
they choose to; but they may also choose no intra-regional integration at all. Thus, 
graphically, these states have the possible dynamic of moving towards the top left comer 
as well, since domestic factors can push them towards the possibility of conducting 
deeper integration, either with other PTAs or at the multilateral level.
Finally, the most interesting case is the bottom left comer, representing states 
with weak domestic institutions that have signed PTAs with deeper liberalisation 
provisions. It is possible to hypothesise that the signing of PTAs with strong provisions 
may create forward forces that foster regional PTA integration. PTAs may enhance their 
domestic institutional capacity to better coordinate and create a clearer organisational 
structure. As indicated in the diagram, this creates a dynamic for states with the 
possibility to enter agreements with deeper integration provisions at the regional level, as 
well as the multilateral level. This allows states to converge to the top left comer of the 
diagram. Alternatively, this scenario may also produce an alternative outcome: since 
these states have limited institutional capacity to begin with, the dynamics may continue 
to be static due to the limited interest in reform, or the stronger backward force that blocs 
further liberalisation.
In summary, this section has presented a conceptualisation of domestic 
institutional trade capacity that merges the literature on PTAs and on institution theory. 
The merger can be utilised to observe the channels by which PTAs can change the 
institutional capacity. This section has also supplied an analytical framework that will be 
used to test the hypothesis that the quality of PTAs and domestic institutional capacity 
reinforce each other. Strong institutional capacity leads to conditions where states are 
able to conduct deeper liberalisation provisions, and vice versa. Simultaneously, the 
framework also has a dynamic dimension. PTAs with strong provisions may also 
enhance institutional domestic capacity and they may provide a state with a convergence 
path, enhancing intra-regional integration. Moreover, the implications here are not 
limited to intra-regional integration. If the spillover effects can improve intra-regional 
integration, then by extending the analysis further it should also improve multilateral 
integration as well.
68
2.5 Conclusion:
There is an extensive literature on the Asian region, however, few studies have examined 
institutional capacity in the region. There have been limited contributions to the literature 
on institutions, although that is beginning to change, especially after the financial crisis 
(Tongzon, 2005), and the proliferation of New Regionalism. This chapter, and the thesis 
in general, attempts to supplement the gap in the literature by introducing a conceptual 
framework for analysing the interaction between comprehensive PTAs and domestic 
institutional capacity.
The chapter began by outlining the traditional literature on PTAs, which relied on 
the Vinerian terms-of-trade arguments. Currently, PTAs and international trade in 
general, are departing from traditional trade barriers analysis to regulatory trade barriers, 
and the Asian region is no exception. As a result, it might be more appropriate to analyse 
PTAs under the scope of New Regionalism, and the regulatory barriers to trade 
associated with it (Lawrence, 1995). Furthermore, to understand how states decide the 
liberalisation of deeper regulatory barriers to trade, we must comprehend the domestic 
mechanism involved in trade policy making. As a result, this chapter proposes the 
analysis of domestic institutional mechanisms.
It is generally believed that liberalisation can enhance a country’s economic 
performance, and a country’s successful economic performance can be attributed to its 
domestic institutional structure that keeps its transaction costs low (North, 1990). In other 
words, the improvement of regulatory policies that facilitates trade and investment 
encourages domestic institutions to change and enhance domestic institutions. This could 
lead towards greater economic performance and an effective means of trade negotiation. 
Some scholars (Gourevitch, 1996; Hamilton-Hart, 2003; Katzenstein, 1997) have 
attempted to analyse and capture this relationship, however, it remains empirically 
untested.
Drawing from previous literature, this chapter aims to reinforce the proposition 
that PTAs can lock-in domestic reforms (J. Schott, 2003, p. 11; World Bank, 2005, p. 7). 
It is also possible to argue that complex trade agreements could build a country’s 
domestic capacity -  consisting of policy-makers, enterprises and civil society actors -  to 
take independent positions on trade issues and develop its own trade policies (OECD, 
2001; Prowse, 2002, pp. 1238-1240). Moreover, PTAs also allow the possibility for
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states to go beyond the locked-in domestic reforms. These propositions will be tested on 
the two case study countries, with the aid of the analytical frameworks.
Consequently, this thesis will employ the two analytical frameworks. The first 
illustrates the steps and variables by which PTAs affect domestic mechanisms. The 
second analytical framework explains the implications that deeper liberalisation may 
have on intra-regional integration. The two frameworks are linked through the forward 
and backward forces which allow the possibility for countries to become dynamic; 
transforming states that are experienced with shallow integration into states that push for 
the improvement of regulatory policies in future intra-regional trade agreements. More 
importantly, this could become the catalyst for intra-regional economic integration 
between developing countries.
It could be argued that the Asian financial crisis may have faded away but one of 
its remaining side effects was the rise of New Regionalism PTAs. The proliferation of 
PTAs in the region has opened doors for the study of contemporary PTAs, and 
institutional changes, amongst other disciplines, in the Asian region.
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3 Chapter III 
Singapore and Thailand’s PTAs
For small countries, like Thailand, foreign policy is reactive, 
we must change and adapt according to the times.
Thus it is not surprising that we react to the current global dynamics, such as FTAs.
Former Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry.
3.1 In tro d u c tio n
The recent proliferation of PTAs has suddenly changed the global economic map. One of 
the most apparent hotspots is the Asian region, with Singapore and Thailand being the 
prime instigators. To date, these two Southeast Asian states have signed the largest 
number of PTAs in the Asian region. The city state of Singapore has spearheaded the 
most PTAs, tallying over a dozen trade agreements. The Kingdom of Thailand had to 
catch up, signing only four comprehensive PTAs. This is not the first time both states 
have deviated from their multilateral commitments, however, the current alteration 
entails greater speed and encompasses more trade related matters.
This chapter will provide a chronological account o f the PTAs Singapore and 
Thailand have concluded, and attempt to provide some narrative background to the 
negotiations, as well as the motivations behind the trade agreements. Most importantly, 
the chapter will provide a comparison between the PTAs of Singapore and Thailand, 
since they have signed several agreements with similar states.
In order to understand the origins of the PTA bandwagon, this chapter will begin 
by observing the intra-regional PTAs Singapore and Thailand signed before they come 
into vogue. The subsequent sections will provide a chronological account of the inter­
regional PTAs both countries have individually signed until the end of the year 2006. The 
concluding part of this chapter will present a comparison of the PTAs they have signed. 
Thus, this chapter should provide some insight in the direction of trade policies the two 
Southeast Asian countries aim to pursue: from the first-steps PTAs to complex and 
comprehensive PTAs.
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3.2 The Grand Regional PTAs
Singapore and Thailand have engaged in PTAs before, however, their limited experience 
has been focused only on two intra-regional PTAs. These regional PTAs may appear to 
be out of fashion, but not out of favour; they are ASEAN and APEC. Both intra-regional 
projects consist of a large cohort of members, with different demands and interests. As a 
result they have been cumbersome and inefficient, and this has forced some members to 
seek inter-regional PTAs as an alternative. Nevertheless, the two intra-regional projects 
were Singapore and Thailand’s first PTAs, which have taught them valuable lessons. 
This section aims to provide an account of the lessons both countries learnt and how they 
influenced their trade liberalisation polices prior to engaging in the bilateral PTA 
bandwagon.
3.2.1 ASEAN: The Grand Sub-Regional Project
One of the world’s oldest and longest-lasting PTA projects is ASEAN. This club 
encompasses all ten countries in the Southeast Asian region.25 Established in 1967, the 
organisation was initially and is still predominantly a political project rather than an 
economic regional organisation. It was created to “locate post-conflict intra-regional 
reconciliation within an institutionalised structure of relations” (Leifer, 1999, p. 27). The 
principal concern above all else was internal security and preventing external interference 
amongst member states and of the region (Yahuda, 1996). It must also be remembered 
that ASEAN was neither a vehicle for collective defence nor for collective security. 
Nevertheless, serious economic integration efforts began a quarter of a century later, 
erecting three major pillars for the ASEAN economic cooperation and economic 
integration projects.
In 1991, the then Prime Minister o f Thailand, Anand Panyarachun, proposed an 
idea to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), as the first pillar. In the same year, 
the economic ministers of the ASEAN countries agreed that all members should establish 
AFTA, with tariffs reduced to levels of 0-5 per cent by 2008, and to 0 per cent by 2010 
for the original ASEAN members, and the same for the CLMV or ASEAN-426 members 
in 2015.
25 The original m em bers were Indonesia, M alaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. States that 
joined later are: Brunei Darussalam  (1984), Vietnam  (1995), Laos, Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999)
26 A SE A N -4 consists o f  the new members: Cam bodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam  (CLM V).
72
During its initial period, AFTA was on the verge of collapse, but the ASEAN 
economic ministers were able to revive it by radically modifying it. In 1994, the then 
Minister for Commerce of Thailand, Supachai Panitchpakdi, enthusiastically proposed 
the rescheduling of tariff reduction to begin earlier, to widen the scope to include 
unprocessed agricultural goods, the tightening of guidelines, and bringing goods from the 
Temporary Exclusion list into the 0-5 percentage tariff rates (Nesadurai, 2003, pp. 58- 
59). Arguably, Supachai’s intention was to make AFTA more attractive than NAFTA and 
the WTO (Nagai, 2003). However, the major players within ASEAN, such as Thailand, 
were reluctant to discard the sensitive list.
In 1996, attempts to tackle non-tariff barriers were also included into the first 
pillar, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition Agreements (ASEAN, 
1998a), aimed at providing the general principles and conditions for developing sectoral 
mutual recognition arrangements.27 Nevertheless, regulatory barriers, such as NTBs and 
TBTs, continued to persist. Most regulatory barriers can still be seen in the forms of 
rigorous product inspections and stringent quality testing. There have been steps to tackle 
the problem, but they have met with little success.
The second pillar aimed to liberalise trade in services within ASEAN. This was 
signed in 1995, under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) (ASEAN, 
1995a), which commits its members to further negotiate liberalisation in seven key 
service industries.28 In practice, however, the liberalisation of some service sectors is 
extremely weak. Again the main players, such as Thailand, were reluctant to liberalise 
most of these sectors. As a commentator noted, in the case of telecom services, they were 
even weaker than ASEAN commitments in the GATS Annex signed in 1997 (Sally, 
2004b, p. 44). The implementation of AFAS has been equally challenging, this can 
chiefly be attributed to the difficult negotiation process. Furthermore, there are concerns 
that the removal of restrictions in services will provide benefits for foreign firms, which 
translates to increases in competition that ASEAN governments were not prepared to 
undertake.
The third pillar is the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), also signed in 1995 
(ASEAN, 1998b). AIA aims to extend national treatment to ASEAN investors, thus 
eliminating control on investment by 2010. AIA provides national treatment for the same
27 O nly tw enty priority products groups were listed, m ainly electrical and electronic items, 
telecom m unications equipm ent and rubber products.
28 This includes Air Transport, B usiness Services, Construction, Financial Services, M aritim e Transport, 
Telecom m unications and Tourism  (1995).
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seven priority service sectors in AFAS. In practice, the seven priority service sectors 
covered under AIA can be loosely perceived as GATS-plus. Nevertheless, the 
implementation process appears to be problematic; as in AFAS, governments are 
prepared to extend national treatment to ASEAN investors, however, they still wish to 
retain investment restrictions against inter-regional partners. Furthermore, there are 
extensive comments from observers expressing concerns about the slow pace of AIA and 
the long delays. As Sally argues, the problem with the AIA is long drawn-out timetable 
and being out of step with the accelerated timetable for liberalisation for AFTA (2004a, 
p. 30).
C ou n try .........  1996....f 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  f 2003
Brunei Darussalam 2.46 2 .2 9 ; 1.91 1.74 1.39 :....... 1.39 ; 1.39; 1.39
Indonesia 11 63
. io  6 i  p
8 .84 j... 7.91 i 5.81 : 5 .70 ' 5.00 r 4 2 5
M alaysia 5.93 5.14 4 .42  . 3 .67 : 2 .90 2.83 2.83 j 2.83
Philippines ................ 9 3 7 .....8 .33 r 7 3 6 ' 6'53 ’ 5.42 [ 4 .9 0 ; A 8 9  [ ...3773
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 ; 0.00 0 .00 0 .00
.. .  o o o  •
0.00
Thailand 14.10 12.69 10.15 : 9.28 7 .00 6 .99 5.78 ! 4.63
A SE A N 7 .7 6 , 7.oo; 5.79 5 3 9 3.97 3.88 3.47 2.95
Table 2: Average CEPT T ariff Rate
Both Singapore and Thailand have always been key players in ASEAN. However, 
the major players, apart from Singapore, have been reluctant to expand the list at a more 
encouraging rate. For example, as shown in Table 2, Thailand’s basic tariff rates, the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), is the highest amongst the ASEAN-6 
members (Chirathivat & Mallikamas, 2004). Nevertheless, there has been notable 
progress in ASEAN, these are considered substantial developments for non-OECD 
countries. The AFAS and AIA may mirror WTO projects, but they have the intention to 
evolve beyond its WTO commitments; when that will be remains unknown. As most 
critics have pointed out, all three pillars have a lengthy timetable, there has been close to 
no progress on plans to expand the coverage of its limited list.
3.2.2 APEC: The Grand Trans-Regional Project
One of the most impressive trade agreements is the Trans-Pacific PTA between the 
Americas and the Pacific nations, namely the APEC. As in ASEAN, Singapore and
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Thailand were amongst the 12 founding members,29 which later became a 21- member30 
club expanding to almost every country that borders the Pacific Ocean. The original 
proposals for APEC came from Australia in 1988, as a response to the deadlock in the 
Uruguay Round. There were high hopes that the Asian tigers would push the Asian 
Pacific region to being new powerhouse of the global arena. However, like ASEAN, 
APEC was weak and ineffective, limiting its current role to monitoring PTAs.
In its early days, there was little interest in APEC, especially once the Uruguay 
Round began to gain momentum in 1990. In 1994, APEC leaders called for continued 
reduction of trade and investment barriers, envisioning an “Asia-Pacific Community” 
that promotes cooperation. As a result, the leaders established goals for reaching free 
trade and investment by 2010 for developed economies, and 2020 for developing 
economies, dubbed the “Bogor Goals” (APEC, 1994). The goals are voluntary and non­
binding actions aimed at 15 policy issues.31 In 1995, Individual Action Plans were 
outlined for undertaking the steps to achieve the Bogor Goals, as well as a Collective 
Action Plan to develop common policy positions on key issues.32
Unfortunately, cracks began to emerge between the Anglo-American members, 
which sought aggressive free trade and investment liberalisation, against the pro- 
economic integration group, led by Japan. Bitter division continued when the pro-trade 
and liberalisation members persisted with a dogmatic agenda, while the other faction 
was still in disarray after the 1997 financial crisis. This included Thailand; whereas 
Singapore, which escaped the full blow of crisis, did not signal which faction it sided 
with because the city state tried to balance its own interests and the unity of its Asian 
neighbours.
Nevertheless, APEC slowly regained momentum, but in a different direction. In 
1999 New Zealand, with the assistance of APEC, brokered a political deal with Indonesia 
on the East Timor conflict. This set a precedent for political, instead of economic, issues
29 The founding m em bers are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam , Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
M alaysia, N ew  Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United Sates o f  America.
30 States that have jo ined  later are: China (1991), M exico , Papua N ew  G uinea (1993), Chile (1994), Peru, 
Russia, and Vietnam  (1998).
31 This included tariffs, non-tariff barriers, services, investm ent, standards and conform ance, custom s 
procedures, intellectual property rights, com petition policy , governm ent procurem ent, regulatory review , 
W TO obligations, dispute settlem ent mediation, mobility ofbusiness people, and information gathering and 
analysis.
32 Every m ember subm its annually an Individual Action Plan, which is a record o f  actions taken to meet its 
stated goals for free and open trade and investment. The m em bers set their own tim elines and goals on the 
15 issues, and undertake these actions on a voluntary and non-binding basis. The C ollective Action Plans 
are co llective  actions o f  all APEC M em ber Econom ies in the 15 issue areas outlined in the Individual 
Action Plans, (http://w w w .ap ec -iap .o rg/)
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to dominate the APEC meetings. There were attempts to revive economic issues back to 
the focal point of the APEC by achieving the Bogor goals and revitalising their WTO 
commitments by negotiating WTO-plus agreements alongside APEC’s trade and 
investment liberalisation policies. However, little progress was achieved on the economic 
front.
After the failure of the APEC meeting on voluntary sectoral liberalisation, several 
key members, such as the US and Australia, lost their enthusiasm for APEC, and began 
to consider bilateral PTA. As a result, smaller APEC economies that relied heavily on 
trade began to change their trade policy orientation. Singapore’s first bilateral trade 
agreement with New Zealand began on the fringe of the APEC Summit. As a result, 
several APEC members, including Australia, Chile, Thailand, Mexico and the US have 
embraced the bilateral strategy, as part of the new geo-political strategy.
Consequently, APEC is currently being dismissed as a weak regional PTA. It has 
no institutional structure or binding legal agreements and sets ambitious goals for free 
trade and investment that most of its members have no intention of meeting. 
Interestingly, most of its members appear now to be engaging in bilateral PTAs, most of 
which have generally emerged from APEC summits; making APEC an ideal forum for 
starting bilateral PTAs. As a result, currently, APEC aims to justify peer pressure 
amongst its own members to ensure bilateral PTAs comply with WTO requirements and 
the WTO-plus coincide with APEC objectives. This includes the Best Practice 
Guidelines fo r  FTAs developed in 2004 (APEC, 2004).
It can be argued that grand regional PTAs have hardly changed Singapore and 
Thailand’s trade polices. In ASEAN, both states are active founding members and have 
pushed for liberalisation; although Thailand appears to be more reluctant than the other 
original members. Nevertheless, they have been the instigators of the three pillars for 
ASEAN economic integration. Within APEC, the two states have played a less prominent 
role, and allied themselves, for economic and political reasons, against further trade and 
investment liberalisers. Nevertheless, despite ASEAN and APEC’s ambitious timetable 
for trade and investment liberalisation, both grand regional projects have stagnated and 
achieved limited liberalisation. Consequently, both Singapore and Thailand have opted to 
engage in bilateral PTAs outside their grand regional projects instead. As most scholars 
(Dent, 2003a; Desker, 2004; Lloyd, 2002) believe, one of the motivations behind the 
bilateral PTA bandwagon in the Asia was a result of the limitation in both the multilateral 
trading system and regional projects.
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3.3 Singapore: Spearheading PTAs
Unlike most of its Southeast Asian neighbours, Singapore has always supported trade 
liberalisation. For exporters, unless one is involved in alcohol, chewing gum, tobacco, 
and certain services, one would hardly find problems trading with Singapore. 
Nevertheless, the entrepot city-state must constantly find ways to gain markets abroad. 
As one Singaporean trade negotiator summed it up:
“Trade is the life and blood of Singapore”.
The consequence of limited evolution in the multilateral system and on the intra-regional 
front persuaded the city-state to become one of the early advocates of bilateral PTAs. 
Without going into great depths, this section aims to describe six main PTAs which 
Singapore has concluded thus far: from the signing of bilateral PTAs with similar 
economies to grander trade agreements with the United States
3.3.1 The Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic 
Partnership
Singapore’s first experiment in bilateral PTAs was with New Zealand. The small sets of 
islands in the South Pacific Ocean appeared to be the ideal test site for Singapore. New 
Zealand is a small country with limited bargaining power, but at the same time New 
Zealand had already conducted a comprehensive agreement with Australia, providing 
New Zealand with practical experience to teach Singapore.
In September 1999, as the APEC Leaders’ Summit was about to come to a close, 
the negotiations for the ANZSCEP (Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on 
Closer Economic Partnership) began. After six rounds of negotiations, the text was 
finalised by August 2000, and was separately approved in September of the same year. It 
was finally signed in November 2000, making this one of the fastest ever PTAs to be 
completed, within less than 14 months (ANZSCEP, 2000).
The ANZSCEP is a comprehensive agreement, containing a respectable 11 parts, 
discussing trade in goods, services, investment, movement of persons, SPS, government 
procurement, intellectual property rights, and a dispute settlement mechanism. Both sides 
openly admitted that the benefits in terms of goods are minute. Nevertheless, substantial
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gains should predominantly come from trade in services. To illustrate, New Zealand has 
committed to remove the registration prerequisite under residency requirements for 
certain Singaporean professionals. Both sides have also made arrangements for mutual 
recognition for professional qualifications and technical standards.
For outsiders, it maybe unsurprising for Singapore to complete an inter-regional 
PTA with a country of similar economic structure at such speed. Nevertheless, for 
Singaporeans, this is an impressive accomplishment, as this is the city-state’s first 
comprehensive PTA, which will set the marching beat for further comprehensive PTAs 
with other countries.
3.3.2 The Japan-Singapore fo r a New-Age Economic Partnership 
A PTA between Japan and Singapore seemed to be the next logical move. Both sides 
have several similarities: they are both small and resource-limited countries; both shared 
experiences of past economic success owed to their developmental states models (Low, 
2004). Moreover, for Japan, Singapore does not have an agricultural sector, which bodes 
well for the Japanese farming lobby. Another motivator is Japan’s interest in regaining 
her dominance in the region, in order to contain China’s presence in the region.
In 1999, the Singaporean Ambassador orchestrated a meeting between the 
Japanese and Singaporean premiers, who later approved of a joint study group on the 
viability of a Japan and Singapore PTA. After the positive recommendation by the Joint 
Study Group, negotiations were immediately launched in October 2000. After 12 rounds 
of extensive negotiations, over a period of 13 months, the two Prime Ministers signed the 
Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in January 2002 
(JSEPA, 2002).
Interestingly, despite Singapore’s limited natural endowments, there were certain 
sectors which both parties found difficult to negotiate and, at the request of the Japanese, 
several sectors were moved into the sensitive list. Some of these were, predictably 
agricultural produce, however, they also include regulation in service sectors and 
competition policies. Some believe the JSEPA was designed to break new ground on 
trade agreements (Dent, 2003a). The agreement, dubbed the ‘new age’ because it did not 
merely cover tariff reductions, but also covered the establishment of mutual recognition 
arrangements on rules and standards, expanded opportunities for trade in services, 
government procurement and the use of commercial dispute resolution mechanism. 
Moreover, it broke new ground in promoting paperless or e-commerce trading,
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competition policy, supporting research and development in science and technology, 
cooperation in information and communications technology, financial services, and 
tourism
Much excitement was expressed when the JSEPA was completed because this 
was the first comprehensive PTA signed by two Asian countries. Moreover, for the city- 
state, it was her first major PTA victory, to complete an agreement with a superpower, 
giving Singapore the confidence to progress and sign further PTAs. As for the Japanese, 
this was part of a master plan to collect signatures of ASEAN members and create an 
umbrella of economic partnership agreements that encompasses the region.33
3.3.3 The Singapore-A ustralia Free Trade Agreement:
At the fringe of completing the bilateral PTA with New Zealand, Singapore decided to 
sign a similar agreement with New Zealand’s neighbour. In 2000, again, during the 
APEC Leaders’ Summit, the Australian and Singaporean Prime Ministers decided to 
launch negotiations for the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). After 
negotiating several PTAs with similarly structured economies, under a learners permit, 
the SAFTA was seen as Singapore’s first real big test, negotiating an agreement with a 
resource-abundant country with greater negotiating leverage.
In almost two years, after ten rounds of formal negotiations, both sides 
successfully finalised the agreement. The 17-chapter agreement was signed in February 
2003 (SAFTA, 2003). Similar to the ANZSCEP, the agreement goes beyond market 
access. In addition to tariff elimination, SAFTA guarantees increased market access for 
service suppliers, telecommunications, facilitating the entry for business visitors and 
professional services, and e-commerce trading. It also provides a more transparent and 
predictable trading environment by promoting fair competition policy, access to 
government procurement markets, intellectual property and mutual recognition 
agreements. Furthermore the agreement also includes cooperation in the education 
sectors.
Interestingly, the SAFTA is Australia’s first trade agreement since the conclusion 
of the comprehensive trade agreement with New Zealand, almost 20 years ago. However, 
this agreement bears many similarities with the ANZSCEP and the JSEPA. Like
33 Formal talks for the ASEAN-Japan FTA already began on April 2005
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Singapore’s previous trade agreements, there are limited gains for trade in goods34 
predominantly because Australian products already enjoy duty-free entry into Singapore. 
As a result, most of the emphases have been concentrated on services trade and 
regulatory issues. This illustrates the motivation behind the SAFTA, as a political 
agreement and a trade agreement that aims to strengthen the existing ties between the two 
nations, by including trade in services.
Arguably, Singapore was able to negotiate the SAFTA in a coherent fashion, by 
using the ANZSCEP and the JSEPA as templates on issues that best represent 
Singapore’s interests. The ability to defend Singapore’s national interests would be put to 
the challenge in Singapore’s subsequent negotiation, which is deemed to be Singapore’s 
most significant and strenuous trade negotiation to date.
3.3.4 The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
While the SAFTA was under way, political elites in Singapore sought to negotiate an 
ambitious PTA with their biggest trading partner. An agreement with the USA 
represented a test for Singapore to demonstrate its ability to negotiate against a 
superpower on various levels. For the US, signing a bilateral PTA with an Asian state 
appears to be the en vogue requirement in the current global dynamic.
At the end of 2000, under the administration of US President Clinton, the 
negotiation for the United States-Singapore Free trade agreement (USSFTA) was 
officially announcement. The Clinton Administration wanted to wrap things up before 
the end of the political term, however, several Singaporean trade negotiators thought it 
was impossible to complete a proper trade agreement in such a limited time (Koh & 
Chang, 2004). After several rounds of negotiations, it was agreed that even a weak 
agreement could not be finalised in such a timeframe. As a result the negotiation was 
dragged into the administration of President George W. Bush. This gave more time for 
negotiations, allowing the administration to turn the agreement into a comprehensive 
trade agreement with stringent rules. Given the sudden change in direction, it took more 
than 11 rounds of formal trade negotiations, and after an additional informal meeting, a 
massive 800-page document spanning 21 chapters. The agreement was finally signed at 
Washington DC in May 2003, and approved by the US Congress and Senate a month 
later (USSFTA, 2003).
34 With the exception o f  Australian beer and stout, which w ill enjoy greater market access due to the 
SAFTA.
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Initially, under the Clinton Administration, the USSFTA was modelled on the 
US-Jordan agreement, which also included labour standards.35 However, under the Bush 
Administration, the trade agreement evolved into what is now regarded as a NAFTA-plus 
type agreement. The USSFTA covers trade in goods, allowing 78.7 per cent of 
Singaporean imports to enjoy immediate duty-free entry into the US. In return, 
Singapore will eliminate remaining tariffs, such that all US imports can enter Singapore 
duty-free immediately. Furthermore, the agreement also includes cooperation of customs 
administration, cross-border trade in services, financial services, movement of 
professional services, telecommunications and e-commerce, temporary entry for business 
persons, investment, competition, government procurement, and a dispute settlement 
mechanism.36
Understandably there are similar hallmarks to Singapore’s previous PTAs, 
especially the emphasis on trade in services, telecommunications and e-commerce 
chapters. Also, from the US standpoint, there has been much emphasis on the intellectual 
property protection and investment chapters, whereas little has emerged from the relevant 
chapters on labour and environment standards. One of the most contentious issues of the 
USSFTA, was the liberalisation of financial services, which was the last issue to be 
hammered out. Financial services was a thorny issue because the financial crisis was still 
fresh in the memory of Singaporeans. Thus, a compromise was struck; in the event of an 
economic crisis, Singapore was allowed to take appropriate measures to overturn this 
agreement.
The USSFTA is an impressive PTA that goes far beyond existing trade 
agreements, covering extensive issues that have hardly been touched in the WTO. 
However, the trade agreement does not merely provide economic gains, Singapore aims 
to use the USSFTA as a lock-in reform for the deeply rooted protective industries. For 
the US, the USSFTA is the first PTA to be concluded with an Asian country. Thus, it 
reaffirms the US’s strategic interest in the region, where the agreement could serve as a 
catalyst towards deeper US economic engagement in the Asian region (Koh & Chang, 
2004).
35 In fact, labour standards were hardly a threat for Singapore.
36 The U SSF T A  includes a dispute settlem ent system  that focuses on co-operation rather than on traditional 
trade sanctions, by  a llow ing a party to pay a m onetary assessm ent into a com m on fund that w ill be used to 
facilitate trade betw een the tw o parties.
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3.3.5 The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement:
During the APEC Ministers for Trade Meeting in 2002, it was announced that Brunei, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore would create the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (Trans-Pacific SEP or P4).37 Officially, the main motivation for 
the agreement was to establish a PTA for existing APEC members, with a plan for 
members outside P4 to join in and fortify their APEC commitments. Moreover, the P4 is 
the first trade agreement that spans three different continents, which should act as a 
bridge between Pacific states.
After more than five rounds of negotiations, the agreement was concluded in 
2005. After the parties completed the necessary domestic processes, the agreement was 
signed in July 2005. The P4 entered into force at the beginning of 2006, with the 
exception of Brunei, which will progressively implement some of the commitments with 
a two-year lag (Trans-Pacific SEP, 2005).
The P4 is a comprehensive agreement that covers trade in goods, SPS measures, 
TBTs, trade in services, government procurement, customs procedures, intellectual 
property, temporary entry of persons, competition policy, and dispute settlement. In 
addition, the agreement also includes a chapter covering cooperation in five different 
fields such as economics, education, primary industry, culture, and science and 
technology. However, the negotiations on investment and financial services remain to be 
concluded. Furthermore, in parallel with the negotiations of the P4, the parties have also 
agreed upon a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Labour Cooperation and an 
Environment Cooperation Agreement.
The importance of the Trans-Pacific SEP agreement, aside from extending to 
three different continents, is that it is Singapore’s first PTA with a South American 
country. More importantly, it builds on existing trade agreements with New Zealand, 
indicating Singapore’s maturity to impose and expand its own version of PTAs on others.
3.3.6 The India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement:
After signing several PTAs with developed countries, Singapore turned its attention 
towards signing PTAs with developing countries. The city-state’s first major signing of a 
prominent developing country was with India. Initially, India was Singapore’s sixteenth 
largest trading partner. Following India’s increasing presence and interests in fellow
37 Prior to B runei’s participation, the agreement w as known as the Pacific Three FTA.
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developing countries, it seemed logical for both states to step forward and complete a 
trade agreement with India. Moreover, both countries share a common aspiration of 
containing China’s presence in the Asian region, thus a trade agreement would benefit 
both countries economically and politically.
Originally India began negotiations on the Framework Agreement to Enhance 
ASEAN-India Trade and Economic Co-operation. However, little progress was made, 
resulting in a break up of the group into separate PTA negotiations with India, this 
included Singapore and Thailand. In 2002 Singapore and India established a Joint Study 
Group to explore the benefits of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA). In the following year, the Declaration of Intent was 
signed by both parties, which signalled the start of the negotiations for the CECA. 
Following a marathon of 13 formal rounds of negotiations that spanned over 18 months, 
both sides successfully concluded the 16-chapter agreement, later signed in June 2005 
(CECA, 2005).
The landmark agreement encompasses trade in goods, trade in services, 
investment protections and other features. Mutual recognition agreements will eliminate 
duplicative testing and certification of products in specific sectors. A chapter on the 
movement of natural persons was also included. There are also several chapters that 
encourage and facilitate bilateral cooperation in several sectors, such as e-commerce, 
intellectual property right protection, education, science and technology and media 
cooperation. Furthermore, the CECA also encompassed a review of the existing 
Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement between India and Singapore.
3.3.7 Singapore’s major PTAs:
All of Singapore’s major PTAs, mentioned above, have been included in the diagram 
below, which illustrates the timeframe of the city-state’s negotiated PTAs, including the 
negotiating period until the signing date.
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Figure 9: S ingapore’s M ajor P T A s
Other countries have signed PTAs with the city-state, such as the Singapore-Jordan FTA 
(SJFTA), which is A sia’s first trade agreement with a country from the Middle East. 
Likewise, the ESFTA between Singapore and EFTA states is the first PTA between an 
Asian state and Europe. Other intra-regional PTAs include the Korean-Singapore FTA 
(KSFTA). There are also other trade agreements which are currently in the negotiating 
process. It is no simple task to keep track o f this growing list. Officially, Singapore is 
negotiating PTAs with; the EU, five M iddle Eastern countries, four countries from the 
Americas, and five others under the flag o f  ASEAN. However, only the ones mentioned 
in detail earlier will be employed in the analysis because they are strong comprehensive 
PTAs. So far the PTAs Singapore has undertaken exemplify the com petence in 
completing com prehensive PTAs, and how Singapore has learnt and adopted lessons 
from different trade negotiations.
Some interesting com m ents can be generated from Singapore’s PTAs. Aside 
from negotiating most o f  these trade agreements in record time, which should be no 
surprise for Singapore, there are two interesting observations. Firstly, in most o f 
Singapore’s PTAs the benefits for trade in goods seem limited, but this is because several
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countries virtually trade duty free with the entrepot state. As a result, several PTAs go 
beyond market access. Consequently, most of the PTAs include chapters on trade in 
services, education, movement of natural persons, paperless trading, telecommunications, 
and e-commerce, all of which appear to be trademarks of a typical Singaporean PTA.
Secondly, most of Singapore’s PTAs are the first such trade agreement between 
an Asian country with another continent. Nevertheless, almost all of Singapore’s trade 
agreements are seen as a backdoor for signing future trade agreements with other 
ASEAN members. A prime example is Japan, which has concluded PTAs not only with 
Singapore, but immediately afterwards Japan has also signed economic partnership 
agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This exemplifies Japan’s plan 
of creating a regional ASEAN-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.
Several ASEAN countries have expressed concerns over Singapore’s bilateral 
trade agreements, some fear a “noodle bowl”, a complex web of agreements within the 
Asian region, hindering the city-state’s ASEAN commitments. Nevertheless, Singapore 
argues that it has always welcomed other ASEAN partners to join when they are ready to 
forge PTAs with Singapore’s existing trade agreements. However, most ASEAN 
members would negotiate a completely new agreement; significantly different from the 
Singaporean template, which emphasises trade in services and limits agricultural trade. 
Moreover, emphasis on regulatory issues will be problematic for several developing 
countries with limited institutional capabilities. Nevertheless, other ASEAN members, 
such as Thailand, have been able to complete trade agreements with the same countries 
as the Singapore. Naturally, the agreements are not identical, however, both countries 
were able to complete trade agreements that goes beyond shallow integration of tariff 
barriers. Has Thailand learnt and adopted similar institutions to tackle regulatory 
barriers? Let us observe Thailand’s PTAs and compare them with Singapore’s PTAs.
3.4 Thailand: Active or Passive Bandwagon?
While the rest of ASEAN were stunned by Singapore’s activities on the bilateral front, 
Thailand slowly became the second ASEAN country to ride the PTA bandwagon. It is 
difficult to say exactly when Thailand seriously began its bilateral PTA strategy. 
However, some scholars reported Thailand’s interests since the early 1990s (Dent, 2006b, 
p. 121), before heading the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi was in change of Thailand’s 
trade policy. At that period, Singapore had already initiated study groups for PTAs with
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Japan and Australia. In response, Thailand initiated PTA talks with Australia, Chile, the 
Czech Republic, Croatia, and South Korea (Nagai, 2003). However, it was only under 
the Thaksin Administration, in 2001, that Thailand truly engaging in PTAs (Talemgsri & 
Vonkhorpom, 2005).
This section will illustrate that Thailand, like Singapore, has been an active 
bandwagon country. The Kingdom has always contacted other states to form PTAs, 
rather than passively joining the bandwagon. Despite a two-year gap behind Singapore, 
Thailand managed to complete a couple of comprehensive trade agreements with larger 
economies with greater leverage power. This should have assisted the kingdom’s 
experience and institutional capacity to engage in comprehensive agreements.
Thailand’s first tutorial in bilateral PTAs was supposed to be with the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. Bahrain was a small, open economy with relatively no complications, and 
Thailand aimed to use the agreement as a stepping stone into Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries. A framework agreement was finalised before the end of 2002, and the Early 
Harvest Programme was completed in 2004. However, after five rounds of formal 
negotiations the programme was halted. Nevertheless, there are other Framework 
Agreements awaiting metamorphosis into full comprehensive PTAs.
3.4.1 The Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement:
Due to the difficulties in the CEP with Bahrain, Thailand engaged in a comprehensive 
PTA with Australia. In comparison with other ASEAN countries, Thailand was a minor 
trading partner for Australia. Moreover, a significant amount of trade barriers existed 
between them. Nevertheless, both parties have never entered in any major trading 
disputes,38 and they have both been active members of the Cairns Group. Consequently, 
they realised the potential for trade, and a preferential trade arrangement might remedy 
the symptoms of insignificant trade.
In 2001, Australia and Thailand announced their intention to form a PTA. A joint 
scoping study was established, which took a considerable 12 months before formal 
negotiations were able to commence. The Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(TAFTA) was successfully concluded in October 2003. The impressive 19-chapter 
agreement was finally signed in July 2004, making this Australia’s third PTA, and
38 With the exception  o f  disputes on Australia’s strict quarantine rules.
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second with an ASEAN country. The TAFTA is Thailand’s first comprehensive PTA, 
and it is her first with a developed country (TAFTA, 2005).
In comparison with Singapore, the absolute contrast laid in the chapters on 
services. Initially, the negotiations ran smoothly, however, during the end of the 
negotiations, several outstanding issues stood out. The finalised version of the massive 
agreement focused on market access,39 suggesting limited disagreements on trade in 
goods. However, most of the sticking points were under trade in services and investment. 
In stark contrast to Singapore, which had a position in services, Thailand was not certain 
of its position in services trade. Nevertheless, after a formal meeting at the head of state 
level, both states were able to iron out some limited concessions in service-related trade. 
Similar to Singapore, considerable liberalisations were made on the presence of natural 
persons, however there are limited concessions on commercial presence.
In other areas, TAFTA aims to build cooperation and exchange of knowledge to 
enhance a more transparent and predictable environment for trade. The most notable 
cooperation is customs procedure, both parties aim to create a technologically advanced 
customs procedure. This also includes the establishment of a committee to oversee and 
resolve any difficulties that may arise relating to SPS and food standards measures as 
well. Similar cooperation programmes were also established for intellectual property 
rights, and competition polices.
Overall, from Thailand’s perspective, the agreement should support Thai 
agriculture and manufacturing exports to Australia. As one Thai trade negotiator argued:
The types of fruit and vegetables that Thailand grows in our mainly 
tropical climate cannot be found in Australia. At the same time, 
Australia possesses much produce that Thailand are unable to produce.
A similar story can also be told with manufacturing products.
In the long term, it is believed that Australia will use Thailand’s strategic position as a 
hub into Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
39 The agreem ent contains tariff elim ination o f  more than 5000  item s, or 83 per cent o f  Australia's imports 
from Thailand, including fruit, vegetables and autom obiles. In return, Thailand w ill w ipe out tariffs on 50  
per cent o f  the goods imported from Australia, including fuels and chem ical products.
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3.4.2 The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement between New Zealand and
Thailand:
In March 2001 New Zealand and Thailand proposed to form a trade agreement, but it was 
only in 2003, when leaders from both sides formally announced their intent in creating a 
PTA.40 New Zealand was a small country, which should pose little complication, it 
seemed natural to sign a trade deal with the small and remote islands. Following the 
announcement of the Joint Study group, negotiations began, after which the agreement 
was concluded before the end of 2004, in record time. The 18-chapters CEP between 
New Zealand and Thailand was later signed in Thailand on April 2005. In parallel with 
the CEP, both parties also negotiated a separate bilateral agreement on labour and 
environment, which lays out the shared understandings and established mechanisms for 
ongoing cooperation and dialogue on these issues. A fourth document on the Cooperative 
Arrangement between the Customs Department of Thailand and the New Zealand 
Customs Service was signed at the WCO Council meeting in Brussels in June 2005 (New 
Zealand and Thailand, 2005).41
In comparison with the TAFTA, the ANZSCEP is a very limited agreement. The 
CEP provides a comprehensive coverage of trade in goods by slashing import tariffs to 
zero on 85 per cent of Thai goods imported into New Zealand and 50 per cent of New 
Zealand’s exports to Thailand. In addition to the removal of tariffs, the CEP also 
addressed SPS measures, standards and conformance and customs procedures.
One of the most significant standing issues under trade in goods was the dairy 
industry. Thai dairy farmers voiced their concerns about the fierce competition they faced 
once tariffs on New Zealand’s dairy products were eliminated. Ultimately, no concession 
or financial assistance was made to alleviate this contentious issue. Instead, a cooperation 
to assist Thailand’s dairy industry was launched. This was one of the first cries from 
minority groups which would later be the building blocs to establish a proper structural 
adjustment programme for the whole economy.
Most interestingly, both sides were mutually committed to further liberalise trade 
in services beyond their GATS obligations. However, formal discussion on this matter 
will only begin within the next three years. The reasoning behind this, according to a 
Thai official, was attributed to the limited concession Thailand offered during the
40 With the intention o f  com pleting the trade agreement by 2004 , in time for the subsequent APEC Leaders’ 
M eeting.
41 The Custom s Co-operative Arrangement between the two adm inistrations w as signed by the Thai 
Director General o f  Custom s Department and the Com ptroller o f  the N ew  Zealand Custom s Service.
negotiations As a result, New Zealand’s trade negotiators were not interested in signing a 
limited CEP. Moreover, New Zealand trade negotiators were concerned that a service- 
weak TAFTA and CEP could potentially become a benchmark for weak PTAs with her 
future trading partners, providing other Asian states an excuse to sign weak service 
agreements. Consequently, New Zealand left the door open for future negations on 
services, in the hope that Thailand might mature and develop the negotiating position and 
institutional structures to liberalise trade in services.
Similar to the ANZSCEP, the agreement also includes cooperation on intellectual 
property rights and competition policy. The cooperation on government procurement 
should create a stable environment for transparent trade, as well as the cooperation to 
enhance trade facilitation by improving their customs procedures, as mentioned above.
Interestingly, the CEP and TAFTA share similarities with the Singaporean 
version, this includes the idea of enhancing APEC objects while maintaining their WTO 
commitments. Unsurprisingly, the PTAs accomplished with Australia and New Zealand 
do not serve only economic importance but they also have strategic significance. Both the 
CEP and TAFTA reflect Australia and New Zealand’s commitment to engage more 
intensively with Southeast Asia as a whole. Like other countries they aim to bridge their 
region with a grand ASEAN-CEP agreement. Hitherto, the concept of an ASEAN- 
Australia or an ASEAN-New Zealand PTA has always been rejected by ASEAN 
hardliners. However, as of late, the doves appear to gaining momentum and other 
ASEAN members are willing to join the flock of doves. As observed from the speeches 
by the Australian, New Zealand and Thai governments, they believe their PTAs will 
serve as a building bloc for achieving a comprehensive and ambitious regional ASEAN- 
Australia-New Zealand FTA initiative.
3.4.3 The Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement:
The proclamation of the ASEAN-China FTA forced Japan to spread her wings and jump 
onboard the PTA bandwagon notoriously late. In November 2001, Thailand proposed the 
creation of a bilateral PTA between Japan and Thailand. Negotiations between the two 
constitutional monarchies began following the recommendation of the Task Force, in 
early 2004. The negotiations were concluded after nine rounds of formal negotiations in 
August 2005. However, the political turmoil in Thailand caused significant delays in the 
signing. Nevertheless, despite the military coup and the change of government, the 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) was finally signed in April
89
2007 (JTEPA, 2007), making the JTEPA Thailand’s third comprehensive PTA and 
Japan’s fourth.
The 15-chapter JTEPA scraps tariffs on 97 per cent of Japanese exports to 
Thailand and 92 per cent of Thai exports to Japan within 10 years. Aside from trade in 
goods and investment, there are also extensive pages on services, especially on the 
temporary movement of persons. The bilateral agreement also promotes transparency and 
the predictability of trade. Cooperation programmes, such as education, human resources, 
development of science and technology, energy and the environment were also included.
Before the JTEPA was signed, as expected, Thailand encountered enormous 
difficulties gaining access to the Japanese agricultural market. Much resistance came 
from the Japanese farming lobby. Ultimately, several agricultural products, both 
processed and unprocessed, were liberalised by both countries, with some notable 
exceptions, such as rice.42 More significantly, in relation to agricultural produce, the 
JTEPA will set a precedent in being Japan’s first trade agreement that contains SPS 
measures.
Another contentious issue relates to steel and the automobile industry, which were 
only concluded at the very last moment. Since various countries poured substantial 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Thai automobile industry, Thailand has realised 
the potential of adopting favourable policies for this industry. As a result, Thailand was 
keen to exchange automobile cooperation and investment for the liberalisation of its 
exceptionally high-tariff automobile industry. This did not go down well with domestic 
steel and multinational automotive industry lobbyists. Ultimately, Japan’s willingness to 
partially open up its agricultural sector meant Thailand gave concessions in its steel and 
automobile industry. A compromise was found that permitted Japan to export 3000cc 
cars at a preferential rate. This compromise, only involving large luxury cars, was 
deemed acceptable for other third parties who had a stake in the Thai automobile 
industry. Furthermore, as part of the compromise, there are several cooperation and 
technical assistance provisions for the development of Thailand’s automobile industry.43 
The programme will allow Thai small and medium enterprises to produce more high- 
technology products and increase their competitive edge in the world. Furthermore, Japan
42 Exceptions in agricultural products include: rice and any product made from rice, agricultural products 
that contain high com ponents o f  sugar and flour, and agricultural distributed by the Japanese government.
43 As part o f  JTEPA, four Japanese car manufacturers (Toyota, Honda, N issan and Denso) will also provide 
assistance in other areas, for exam ple, N issan w ill transfer technological expertise in stam ping, die 
finishing, m echanical assem bly finishing and m echanical and electrical m aintenance w ill provide the 
transfer o f  recognised autom obile technology; w hile Honda w ill focus on training in design and machining.
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also pledged to provide 60 billion Baht44 as financial assistance into the automobile 
industry, as well as Thailand’s tourism and ICT industry.
In comparison to the Singaporean counterpart, the JSEPA, there are several 
differences. The JTEPA emphasis is more on trade in goods, especially in agricultural 
trade. The most striking difference is the inclusion of SPS measures, which is a first for 
Japan. Furthermore, JTEPA also includes financial and technical assistance, which is the 
first such agreement Thailand has secured. However, the areas of similarity between 
JSEPA and JTEPA lie under the chapters on trade in services. The movement of persons 
is considered similar, but not in the detail that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Consequently the JTEPA is a comprehensive trade agreement, merely five 
chapters deal with trade in goods, and some of the remaining chapters are considered 
WTO-plus. Japan has been focusing its bilateral negotiations on a few countries around 
the Pacific; slowly but carefully Japan aims to complete an economic partnership 
agreement with every ASEAN member. To date Japan has concluded four trade 
agreements with ASEAN members. The interesting question, however, is whether Japan 
can complete a comprehensive PTA with the rest of ASEAN before its regional rival, 
China?
3.4.4 Other Framework Agreements:
Aside from the three signed PTAs, there other trade agreements Thailand has waiting in 
the wings. One inter-regional project is with Peru, which has been under negotiation 
since 2003. During the APEC summit in 2005, both leaders signed an Early Harvest 
Programme, making it Thailand’s first trade agreement with a South American country. 
Modest progress has been made, due to the limitation in the number of goods which both 
countries can trade. Furthermore, the list of sensitive products, such as Peruvian fish and 
Thai rice, have been growing. Other countries, which have also signed agreements with 
Singapore, include one with EFTA, which is still in the joint study stage. Nevertheless, 
there are several interesting incomplete PTAs worth exploring because they will 
influence Thailand’s perspective on trade negotiations, which will be described below.
44 A pproxim ately U S$ 1.5 billion.
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3.4.4.1 The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement
During the ASEAN summit in November 2000, the Chinese Premier surprised everyone, 
including ASEAN countries, by proposing the creation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA). There are several motivations behind this agreement: politically, China 
aimed to capitalise on the growing resentment in the Asian region over limited US 
support (Higgot, 1998). Strategically, ASEAN believed it would be beneficial to contain 
China’s growth by establishing a trade agreement with the rising great power (Desker, 
2004). Economically, opening trade with a country with a population of over 1.4 billion 
is a temptation hard to resist. Moreover, China’s trade with ASEAN has boomed since 
the second half of the 1990s, and particularly so with the original ASEAN members 
(Sally & Sen, 2005, pp. 95-97). As a consequence, in 2001, negotiations for this 
ambitious intra-regional PTA began. It is hoped that by January 2010 an ACFTA would 
be realised with the six original ASEAN members and it will be ready for the CLMV 
states by 2015.
Some progress has been made, ASEAN and China have implemented the Early 
Harvest Programme (EHP), which is a trial move for a tariff cutting programme on 
agricultural produce. Under the programme, both sides have cut tariffs on 600 
agricultural imports by between 2 and 15 per cent, and agreed to abolish these tariffs 
completely in 2006. Thailand has taken the lead among the ASEAN members by 
initiating the China-Thailand Early Harvest Programme Acceleration Agreement in June 
2003 (ASEAN-China, 2003). Exactly 12 months later, Singapore also joined the 
accelerated agreement that saw the three countries eliminating tariffs on all fruit and 
vegetables. The rationale for liberalising this sector is because all parties believe they can 
complement, rather than compete with each other. ASEAN members export tropical 
fruits and vegetables to China and import temperate-climate ones from China. As of 
2005, the EHP has now been expanded to all ASEAN members.
At present, the negotiations for ACFTA are divided into four Negotiating 
Committees: Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Trade in Investment, and Dispute 
Settlement. Landmark agreements on Trade in Goods (ASEAN-China, 2004b) and 
Dispute Settlement (ASEAN-China, 2004a) were concluded and signed in November 
2004. The Trade in Goods Agreement was implemented in July 2005,45 under which 
concessions will be granted only to China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
45 The im plem entation date w as postponed by less than three w eeks because China cited technical 
difficulties in their im plem entation process.
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Thailand, and Singapore. Unfortunately, negotiations on Trade in Services and 
Investment are in gridlock, but observers believe some positive progress has been made.
One might expect this intra-regional PTA to tackle market access alone, 
especially since only the issues on trade in goods have been implemented. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the China-Thailand EHP Acceleration Agreement, both countries have 
attempted to tackle customs procedures and health and safety standards, thus showing 
signs that the ACFTA has the potential of blossoming into a comprehensive intra- 
regional PTA. Further details on the ACFTA will be discussed in chapter seven.
3.4.4.2 The India-Thailand Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
The natural-resource rich nation of India is one of the few countries Thailand has 
desperately been chasing to obtain a signature in its all-star PTA list. In total Thailand 
has attempted to obtain India’s signature from three fronts. This began with the ASEAN- 
India FTA, which was originally proposed by India in 2002. Thanks to India’s economic 
reform, under its “Look East” policy, in 1991, India became more outward looking and 
willing to engage in further trade with her Asian neighbours. Simultaneously, the 
strategic aspect of the ambitious proposal was to contain China’s influence in the region. 
However, to date, the ASEAN-India negotiation has almost come to a complete stop. 
During the latest trade negotiation in 2006, India presented a list of 1414 items to be 
excluded from tariff cuts. The items, consisting of products from textiles to vegetable oils 
to chewing gum, account for 44 per cent of ASEAN exports. Several ASEAN trade 
negotiators felt, with such an extensive list, there was little left to trade. Moreover, one of 
India’s major concerns is the circumvention of cheaper goods from China through the 
ACFTA.
Secondly, due to the deadlock, India now favours a policy of signing trade 
agreements with separate ASEAN countries. Thus, India and Thailand have managed to 
sign an Early Harvest Programme in 2004. Currently, India has proposed about 1000 
items in the sensitive list products, which accounts for 25 per cent of their trade. At 
present, however, the trade negotiations have been halted due to the Indian general 
election, where Indian trade negotiators are unwilling to commit to any trade agreements 
until a new government is formed. There are further concerns that Thailand is unwilling 
to continue with the negotiations if India does not discuss a phasing-out programme for 
its sensitive products. Moreover, in 2005, India became wary that Thailand’s exports to
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India had doubled since the implementation of EHP, thus limiting India’s interest in 
further liberalising the trade pact.
The third front is BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation), consisting of seven states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, which have merely agreed to initiate an 
EHP, or a trade in goods, by July 2006, with plans to conclude agreements on services 
and investment at the end of 2007. The proposal for BIMSTEC was an initiative by 
Thailand to conclude a trade agreement with India, however, in order to gain India’s 
attention, her neighbours were required to be in the pact. The intra-regional project aims 
to achieve a BIMSTEC Business Travel Card and an exchange of information to control 
outbreaks of avian influenza. Six key sectors have been identified for cooperation: trade 
and investment, technology, transportation, energy, tourism, and fisheries. Currently, 
BIMSTEC talks have been stuck on ROO and sensitive lists, chiefly by India.
There have been, therefore, several attempts to form a preferential trade 
arrangement between India and Thailand, however, there appears to be little success. 
Under ASEAN, this appears to have come to a standstill. Similar results may also 
transpire with the India-Thailand FTA; if that is the case, there may be little hope for the 
BIMSTEC as well.
3.4.4.3 The Thailand-United States Free Trade Agreement:
Similar to many states in Asian, Thailand foresees enormous political and economic 
benefits in entering a trade agreement with the US. The US is also keen to rescue its 
standing in the region. Prior to the trade agreement, US investors enjoyed benefits from 
the 1966 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States and 
Thailand. The treaty provides national treatment for Thai and US investors, with the 
exception of communications, transport, banking, exploitation of land or other natural 
resources, and domestic trade in agricultural products. However, under WTO rules, the 
treaty was due to expire at the end of January 2006. Consequently, Bangkok and 
Washington planned to establish a PTA that would supersede the treaty.
The negotiations for this comprehensive PTA began in June 2004. Interestingly, 
unlike Thailand’s previous trade agreements, there were no official deadlines for 
finalising the negotiating. Previous trade agreements always saw the kingdom hastily 
concluding negotiations with deadlines. This reflected Thailand’s awareness of the uphill 
challenge it faced. Nevertheless, at the time, it was generally understood that an official
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deadline existed, the agreement needed to be concluded prior to the expiration date of the 
US Trade Promotion Authority in July 2007. Unfortunately, negotiations for the 
agreement have come to a complete stop. This is partially due to the political turmoil in 
Thailand, which made many American politicians feel uneasy about continuing to 
negotiate a trade agreement with an authoritarian government.
In reality, regardless of the political regime in Thailand, negotiations between the 
two countries were already encountering several deadlocks. Similar to other American 
PTAs, the most notable contentious issues included labour and environmental protection, 
intellectual property rights, financial regulations, and government procurement.
An example, is the controversial issue of financial regulation. The US wants 
Thailand to fully liberalise the heavily protected banking, insurance and securities sector. 
As a compromise, Thailand attempted to adopt the positive list approach in the financial 
negotiation; however, the US would not move away from the negative list approach. The 
US’s insistence on liberalising Thailand's financial sector with a negative list approach 
has not been well received amongst Thai trade negotiators, the comment below of a Thai 
trade negotiator summarises Thailand’s reluctance:
Although we are aware that the FTA will benefit the financial sector 
by making our country stronger, efficient, and competitive. We have to 
acknowledge that our system is not ready to face the open market yet, 
let alone compete in areas of new technology, such as internet banking.
Another contentious area is intellectual property rights. Firstly, Thailand produces 
virtually all of its own pharmaceutical products, hence a PTA with stringent intellectual 
property rules will cause a significant hike in pharmaceutical prices and the cost of the 
health care system. Secondly, many Thai farmers feel they would lose their comparative 
advantage and their cultural identity if natural resources, such as rice, were genetically 
modified by the US which exports the patented produce back to Thailand. Consequently, 
there is an alliance between human rights NGOs and farmers, mobilising to prevent the 
inclusion of such a chapter. Thirdly, with limited institutional capacity, it is difficult to 
see how Thailand would enforce such stringent intellectual property rights.
Nonetheless, the US ambassador to Thailand has given assurance that the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights on drugs for catastrophic illness, such as HIV, 
will not be addressed in the bilateral agreement, unlike the multilateral level.
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Nevertheless, the US am bassador also urged that trade negotiators should be allowed to 
discuss all 24 chapters o f  the trade agreement at their own pace.
3.4.5 Thailand a passive PTA Actor?
Officially, the Thai government has a three-pronged strategy in choosing its PTA 
partners. The first group o f  countries consists o f “traditional” export markets for Thailand 
such as the United States and Japan. Thailand’s prim ary objective in negotiating with 
these countries is to retain the present level o f market access and expand access for new 
products. The second group o f negotiating partners are the “potential” markets. These are 
countries with large populations but with relatively low levels o f trade with Thailand, 
such as China and India. The third group are the “gatew ay” countries. They are small but 
can provide access for Thai products into their regions, such as Bahrain and Peru 
(Talemgsri & Vonkhorpom , 2005, p. 69).
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F igure 10: Thailand's P T A s
From the diagram  above, two observations can be made about T hailand’s PTAs. 
Firstly, at first glance, many observers believe Thailand is focusing only on trade in
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goods. This appears to be the case, considering the number o f completed EHPs, which 
have not evolved into proper comprehensive PTAs. Similarly, Thailand has been 
unwilling to liberalise trade in services, as noted in the New Zealand-Thailand CEP. 
Even in the JTEPA, Thailand’s most comprehensive trade agreement, there is a 
significant imbalance in the concessions for trade in services. Consequently, Thailand 
does not have a strong position for trade in services, with the exception of service mode 
4.46 Nevertheless, Thailand’s primary attention in market access has also influenced other 
regulatory areas as well, such as health and safety standards, and other means of 
facilitating trade. This will become apparent in the subsequent chapters.
Secondly, Thailand may not have completed an impressive amount of PTAs, 
however, in comparison with the rest of Southeast Asia, Thailand currently is second 
only to Singapore. Thailand may have jumped on the PTA bandwagon because of 
Singapore, however, Thailand was not a passive passenger. If examined carefully, 
Thailand constantly sought new ventures, actively approaching their trade partners. In 
addition, Thailand did not sign PTAs for the sake of completing the agreement, it did not 
rush to conclude a trade agreement with USA in order to make a political statement. 
Similarly, Thailand was the only ASEAN country not to jump on board the framework 
agreement of the ASEAN-Korea FTA in 2005.47 Interestingly, Thailand believes the 
framework agreement would not lead to any economic gain, and only political objectives 
would be realised. One o f the key deciding factors was the exclusion of significant 
economic goods, such as Thai rice, indicating how Thailand does not seek to jump on 
board any trade agreement if it does not best represent its national interest. It appears, for 
Thailand, after concluding several PTAs the kingdom is aware of its strengths and 
weaknesses. Can it be argued that comprehensive PTAs have raised Thailand’s 
awareness in trade policy making? This question will be answered later in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that Thailand is enthusiastically and yet cautiously pursing 
its PTAs by being an active participant of the PTA bandwagon.
Consequently, it can be argued that Thailand’s path into PTAs has been limited. 
Nevertheless, Thailand has been enthusiastic in its PTA policies, with trade agreements 
including some non-traditional trade provisions, and some of them run parallel with 
Singapore’s PTAs, providing a field for discussion and comparison in the subsequent 
chapters.
46 M ode 4 w ill be defined in chapter 6
47 The agreem ent includes a list o f  around 40 0 0  items, with a target o f  reaching zero tariff by 2009.
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3.5 The future
Interestingly, Singapore and Thailand’s trade agreements have been motivated by several 
similar reasons. Some are aimed at securing existing market access, such as those with 
Australia and New Zealand. Others have been stimulated by the desire to expand into 
new markets, such as Bahrain, Chile, and China. Some trade agreements were created as 
a means of containing China’s rising influence in the region, those with India and the US 
are such examples. However, most of the inter-regional PTAs are seen as a stepping- 
stone for the wider ASEAN initiative. Several trading partners have publicly expressed 
their desire to fuse their bilateral PTAs into a regional ASEAN PTA. The ACFTA is an 
impressive project, in which Thailand has been a prime mover. Others also include India, 
Japan, Korea, and the CER countries. Both Singapore and Thailand are aware they are 
the bridges linking ASEAN with the outside world. As a result they must act now in 
order to reap the benefits. As the then minister responsible for trade for Singapore, 
George Yeo, argued: “As an economic community, ASEAN must play the global game 
skilfully. As a region, we are of strategic importance to the US, Japan, China, Australia 
and Europe” (in Desker, 2004, p. 14). In a later speech, on the rising prominence and 
rivalry of China and India, the same Minister predicted that: “Southeast Asia becomes a 
major intermediary between China and India” (in Desker, 2004, p. 14). The next 
question, is whether Singapore, Thailand, and the rest of the ASEAN members have the 
institutional capacity to initiate all the regulatory nature of comprehensive PTAs? Where 
would they obtain the inspiration for tackling regulatory issues? Have inter-regional 
PTAs played any role?
3.6 Conclusion
Arguably both Singapore and Thailand are the main instigators of PTAs in the Asian 
region. Their limited experience in intra-regional PTAs are constrained by the two grand 
regional projects, ASEAN and APEC, which have failed to materialise into a 
comprehensive trade agreement. As a result, coupled with the deadlock at the multilateral 
level, both countries have undertaken the inter-regional PTA route (Desker, 2004). 
Despite the difference in size, level of economic development, resource endowment, and
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technological capabilities, and institutional capacity, Singapore and Thailand have 
managed to complete several similar PTAs.
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparison between Singapore 
and Thailand’s PTAs. The overlapping of trade partners provides some opportunities to 
compare their similarities and differences. Without entering into the substance of the 
trade agreements, one of the significant dissimilarities between their PTAs is speed. Due 
to Singapore’s head start, and liberal approach, the city-state has spearheaded the signing 
of several PTAs. Some of Singapore’s PTAs, such as the ESFTA, took less than 12 
months to negotiate. Thailand’s quickest, on the other hand, was the New Zealand- 
Thailand CEP, which took 12 months to negotiate, but barely covered trade in services.
Generally Singapore has entered into negotiations on all fronts, with some 
defensive positions on certain service sectors. As a consequence most of Singapore’s 
PTAs, especially after signing the JSEPA and the USSFTA, deal mainly with education, 
movement of natural persons, and telecommunications, all of which bears trademark of 
Singaporean PTAs. Thailand, on the other hand, has concentrated negotiations on the 
area in which it has a comparative advantage, on agricultural trade. Unfortunately, 
Thailand’s offensive in the agricultural sector is considered unattractive in certain 
countries. Consequently, this has forced Thailand to concentrate on the elimination of 
health and safety standards in its agricultural negotiations. The kingdom’s trade interests, 
however, are not limited to trade in goods.
Despite the differences, there are areas of similarities in Singapore and Thailand’s 
PTAs. Firstly, both Singapore and Thailand have learned and gain experiences from their 
PTAs, which have allowed both countries to complete PTAs in greater speed and wider 
coverage. In other words, inter-regional PTAs have enhanced Singapore and Thailand’s 
negotiating capacity. Secondly, both Singapore and Thailand tend to incorporate means 
and mechanisms for facilitating trade. This sometimes comes as an exchange of 
knowledge and cooperation to enhance customs procedures. Singapore has constantly 
sought to improve its technological systems to facilitate trade; whereas Thailand has 
aimed to create a more predictable environment for agricultural trade. There might be a 
difference in the type of goods and services, but both countries seek to enhance the 
predictability in the flow of trade. Thirdly, both countries have included an extensive 
chapter on the movement of persons. Singapore, with its highly educated population, 
believes its qualified professionals are able to compete abroad, if they there were less 
restrictions. In Thailand, there are attempts to accomplish similar agreements for
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professionals, but mainly for semi-skilled professionals. These similarities will be 
outlined in further detail in the subsequent chapters.
Nevertheless, the differences and similarities lead us to ask several interrelated 
questions. Why has Thailand been ill-equipped in its service negotiations compared with 
Singapore? Why do both countries appear to be enthusiastic to engage with only mode 4 
services? Can we attribute this solely to the economic logic of natural resources and 
endowment, or is it more systematic and rooted in the domestic institutions of these two 
states? Perhaps it is time we should open the black box of the state and observe what lies 
within the domestic institutional structures of Singapore and Thailand’s international 
trade policy making.
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4 Chapter IV 
Comparative Macro Dom estic Structures
The toughest trade negotiations are not 
external ones [between countries], but internal ones.
A Singaporean Chief Trade Negotiator
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter illustrated the large number of PTAs Singapore and Thailand have 
accomplished in a short period of time. More importantly, the number is still rising. This, 
however, leads to a series of curious questions: why have these countries decided to 
engage in PTAs? In the literature, much of the scholarly work discusses the signing of 
agreements, however, much of the analysis fails to examine how PTAs influence the 
domestic factors after the signing of the trade agreement. Would the analysis at the 
domestic level provide alternative explanations to why Singapore and Thailand have 
engaged in PTAs? What are the structural processes in trade policy making for both 
countries? More importantly, have PTAs bought about any changes to Singapore and 
Thailand’s institutional trade capacity? All of these questions should provide us with a 
clearer picture of how domestic agents and agencies are able to influence international 
trade policy.
As a consequence this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive macro 
comparative analysis of international trade policy making in the two case study countries. 
In other words, most of the analysis will be done by observing Singapore and Thailand’s 
overall trade policy making, placing emphasis on the ministries responsible for trade. 
This may prove to be interesting because, during Singapore and Thailand’s engagement 
with PTAs, both countries underwent major bureaucratic restructuring. In an attempt to 
provide some answer for the thesis, the chapter will analyse the changes in domestic 
institutional capacity according to the analytical framework -  the negotiating capacity, 
coordination, consultation, procedural, and trade policy changes. In order to create a 
timeline narrative, the observation will be conducted in parallel with their involvement 
with inter-regional PTAs.
101
Consequently, this chapter will aim to show the changes that have occurred 
before and after the implementation of PTAs. Furthermore, the chapter will argue that 
domestic institutional changes occurred not entirely due to the governments in the case 
study countries, but mainly due to the rapid and comprehensive nature of inter-regional 
PTAs. This may not be completely clear in the macro picture, however, there are some 
interesting points to observe. Nevertheless, the main aim of the chapter is to illustrate 
how PTAs influenced the case study countries’ domestic institutional trade capacity.
In order to understand Singapore and Thailand’s attitude to international trade 
policy making, the chapter will begin with the historical backgrounds that may have 
shaped and influenced their orientation towards global trade policies. The second section 
illustrates the governmental and non-governmental agents involved in international trade. 
Within this section, an examination of the structure, decision making process, interaction 
and coordination between agents will be examined. The final section concludes with 
some comparative insights on how PTAs may influence domestic macro institutional 
trade capacity.
4.2 Domestic Changes towards International Trade Policy
Before commencing with Singapore and Thailand’s institutional trade policy making 
structure, it would be best to understand the historical and social changes in the two case 
study countries. These historical events may be embedded in their culture and society, 
influencing their perception towards international trade. Consequently, this section 
presents a comparative study on the social background, followed by political changes, 
civil society movements, and finally ending with a comparison of their economic 
policies.
4.2.1 Public Perception o f Foreign Affairs
Initially, both Singapore and Thailand have different perceptions of and exposure to 
international affairs; nevertheless, recent changes have forced some convergence towards 
a common position. In Thailand, traditionally, the general public were commonly 
uninterested in foreign affairs, including international trade. Foreign relations were 
perceived as too technical for the normal layman, and best left in the hands of 
government officials. More importantly, the general public regard themselves as being 
unaffected by foreign policy decisions. This, however, changed after the financial crisis,
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which elevated public awareness of how international affairs can affect their daily lives 
(Rathanamongkolmas, 2001, p. 332).
The aftermath of the financial crisis brought several changes to the Thai 
economy, as well as the political structure. The public viewed the crisis being caused by 
cronyism and corruption in the financial sector, and a failure of the government’s 
regulatory mechanisms to monitor the operations of banks and financial firms. Some 
Thais believed they have experienced bad governance, at first hand. To resolve the crisis, 
the Thai public believed substantial reforms in both public and private sectors were 
needed (Bunbongkam, 1999, p. 63).
Despite Singapore’s close economic interdependence with its neighbours, the 
city-state was not susceptible to the Asian financial crisis pandemic. Surprisingly, 
Singapore’s worst recession since its independence, came afterwards, in 2001, when, 
during the general slump in the global economy, Singapore produced negative growth 
figures. The severe decline brought by the negative impacts of the 9/11 attacks on the 
airline industry, recession in the US economy, and weaker regional growth, and the 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) also caused negative affects to 
the region.
Despite being negatively affected by forces beyond Singapore’s control, it is 
generally accepted that Singapore has limited options for its trade polices. Unlike 
Thailand, the small city-state cannot turn its back on the global economy, its economic 
performance is utterly dependent on the global economy. Singapore’s trade to GDP ratio 
is approximately three to one, making the city-state one of the most trade dependent 
economies in the world (Desker, 2005, p. 341). Consequently, their susceptibility to the 
global economic situation has forced the Singaporean public to be constantly aware of 
international affairs.
Overall, Singapore may have limited interest in global political affairs, since the 
city-state is unable to wield much influence over the international arena. However, being 
a small soft power, its strength lies in its foreign economic polices, based on its 
reputation and credibility to influence global debates (Low, 2004).
In sum, Singapore and Thailand’s role in the global political arena is very limited, 
both being small players. Their citizens are aware of their dependence on the global 
economic environment. Nevertheless, both countries appear to place confidence and trust 
in foreign affairs at the hands of their government.
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4.2.2 Political Dimensions
If Singapore and Thailand place much faith of international affairs in the hands of their 
governments, it is best to understand the background of their political leaders.
4.2.2.1 Political Dimension: The Thaksin Effect
One of the greatest changes to Thai politics was the emergence and downfall of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, who was prime minister for two terms from February 2001 until September 
2006. When Thaksin first came to power, he won an unprecedented 57 per cent o f seats 
in the lower house of parliament for his party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT)48 (Pongsudhirak, 
2003, p. 279).
Given Thaksin’s private-sector experience, coupled with his high electoral 
mandate, many hoped he would be able to press ahead with serious reforms (McCargo, 
2002, p. 123). Even since Thaksin took office, he has expressed persistent frustration at 
the bureaucratic system; as a result, one of his first acts was the restructuring of the 
bureaucratic system. At the beginning of the new fiscal year, in 2002, the Bureaucratic 
Restructuring Act and the Ministerial Restructuring Act were passed. These two crucial 
pieces of legislation represented a significant turning point in Thailand’s institutional 
landscape.49 They streamlined the structurally outdated bureaucracy, creating several new 
ministries, and a host of departments and agencies were reshuffled to accommodate the 
extensive restructuring of the bureaucracy (Pongsudhirak, 2003). These restructuring 
programmes will become the platform for understanding the changes in Thailand’s trade 
policy.
4.2.2.2 Political Dimension: PAP’s Dominance
Unlike Thailand, there have hardly been any changes in the Singaporean government, 
this is mainly because the small entrepot state has been ruled by one party since its 
independence. Thus, it may be appropriate to observe how this party came to power.
Before self-government, Singapore had a large population of immigrant workers 
from China and India, creating a large multi-racial population in a small island. Formerly 
part of the then Federation of Malaysia, Singapore’s separation from the Federation was a 
traumatic event. At the time, very few envisioned Singapore would survive as a separate
48 Together his coalition won an outright majority o f  70 per cent o f  seats in the lower house o f  parliament
49 One com m entator be lieves this legislation was the first contemporary bureaucratic reform for more than 
a century (M utebi, 2003)
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political entity because it lacked natural resources. Furthermore, Singapore had to build a 
nation out of an ethnically diverse, immigrant population. Thus, a political entity was 
required to control domestic dissent and promote stability to attract much needed foreign 
investment and coherent economic polices.
Consequently, the People’s Action Party (PAP) emerged, to manage the city state. 
Interestingly, when PAP came into power, their leaders were heavily influenced by 
Fabian ideas. As a result they tried to deploy social democratic policies, however, the 
harsh realities of limited industries available for nationalisation, and limited resources for 
self-sustainable development, forced PAP to change its policies drastically. The 
government, therefore, had to take the initiative in setting up new development agencies 
and enterprises. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the government, on its own 
or in partnership with private interests, became heavily involved in the production of 
goods and services. Currently, there are nearly 500 government-linked companies 
(GLCs) involved in a wide range of manufacturing and service activities, employing over 
one-fifth of the island’s labour force.50 The special relationship between the state and the 
business community sometimes brings complications in Singapore’s PTAs. However, it 
must be understood that the public-private partnership was not a result of ideological 
inclination but instead a pragmatic response to changing conditions of the city state 
(Fong, 1987).
Unlike Thailand, Singapore has PAP as the sole political entity that can guide the 
city state’s economic and trade policy. However, as the subsequent section will show, 
PAP has also brought some domestic changes which will become crucial in Singapore’s 
trade policy.
4.2.3 Civil Society
One of the few positive consequences of the financial crisis was how it helped propel the 
new Thai Constitution through parliament earlier than expected (Jumbala, 1998). The 
new Constitution of 1997, also know as “the peoples’ constitution”51, established several
50 Including steel m ills, textiles, electronics, oil refining, hotels, shipbuilding and repairing, shipping, 
financial services, air transport, and property developm ent.
5lCoined by Uthai Pim jaichon, Chairman o f  the Constitution Drafting A ssem bly.
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major reforms, such as erecting several independent bodies acting as impartial referees on 
behalf of the public52, and paving the way for people to exercise their civil rights.53
Another benefit of the financial crisis was that it taught the Thai public that civil 
problems cannot be resolved without the participation of the people. As a consequence, 
demands from civil society, such as a more participatory form of democracy, were 
incorporated into the constitution (Jumbala, 1998). Embedded within the new 1997 
constitution are guarantees for the right of communities and local people to protect the 
environment and to participate in making decisions on the use of the natural resources in 
their community. Thus, the Thaksin administration, unlike its predecessor, had to deal 
with the unprecedented rise in civil society movements (McCargo, 2002, p. 124), 
primarily because the constitution provided a structure that accommodates these 
movements, which are gaining ever stronger momentum.54
Singapore’s civil society movement, on the other hand, took a completely 
different path. Before independence, civil societies were mainly formed by indigenous 
groups, providing social services and welfare equalling the colonial government. During 
the move towards merdeka, the call for independence, political and civil society 
movement gained momentum. Unfortunately, the rising dominance of PAP suddenly 
bought about a change in dynamics. PAP’s initial spread of social democratic projects 
diminished the needs for civil society. As time progressed, and as PAP switched 
emphasis towards the importance of political and economic survival for nation building, 
civil society began to dwindle. During the period, most civil society organisations were 
legally circumscribed; others such as the trade unions formed a cooperative relationship 
with the PAP government, and they have been supportive of trade liberalisation, as it 
recognises how Singapore benefits from the expansion of international trade.55 
Nevertheless, the majority of Singapore civil movements are rendered immobile, it is 
generally understood that PAP keeps a tight lid on civil society (Tay, 1998, pp. 246-249).
The history of civil society movements in both the case study countries could not 
be more different. Singapore kicked-off with some form of civil society, however, due to
52This includes, for exam ple, the National Counter-Corruption C om m ission, the A nti-M oney Laundering 
C om m ission, as well as the muscular Election C om m ission, w hich has the main objective o f  deterring 
fraudulent candidates from entering politics.
53 Such as g iving the Thai public the right to vote in the Senate elections for the first time.
54 The rise o f  civil society has derailed the negotiations for the T U SFT A , and they have been a key force in 
rem oving Thaksin from power.
55 The National Trade Union Congress o f  Singapore only opposes the inclusion o f  labour standards on trade 
agendas (Desker, 2005, p. 343).
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political and economic exigencies, civil society groups were merged into the government. 
Alternatively, Thailand did not have a true civil society movement until the birth of the 
1997 constitution, which built the infrastructure and confidence for such societies to 
mobilise. However, despite accommodation from infrastructure, civil society is still a 
novel concept for Thai politics. Nevertheless, the difference in civil society movements 
will lead to significant divergent in their trade policy formulations.
4.2.4 Economic Policies
With the background of their historical and social past, it is best to understand Singapore 
and Thailand’s economic policies and why they have pursued bilateral PTA strategies.
4.2.4.1 Economic Policies: The Dual Track Approach
The centrepiece of the Thaksin administration’s economic strategy was the “dual track” 
strategy. Due to the financial crisis, the government sought economic policies that would 
enhance economic development by strengthening the domestic economy and 
simultaneously facilitating international trade and investment. To accomplish this goal, 
on the domestic front, the Thaksin administration needed to stimulate domestic 
consumption through a combination of low interest rates and easy credit conditions that 
would assist the grassroots economy. Consequently the government was shifting away 
from a Keynesian fiscal stimulus towards greater reliance on monetary management 
policies.
Simultaneously, there were fears that the dual track may drag the country 
away from export-led growth policies. As noted from the former premier’s speech on 
domestic economic policies in 2001:
“The East Asian Economic Model had not addressed many of the 
country’s fundamental problems...we find it necessary to strengthen 
ourselves internally so that we can stand on our own two feet”
(in Nagai, 2003).
However, dual track strategy continued to attach importance to foreign direct investment 
and exports, placing much emphasis on mercantilist policies of trade surplus. 
Nonetheless, Thaksin reassured investors that Thailand was not returning into a 
protective state.
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Moreover, Thaksin also attempted to improve the competitiveness of Thai 
companies. Another notable lesson the financial crisis taught the Thai elites was how 
uncompetitive domestic companies had become; a symptom the Thaksin administration 
was eager to cure. The economic team believed that, through greater liberalisation, Thai 
firms must become more competitive. This is confirmed in most of the administration’s 
speeches relating to economic policies, which have highlighted the need for domestic 
firms to raise their competitiveness in order to face the inevitable future of economic 
liberalisation.
How and when would Thailand engage in greater liberalisation policies? Few 
details were revealed, however, it was believed that its proactive position towards 
bilateral trade agreements would be key. Initially the Thaksin administration was 
reluctant to adopt bilateral PTA polices (Nagai, 2003).56 However, after the signing of the 
USSFTA, a sudden change of heart took place. Moreover, the rise in global oil prices in 
2005 helped fast-track the idea of engaging in bilateral PTAs.
Since engaging in PTAs, two notable export strategies have become an integral 
part of Thailand’s PTA strategy. The first scheme is the unplanned “Detroit of the East”, 
with several commentators observing the agglomeration of multinational automobile 
companies pouring FDI into Thailand, transforming the kingdom into a regional hub for 
the automobile industry. Currently Thailand is the world’s second largest manufacturer of 
one-ton pickup trucks.57 As a result, most of Thailand’s PTAs, especially the JTEPA, 
place much emphasis on the automobile industry. This will require a restructuring of 
ROO in Thailand’s trade agreements. The second project, backed by the government, is 
the “Kitchen of the World”, this scheme aims to promote Thai produce, cuisine, and 
chefs abroad. The strategy does not merely accelerate Thailand’s plan to be a major food 
exporter, but also promotes the export of several domestic grassroots products abroad, 
which also requires the development of food safety and hygiene standards.
4.2.4.2 Economic Policies: Towards a Service Hub
Singapore may be a pro-trade society, with virtually no tariffs, but most of Singapore’s 
service sectors are linked with the government, which has been slow to liberalise. Since 
the rise of China, the city state has suddenly realised the limitations in her
56 Actually the original plans for adopting PTA strategies were laid dow n by the previous administration, 
but they were equally reluctant.
57 The world’s largest exporter o f  pickup trucks is the U SA .
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competitiveness, especially when compared with resource-abundant countries. 
Consequently, Singapore has had little choice but to re-brand itself and focus in the 
service sector, in order to rival other service hubs in the region, such as Hong Kong.
As a result, around the turn of the new millennium, sudden changes were 
introduced by the Singaporean government, aimed at facilitating Singapore’s move to 
become a service hub for the region. One of these areas, for example, is the financial 
sector, which the PAP government claims to have had a long term plan to liberalise, since 
1997. However, similar to Thailand, there are no clear dates for such grand strategies. 
Nevertheless, as the subsequent chapters will show, Singapore’s financial services have 
begun to liberalise, but only after engaging in PTAs.
Another predicament the entrepot state needs to ponder is the limited export 
destination. Even if Singapore could become more open and competitive, it cannot gain 
more market access until further multilateral negotiations are concluded. The deadlock at 
the multilateral trade level forced Singapore to accept bilateral PTAs as an alternative to 
further the its trade ambitions. Nevertheless, Singapore believes it has adopted a multi­
prong approach in pursuing trade liberalisation through multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements (Liang, 2005). Each level is not exclusive of the other, there is 
no discrimination amongst the different levels, and Singapore can approach all different 
levels when its trading partners are ready to move at Singapore’s pace.
In short, the crucial similarity in Singapore and Thailand’s economic polices is 
their desire to achieve more exports. Furthermore, both states desire to reform their 
economies: Thailand has a strategy of transforming its key domestic industries to become 
more efficient and competitive. In contrast, Singapore’s survival has pushed the city state 
to become more efficient in its service sectors. Apparently, adopting PTAs has been a 
crucial part of Singapore and Thailand’s economic and growth policies. However, the 
question is how much reform has occurred to the economy and the domestic mechanism, 
and how much can be attributed to PTAs?
4.3 Trade Policy Formulation
Armed with the historical and social background knowledge of the two case study 
countries, this section will outline how PTAs c
an influence the domestic mechanism. In order to understand how institutional capacity 
at the macro level has evolved, one must observe the changes in the system.
109
Consequently, this section will begin by introducing Thailand and Singapore’s 
international trade policy making structures coupled with an outline of the key players 
involved in international trade policy making, from ministries to non-profit making 
societies. The section aims to examine how the players interact in order to obtain a 
coherent trade policy, thus an observation of the negotiating team will also be required. 
Overall, this section aims to highlight the emergence of new agencies or changing roles 
of government and non-governmental players in the trade policy making, brought about 
by PTAs.
4.3.1 Thailand's Policy Making Structure in International Trade 
Since 1932, Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliamentary 
system, however, neither legislative chamber fully participates in the trade policy making 
process. Consequently, the executive branch is free to negotiate and bring international, 
and bilateral, treaties into effect. In other words, the prime minister can ratify the signed 
international trade treaties, without parliament’s consent nor is there any obligation to 
hold public hearings. Thus, trade policy making in Thailand is a centralised affair, only a 
handful of ministries and a select few policy-makers are truly involved in international 
trade policy making. Recently there have been demands to stop such opaque procedures. 
Since the TUSFTA negotiations, several scholars believe that PTA negotiations 
contravenes Article 224 of the Constitution, which provides that parliament and the 
monarch’s consent are needed when entering peace, armistices and other treaties, 
especially any agreement that alters Thailand’s territorial or state jurisdiction.
Consequently, under an amendment of the 2007 Constitution, article 190 states 
that any international agreement related to trade and investment and with an important
c o
impact on the country’s economic security must be approved by parliament. Thus, 
recent bilateral PTA negotiations have raised public awareness on the matter, such that a 
more transparent process in Thai trade policy making has emerged.
Departing from the legislative procedures, as mentioned above, the Thaksin 
administration introduced the Bureaucratic Restructuring and the Ministerial 
Restructuring Acts in 2002. The reforms were focused on correcting the weakness in the 
bureaucratic system which was perceived to be responsible for the fragile economic 
system.
58 H owever, there are still problems with article 190 under the military government. The JETPA was signed  
without parliam ent’s endorsement, thus NGOs are seeking w ays o f  nullifying the agreement.
110
Despite reforms, the overall structure of Thailand’s international trade, 
summarised in Figure 11 below, has hardly changed, apart from cosmetic changes of the 
names of organisations and committees. The main ministries responsible for formulating 
and implementing issues relating to trade and investment policies are the Ministries of 
Commerce (MOC), Industry, Finance (MOF), and Agriculture and Cooperatives 
(MOAC). Due to the comprehensive nature of the recent bilateral PTAs, authority on 
trade policy making was extended to other ministries, such as Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Public Health (MOPH), Information Technology and Communications (MICT), to name 
a few.
Overall, the top decision making level is the Cabinet and the Committee on 
International Economic Relations Policy (CIERP), the key policy making committee on 
Thailand’s economic-related policies, chaired by the member responsible for economic 
affairs. All matters relating to international economic polices must be considered by 
CIERP before seeking final approval from the premier and the Cabinet. Furthermore, due 
to the recent proliferation of PTAs, new committees are emerging purely for the purpose 
of PTAs. The Committee on FTA Strategy and Negotiations, composed of similar 
members to CIERP, was established in an effort to provide a clear and consistent 
direction on Thailand’s PTA position before disseminating to the relevant ministries 
(Talemgsri & Vonkhorpom, 2005, pp. 71-72).
However, the actual decision making process still rests in the hands of the 
politicians. Interestingly, most of Thailand’s PTA obligations have been administrative 
obligations. The reasoning is because negotiations are undertaken by civil servants, who 
are unenthusiastic at negotiating issues beyond their domain; legislative changes are 
perceived to be under the political domain. To illustrate, during the negotiation of the 
TUSFTA, contentious issues on public health were hardly discussed by the regular trade 
negotiators, it was left in the hands of the politicians such as the Deputy Minster for 
Commerce and the Minster for Public Health to negotiate, who had to join the 
negotiating team at a later stage.
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Figure 11: T hailand’s decision  m aking structure in international trade
Departing from the decision making level, the Department o f Trade Negotiations, 
under MOC, acts as the secretariat to CIERP, and coordinates PTA policies with other 
ministries. This makes the MOC the lead agency in international trade policy. 
Interestingly, this ministry has undergone some internal restructuring over recent years. 
Prior to the bureaucratic reform, the Department o f Business Economics was responsible 
for plurilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, whereas the division responsible for 
bilateral trade negotiations was under the Department o f Foreign Trade. Due to the 
reform acts, in 2002, the two departments were merged into the Departm ent o f Trade 
Negotiations. In order to trim down the overlapping duties, the department was 
formalised to oversee both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. The rationale for 
merging the departments was a key move by the Thaksin adm inistration to further
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emphasise international trade negotiations, especially bilateral negotiations; thus shifting 
to a multiple level strategy. Clearly PTAs were not directly involved in the MOC’s 
restructuring.
Another key ministry that underwent internal restructuring is the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives. An old saying in Thailand is: “Agriculture is the backbone 
of our [the Thai] nation”. True to this saying MOAC has also played an important role in 
Thailand’s trade policy formulation.
Several departments in MOAC underwent massive internal restructuring, include 
newly formed agencies for monitoring and certifying food safety, however, these 
agencies will be discussed in chapter five. This chapter will focus on agencies 
traditionally responsible for trade.
A key department within MOAC is the Department of Agricultural Economics. 
Due to PTAs, the department has become the main communication point on agricultural 
trade-related issues, both within MOAC and between ministries. Consequently, there has 
been massive reallocation of staff to the Department of Agricultural Economics, in order 
to accumulate greater specialisation, especially on issues not traditionally related to 
agricultural trade, such as scientific knowledge. In order to understand specific PTAs, 
more staff were required on the grounds of country specialists.59
Moreover, the Department of Agricultural Economics interacts with local farmer 
on trade-related issues as well. Traditionally, once a trade negotiation was completed, 
such as during the Uruguay Round, MOAC would instruct farmers what needs to be 
achieved. Under the PTA era, MOAC admits they have limited information on 
agricultural production, and rely on farmers advice instead. Consequently, the 
Department of Agricultural Economics consults with stakeholders on what farmers, and 
the nation, can accomplish. Thus, the intensity and speed of bilateral negotiations have 
transformed the farmer-govemment relationship from a top-down to a bottom-up 
approach.
The Ministry of Finance is another key player in Thailand’s international trade 
policy making, such as setting tariff rates. The key department overseeing international
59 In fact, this phenom enon is not unique to M OAC, several other m inistries have also assigned a team or 
individuals to study and fo llow  up on specific PTAs. This includes the M inistry o f  Industry, and the 
M inistry o f  Education. Furthermore, these same m inistries have also assigned at least one department 
which acts as the central coordinator o f  various PTA-related issues. This w ould not be too onerous for 
ministries already involved with trade, but for ministries not traditionally involved with trade, a com pletely  
new department had to be created.
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trade policy issues is the Fiscal Policy Office. Recently, MOF conducted tariff 
restructuring in several key industries, for example, the tariff rates for 1900 key electrical 
products were revised in November 2005. As a Thai trade negotiator commented:
This is in line with the policy to transform Thailand into a regional 
electronic manufacturing centre, and to improve medium-sized 
manufacturers’ competitiveness, especially for the automobile 
industry... It will also complement free-trade agreements, whereby 
import tariffs will eventually be cut to zero per cent.
The idea for restructuring tariff rates has been long thought out. On a number of 
occasions, the government has vocally urged key industries to become more competitive. 
As a consequence, the new tariff policies should reduce the cost of components from 
abroad, identifying key sectors in which the government desires to enhance 
competitiveness. These changes can be attributed to Thailand’s increasing involvement 
with PTAs. The rapid speed and multiple negotiating partners have forced MOF to re­
examine the tariff schedule on a number of occasions, thus allowing it to bring the 
reforms in quicker. Similar tariff restructuring can also be seen in the automobile and 
processed food industries, in line with the “Detroit of the East” and “Kitchen of the 
World” programmes.
Another notable change in the Thai organisational structure is the establishment 
of the International Strategic Trade Agency (ISTA). As a result of PTAs, several Thai 
policy makers discovered the challenges of following up on existing PTAs. As expressed 
by a high-ranking civil servant:
There have been several instances when we ask ourselves who has the 
information on a particular FTA, or who is responsible for the follow 
up of a particular FTA? ... Most of the time, there will be a silence 
followed by several phone calls chasing this unknown person. 
Ultimately, we realised that such a person does not exist, nobody is 
responsible for following on these issues.
Former permanent secretary of MOC (JTEPA conference in 2005)
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As a result the ISTA was established in October 2005, the agency plays the key 
role as a com m unicating and coordinating unit on international trade affairs, as set out in 
Figure 12.
MOC
MOA
Chief
Negotiator
NGO
Business
Figure 12: O rganisational chart o f  International S trategic Trade A g e n c y  (IS T A )
Consequently, ITSA will have three main tasks. Firstly, it will be an information 
gathering agency on PTA-related issues. Secondly, the centre will summarise trade 
obstacles, including NTBs, and seek ways to solve the problems. Thirdly, ITSA will 
provide Thai firms with advice in doing business overseas. Thus, it will provide benefits 
for both government agencies and the general public. Consequently, overall, the ISTA 
will become a com m unicator to the general public, ensuring awareness o f  international 
trade policies.
Currently, this promising and much needed agency is under the umbrella o f 
MOC, however, due to the exponential rise o f PTAs, there are plans to transfer ISTA to a 
more prominent role under the Prime M inister’s Office, providing it with a more 
assertive coordination and implementation authority in international trade-related issues. 
This illustrates how new agencies, created as a result o f  PTAs, can improve institutional 
trade capacity.
Aside from government agencies, there is also consultation support from 
academics and business groups who are involved in the decision making process. Civil 
movements do not play any direct role, but they are becoming a familiar face in 
international trade negotiations.
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The roles of academics as technical consultants is not a new phenomenon in Thai 
trade policy making. However, since the PTA era there has been a rise in the number of 
academic consultancies, which have generally been attributed to the escalating number of 
comprehensive PTAs. To illustrate, in the ACFTA, academic consultants were hired to 
examine macro issues such as the impact of the agreement on exports, imports, inflation, 
general employment levels, and other socio-economic indicators. However, after 
implementing the EHP between China and Thailand, the government realised it had 
overlooked micro issues, such as the garlic industry, adversely affected by the EHP. 
Consequently, there is greater willingness to hire consultants both at the macro and micro 
level. Aside from academic institutions, other independent academic bodies include the 
Thai Development Research Institute (TDRI), which conducts policy assessments and 
research on social economic development; virtually all ofTDRI’s independent reports on 
PTAs are disseminated to the public.
In the private sector, the government formally and informally consults about 
trade-related matters with three main organisations: the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the 
Federation of Thai Industries, and the Thai Bankers’ Association. Together they 
represent the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry, and Banking 
(JSCCIB)60, aimed at facilitating the private sector’s participation in Thailand’s trade 
negotiations. To illustrate, during trade negotiations JSCCIB were invited on several 
occasions, at their own expense, to join the negotiations in a supportive role.61
Opponents of JSCCIB believe the organisation does not include a sufficiently 
wide representation of businesses organisations in Thailand, as a result it does not 
represent the entire economy. However, JSCCIB would argue that several business 
groups were initially disinterested in international trade negotiations, believing 
themselves to be immune from distant matters. To illustrate, previously, several business 
organisations would sending junior members of their organisation to meetings and 
conferences on international trade matters. However, in the era of comprehensive PTAs
60 O riginally formulated in 1999, called the W TO Com m ittee, aimed at facilitating Thailand’s position in 
the multilateral level.
61 Interestingly, the A FTA  negotiation highlights an interesting m echanism called the parallel negotiations. 
This involves tw o negotiating rooms: one is the negotiations betw een the tw o governm ents; the second for 
the business groups. In certain circum stances, when the topic is not too sensitive, crossovers between the 
two room s are permitted in order to obtain a broader picture. Thus, the information can also bring a clearer 
picture to the negotiations.
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and greater competition, more seasoned members of the business community are being 
sent to such conferences. Moreover, as a JSCCIB member proclaims:
The government listens to us because JSCCIB is one of the largest 
business organisations, although JSCCIB does not encompass 
everyone, but JSCCIB is able to generate large revenues. JSCCIB 
wants a committee that can make decisions, not one where there are 
too many members, such that a decision will never be made.
Consequentially, PTAs have most certainly increased the participation of 
businesses in trade negotiations. Perhaps other business organisations should be included 
in order to provide more detailed micro data, as well as an opportunity to safeguard their 
interests. However, the limited involvement of non-JSCCIB groups can be attributed to 
the weak abilities to mobilise and generate enough revenue to catch the attention of the 
government. Nevertheless, several Thai trade negotiators have acknowledged the need 
for inputs from other businesses, but it remains a mystery how their voices will be heard.
The final group that has gained prominence in international trade making, due to 
constitutional change, is the mobilisation of non-profit making civil society groups, most 
notably the rise of the FTA-Watch Group. The organisation was conceived during the 
2003 APEC Summit in Bangkok, when it was clear that PTAs would become part of the 
Thaksin administration’s economic policy. The main concern for FTA-Watch is how 
comprehensive PTAs, encompassing various trade related issues, will directly affect 
Thailand’s sovereign rights. Interestingly, FTA-Watch is a very diverse and well 
informed group, although possibly overstretched. Nevertheless, FTA-Watch has 
positioned itself as informers for the middle class and the mouth piece for the rural poor, 
becoming a vocal critic of government policies towards PTAs.
FTA-Watch has always expressed willingness to participate in the negotiations, or 
at least become acknowledged like the JSCCIB. There are concerns amongst their 
members that the government prefers to convince them, rather than consult with them. 
The difficulties between the government and NGOs still remain, but there have been 
attempts to reconcile the quarrel. For example, during the JTEPA negotiations, the 
government invited FTA-Watch to accompany the delegation to Japan. FTA-Watch 
declined, seeing little point in accompany the trade team if they were not allowed to 
participate, or at least to provide support. They did not welcome the idea of being invited
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for cosmetic purposes. Nevertheless, the presence of NGOs can be appreciated, as two 
Thai trade negotiators commented:
When the public come out to protest, it helps the negotiators 
understand what the public think and want from the trade agreement.
Thailand is a developing country, and everything is currently 
developing, including civil servants, and NGOs. We are not in a 
position to assist each other at full capacity yet, but one day we should.
At least for certain, NGOs acts as alert systems in case the government 
has gone overboard, it is good to have such a system.
Overall, the involvement of civil society was not initially welcomed, and the 
relationship is still not smooth. However, their participation marks a change from the old 
system. The process of deep integration encourages domestic policy reform, which 
inspires more open and democratic processes in countries where policy making has 
traditionally been top-down. The best example is the way NGOs have pressured the 
government to draft a Trade Negotiation Bill which requires the government to disclose 
details of pacts as well as strengths and weaknesses for public consideration.
4.3.2 Singapore's Policy Making Structure in International Trade 
Singapore is a republic with a unicameral parliamentary system. Procedurally, before any 
international treaty becomes incorporated into domestic law, the cabinet must first 
approve the legislation. Furthermore, any legislation that entails changes in Singapore’s 
rights must be endorsed by parliament before becoming domestic law. However, since 
PAP controls the parliament, the cabinet is at the apex of the city state’s decision making 
process. Moreover, the cabinet can veto any international treaty.
In Singapore, unlike Thailand, no major constitutional changes have taken place, 
however, in 2002 there were significant modifications in Singapore’s institutional and 
bureaucratic systems, especially in key ministries and departments involved in 
international trade affairs. Interestingly, most of these transformations took place after 
Singapore’s first PTA negotiation, in 2000. Nevertheless, several government officials 
believe these transformations were not a direct result of Singapore’s enthusiasm towards 
PTAs, instead they reflected the changing climate of the global trading system.
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The overall structure in Singapore’s decision making process on international 
trade affairs are summarised in Figure 13 below. At the head sits the cabinet. The 
decision to initiate PTA negotiations are filtered and managed by the ministry responsible 
for trade, which submits recommendations to the cabinet for approval. Alternatively, 
politicians also propose a list of potential PTA partners. In fact, most of Singapore’s 
PTAs were initiated by the prime minister during several APEC Summits.
Moving away from the decision making process, Singapore’s main government 
agencies responsible for international trade policy making are: the Ministries of Trade 
and Industry (MTI), Finance (MOF), Natural Development (MND), and Law. Moreover, 
ministries are supported by Statutory Boards, semi-independent government agencies 
overseen by a cabinet minister, but given autonomy and flexibility to perform operational 
functions separate from regular government departments. More importantly, statutory 
boards regularly interact with non-governmental agencies; thus, providing a link between 
the government and the private sector.
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making level
Cabinet
MTI
Ministries 
involved in 
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MND MOF M OL MFA
AVA IE
Non-Government
Actors
Customs SPRING
Academia Business NGOs
IDSS
ISEAS
Singapore Business Fed National W age Council
Singapore Confed o f Ind National Trade Union
Chamber o f Commerce Consum er Association
Source: Author
Figure 13: Singapore's d ecision  m aking structure in international trade
The Ministry o f Trade and Industry (MTI) is the key m inistry responsible for 
trade and investment-related issues. MTI also coordinates various ministries to 
participate in the preliminary and actual negotiations. Prior to the prom inent rise o f 
bilateral PTAs, multinational trade negotiations were in the hands o f  a statutory board, 
formerly known as the Singapore Trade and Development Board. However, in April 
2002, two massive internal restructurings occurred: Firstly, two new trade divisions were 
created, Trade Division Directorate A and B, creating a matrix system, where the former 
deals with overseas country-specific trade issues, and the latter deals with specific 
horizontal trade policy, such as tariffs, ROO, SPS etc. M atters relating to the W TO were 
moved back into MTI, under Trade Directorate B. Consequently, virtually all personnel
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in Trade Directorate B had to be recruited, most were commercial lawyers who were 
assigned to deal with deeper integration provisions. Moreover, he establishment of Trade 
Directorate B demonstrates Singapore’s emphasis on comprehensive trade issues.
The second restructuring was that MTI’s statutory board,62 the Singapore Trade 
and Development Board was transformed into International Enterprise (IE) Singapore. IE 
Singapore had a mandate to help Singaporean companies export and internationalise 
successfully. Furthermore, IE Singapore also become an active player in Singapore’s 
bilateral PTA negotiations. Another significant statutory board, under MTI, is the 
powerful Economic Development Board (EDB), responsible for planning and 
implementing industrial and service strategies. Interestingly, most of the restructuring 
within MTI, especially the statutory boards, can been seen as a refocusing of priorities 
and bringing the WTO back into the heart of international policy making in Singapore.
Other Singaporean governmental agencies underwent structural changes during 
the 2002 bureaucratic restructuring programme. However, interestingly, most of the 
restructuring occurred with governmental institutions involved with regulatory issues, 
reaffirming Singapore’s programme to become a regulatory hub for the region. For 
example, the Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING), a statutory board 
under the MTI, formerly responsible for improving industrial competitiveness, 
formulating and implementing standards, has now become a standards regulator, free 
from certain overlapping issues such as testing procedures. Other ministries have also 
undergone structural changes. The Ministry of Information, Communications and the 
Arts, and the Ministry of Transport have also relinquished their authority to the new 
statutory boards of the Infocomm Development Authority and the Land Transport 
Authority, respectively.
Regarding non-governmental agencies, similar to Thailand, Singapore has always 
engaged the services of academic consultants to study the feasibility of trade agreements. 
However, some differences can be immediately observed between Singapore and 
Thailand’s private sectors. The Singaporean government regularly consults with the 
business community through statutory boards. Moreover, due to the unique special 
relationship between the government and the private sector, companies tend to fall in line 
with PAP’s policies. However, most of these companies are predominantly in the service
62 Currently, M TI oversees nine different statutory boards.
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sector, if Singapore desires to become a regional service hub, major restructuring will be 
required.
The government, though MTI, regularly consults with the Singapore 
Confederation of Industries, and the Singapore Business Federation (SBF). Under the 
Singapore Business Federation Act 2002, SBF was established as part of the wider 
restructuring programme by the PAP government to enhance Singapore’s trade capacity. 
SBF encompasses all the largest companies in Singapore, including all the Chambers of 
Commerce in Singapore, and it is responsible for promoting business related matters to 
the government.
Recently, the Singaporean government realised how ill-informed the business 
community was on matters relating to signed PTAs. Most businesses were unaware 
which countries had signed PTAs with Singapore, let alone the benefits they would gain. 
This posed serious problems because the members of the business community are the 
ones who make these agreements work. As a result, MTI recently established the “FTA 
Optimisation Unit”; its main duties are to educate the business community about recently 
concluded agreements, and how they may benefit from them. Consequently, this 
illustrates how PTAs have brought better communication between the government and 
the businesses community.
With respect to non-profit making civil societies, unlike Thailand, there are no 
NGOs which concentrate their energy on international trade issues. As mentioned earlier, 
Singapore does not foster an environment for strong civil society movement. Most major 
civil society organisations, such as the National Trade Union Congress, have already 
formed cooperative links with the PAP government. Other NGOs, such as the Consumer 
Association, rarely touch Singapore’s international affairs. Overall, when deemed 
appropriate, the Singaporean government welcomes consultation from the National Wage 
Council, the National Trade Union Congress and the Consumers Association of 
Singapore.
4.3.3 The Trade Negotiating Teams: Coordination Process
One way of observing how coordination has changed is by observing the trade 
negotiating team. Unlike the general trade policy making structure, the negotiating team 
illustrates an alternative approach of inter-ministerial coordination. Furthermore, in 
reality the negotiating team undertakes the decision making in real time, not the political 
masters at home.
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In Thailand, ever since the Uruguay Round, MOC has carried the heavy burden of 
negotiating Thailand’s trade position on most fronts. There may be limited participation 
from other ministries, with the notable exceptions of MOAC and MOF. Thailand’s chief 
negotiators have always requested MOAC’s contribution, since Thailand was a member 
o f the Cairns Group. In fact Thailand’s chief negotiator during the Uruguay Round aimed 
to create an ensemble of negotiators from various ministries into the negotiating team,63 
an interesting trait that still holds today. However, a large delegation hardly counts unless 
they fully participate in the negotiations. For example, on agricultural issues, the 
Permanent Secretary of MOAC represented Thailand during the Round, but only 
participated during the final moments, resulting in limited input. Overall, most non-MOC 
delegation were there to participate not negotiate, they merely offered consultative 
advice. The limitation can be attributed to technical difficulties and limited interest in 
multilateral trade negotiations.
The composition of the negotiating team from Singapore, on the other hand, has 
hardly changed. During the Uruguay Round, Singapore had already shown interest in 
emphasising trade rules. Thus, the composition of Singapore’s trade negotiating team has 
encompassed several agencies outside MTI. Unlike Thailand, the Singaporean delegation 
included non-MTI staff who participated and led the negotiations on the respective 
topics. For example, the chief negotiator was from MTI, who negotiated on trade-related 
investment measures (TRIMS), whereas the negotiations for the rules on anti-dumping, 
safeguards, subsidies, countervailing duty measures and dispute settlement were led by 
academics (Liang, 2005, p. 59).
After the Uruguay Round, Thailand’s trade negotiating team at the WTO did not 
reduce in number, various ministries still provided consultative inputs. However, their 
participation diminished, mostly sending junior bureaucrats who did not hold direct 
control over the ministry’s policy. This effectively dumped most of the negotiating work 
on MOC. The negotiating team no longer had direct control and discretion to negotiate 
regulatory barriers to trade issues beyond MOC’s scope. Consequently, Thailand seemed 
disinterested in non-market access issues.
Nowadays, in the era of PTAs, MOC still retains authority as the principal agency 
responsible for trade negotiations. However, the rise in PTAs coupled with the deepening 
on trade issues, has overwhelmed MOC’s workload, Accordingly, several trade
63 This success is docum ented in the photograph taken during the round, where the entire Thai delegation  
appears have been one o f  the largest delegations present.
123
negotiating issues have been outsourced to other ministries, including the position of 
chief negotiator. Some of the lead negotiators are still from MOC, such as PTAs with 
Australia, China, New Zealand; However, some were led by MFA, including PTAs with 
Japan and USA; and others by the Thai Trade Representative, the PTA with Peru. In 
contrast, Singapore’s chief negotiators have never been restricted to MTI personnel: 
some negotiators came from MTI, such as in the negotiations with India; others were led 
by MFA, such as the negotiations with the USA; whereas others were led by academics 
and retired civil servants, such as in the PTA with South Korea.
In Thailand, outsourcing has not been confined to the chief negotiators. The 
deepening of trade issues demands greater participation from various government 
agencies which hold direct control over non-traditional trade policies. The complexities 
of current trade negotiations can be observed in appendix B and C, these provide 
individuals with the opportunity to learn about and maintain direct control over trade 
issues under their jurisdiction. For example, previously, the Ministry of Education 
(MOE) had never entered any international trade negotiations, and MOE was merely 
invited to provide consultation and formulate a trade position. Nowadays, MOE leads the 
subcommittee negotiations on Education and Human Resources in JTEPA. Moreover, 
thanks to the complexities of comprehensive bilateral trade negotiations, several 
seasoned civil servants are now involved with the negotiation process, thus placing 
experts with authorised power at the head of the negotiation table.
In Singapore, the format of the trade negotiating team has always encompassed 
experts from various government agencies. The same system still holds in bilateral PTA 
negotiations, as shown in appendix D. The negotiating team consists of newly established 
agencies. For example, SPS negotiations used to be headed by the Ministry of National 
Development, but is now led by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority (AVA), which 
consists of individuals from Ministry of National Development as well as specialists from 
other agencies. Consequently, even new governmental agencies still need to regroup in 
order to discover their own grounds under the new regime of comprehensive PTAs.
One interesting point of comparison on trade negotiating teams is that, unlike 
Thailand, the number of ministries involved in Singapore’s negotiating team is much 
less. Primarily this is because MTI still retains control over most of the negotiations and 
the subcommittees, while other governmental agencies merely provide a supportive role; 
thus reaffirming the centralisation of Singapore’s trade policy making.
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A common point to report is that, as a result of comprehensive PTAs, there has 
been a change in both the Singaporean and Thai trade negotiating teams. Previously, the 
main bulk of their trade negotiators were located at the Geneva mission, and other 
ministries only participated when invited. Given the slow nature of multilateral 
negotiations, when proper negotiations are held, most of the negotiators from previous 
rounds might have moved elsewhere. However, since the rise of comprehensive PTAs, 
trade negotiators from both countries believe there is currently a regular pool of experts 
from various agencies working together towards a common goal. Given the speed and 
intense nature of PTAs, trade negotiators regularly meet,64 and form a better 
understanding of each department’s views on trade policy. The pool of experts also forms 
a working relationship which allows them to communicate with each other and they can 
easily be called upon for assistance. In Singapore, there is an FTA Fund, aimed at 
lubricating inter-agency work and any means of enhancing inter-departmental 
relationship (Ong, 2004, p. 39), cementing the bonds of various government agencies and 
their coordination. More importantly, both Singaporean and Thai negotiators believe that, 
since the same individuals are involved in future negotiations, it creates a pattern of 
consistency for future trade negotiations. This provides an example of how PTAs provide 
support in the coordination of the domestic structure.
4.4 Conclusion: The Comparison
This chapter outlined the ‘macro’ domestic institutional structures in Singapore and 
Thailand. The chapter began with a narrative on the historical background which helps 
explain contemporary developments. Singapore has always been conscious of 
international trade, as trade has been linked with the struggle for survival. This struggle 
inspired PAP to establish several well-oiled domestic institutional agencies and processes 
for international trade-related issues. On the contrary, Thailand was initially unconcerned 
with international affairs. The Kingdom never felt the need to compete internationally, 
and believed its agricultural sector was competitive enough. However, as the economy 
became more dependent on foreign direct investment, Thailand needed to integrate with 
the global economy. Unfortunately, international affairs and trade negotiations were 
considered distant topics for the general public, the business community also felt that
64 An interesting exam ple would the U SSFT A , which lasted tw o and a ha lf years, how ever, there were 11 
rounds o f  formal negotiations, suggesting there must have been, at least, one m eeting every two months, in 
order to formulate a trade strategy.
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multilateral trade negotiations would not affect their businesses, and the media were 
equally ignorant. As a Thai trade negotiator recalled, during the Uruguay Round a Thai 
reporter asked: “Why was the Uruguay Round held around Uruguay, why was it not held 
in Uruguay itself?”
However, an abrupt change took place. The financial crisis unexpectedly 
improved the public’s awareness of international affairs, and Singapore’s economy also 
plummeted after the crisis. Due to Singapore and Thailand’s developmental state ethos 
coupled with a strong bureaucracy, they aimed to catch up with the industrialised 
economies by establishing high economic growth and structural change in the productive 
system (Low, 2001, p. 413). Consequently, both governments initiated several 
restructuring projects. Thailand saw the emergence of the Thaksin administration, which 
introduced immense bureaucratic reforms. Similarly, Singapore’s PAP government saw 
the need to redirect the economy into a service hub in the Asian region. More 
importantly, these developments led towards their PTA policies.
Furthermore, bilateral PTAs have now become an integral part of Singapore and 
Thailand’s economic policies. Singapore is still spearheading bilateral PTAs with new 
markets. In Thailand, even after the removal of the Thaksin administration, the military 
junta still continues with the PTA policies, which they initially regarded as a justifiable 
reason to remove Mr Thaksin. The interim prime minister of the military junta even 
personally led the Thai delegation to negotiate the India-Thailand PTA in June 2007.
After the historical background comes the analysis. This chapter aims to illustrate 
how inter-regional PTAs have influenced the case study countries’ domestic institutional 
trade capacity at the macro level. This will be conducted with the assistance of the 
timeline diagram below, which shows the negotiation, the signing, and implementation 
date of Singapore and Thailand’s PTAs. These dates will be compared to the key macro 
institutional developments; thus providing a visual timeline comparison. However, one of 
the drawbacks of this method is the difficulty of identifying when the actual idea of 
institutional development was conceived. Consequently, it is difficult to say with 
complete certainty whether PTAs were the direct cause of recent institutional 
developments.
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Figure 14: Thailand's M acro T im elin e  C om parison
In the case o f  Thailand, most domestic institutional developments occurred before the 
negotiations o f the TAFTA. However, other macro institutional developments, such as 
the tariff restructuring, the idea o f the ISTA and the Trade Negotiation Bill, all came into 
the picture after signing PTAs. This indicates m ost o f  the changes occurred not only 
because o f the Thaksin administration, but PTAs may also have some contribution.
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In Singapore, on the other hand, due to the closeness o f  the time period, there are 
difficulties in distinguishing the causations. M ost o f  the key developm ents, such as the 
bureaucratic restructuring and the establishment o f  the SBF, were conducted after the 
signing o f  the ANZSCEP, and several Singaporean trade negotiators argued that these 
changes were already laid out prior Singapore’s engagement with PTAs. Nevertheless, it 
is questionable whether additional developments were accelerated due to PTAs. The 
ANZSCEP may have acted as a testing ground for policy makers to observe how new 
agencies would function. Nonetheless, other domestic developments, such as the FTA 
Fund and the FTA Optim isation Unit, were established after PTAs.
The timeline diagrams only inform about the establishm ent o f institutional 
developments. However, to discuss how PTAs influenced the case study countries’ 
domestic institutional trade capacity, an examination o f  the local institutional
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development will be assessed under the lens of the institutional trade capacity 
framework. The findings are summarised in Table 3 below.
Area o f Impact Singapore Thailand
,
Negotiating Capacity
Recruiting new personnel 
for Trade Directorate B 
and the negotiating team.
Pooling of trade experts
Outsourcing and giving 
powers to the correct 
authority. However, 
inexperience has led political 
masters to deal with sensitive 
issues of the negotiations.
Pooling of trade experts
Coordination
Within ministries No change Creating new departments to 
coordinate within the 
ministry
But could be too demanding 
and overstretches the new 
department.
Between ministries FTA Fund established to 
assist inter-ministry 
coordination
ISTA assist the coordination.
NGO Consultation
Academic institutions No change Demanding more micro 
information
Business society Government requires 
more information from 
businesses.
SBF plays more role
FTA Optimisation Unit 
disseminates information
Government requires more 
information from businesses
More participation from 
businesses.
ISTA helps disseminate 
information
Non Profit agencies No change. Become a voice for the poor, 
and provide an alternative 
perspective for negotiators. 
However, they could derail 
future trade liberalisation.
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Implementation
Judicial and legal system None Possibility of introducing the 
Trade Negotiation Bill
Procedural and establishing 
new agencies.
Restructuring statutory 
boards, such as AVA. But 
can put strain on the new 
agency.
Establishing ISTA for wider 
PTA strategy
Rapid speed of PTAs has 
allowed the government to 
re-examine every tariff 
schedule. However, this 
could also mean too much re­
examination and focussing 
too much on one area.
Creating New Trade 
Strategy
The USSFTA has 
accelerated the 
liberalisation of financial 
services.
Singapore is now keen to 
adopt the negative list 
approach in future trade 
negotiations.
Table 3: Institutional Trade Capacity Framework and M acro Institutions
Beginning with the composition of the trade negotiating team, as mentioned 
above, it is disputable whether Singapore’s bureaucratic restructuring programme 
occurred as a result of PTAs. Nevertheless, some developments have been significant, 
especially the creation of Trade Directorate B, directly involved with regulatory barriers 
to trade. In Thailand, comprehensive PTAs instigated the outsourcing of trade 
negotiators, including the chef negotiators, which allows the appropriate government 
official with the correct authority to negotiate. More importantly, for both countries, the 
frequency of PTAs contributed to creating a pool of experts on various trade related 
issues. However, there are concerns that outsourcing could lead to backward forces by 
delegating important issues to agencies with limited experience.
Regarding coordination, in Singapore no new departments were created to 
oversee coordination within ministries. In Thailand there has been an increase in 
workload for existing departments to become the principal coordinator on PTA matters. 
Moreover, those departments have also become the main contact point between
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ministries as well. This could lead to backward force, placing strains and burden on these 
departments, especially when they conduct more trade agreements.
Nevertheless, there is now a pool of trade experts from various governmental 
agencies, this brings in greater involvement and awareness amongst bureaucrats from 
ministers previously not directly involved in trade policies. Some bureaucrats from non­
trade ministries believe greater coordination and awareness has been enhanced not only 
during the pre-negotiating stage, but throughout the whole negotiation process. However, 
the “coordination” is a broad word with various meanings, there is definitely an increase 
in communications, and perhaps more understanding of each other’s position. However, 
it is debatable whether new negotiators are fully aware of Thailand’s position in 
international trade. As a Thai trade negotiator commented:
“At the beginning of every trade negotiation, there is always 
confusion, however, the more we meet, things become calmer and 
clearer... but perhaps only a select few truly understand Thailand’s 
position”.
The positive impact of coordination is not confined to Thai negotiators. In 
Singapore, some trade negotiators believe there is greater coordination amongst 
government agencies. Singaporean negotiators believe that the more PTAs Singapore 
negotiates and the more frequently the meetings take place, the smoother the meetings 
will become for Singaporean trade negotiators. As one Singaporean trade negotiator 
admits from experience:
There is a misperception that Singaporean ministries think alike and 
obey the same orders. It is not easy to coordinate the efforts of 21 
negotiating groups, especially with members drawn from different 
ministries and agencies. However, as we continued to negotiate on 
complex issues that require coordination from other ministries, such as 
intellectual property rights, we come up with more tools that facilitates 
a better networked government, which did not exist before.
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Consequently, trade negotiators from both countries acknowledged that negotiating 
bilateral PTAs have clarified their position and raised awareness in their negotiating 
capabilities. Moreover, they find it easier to accept such provisions in future trade 
agreements (Talemgsri & Vonkhorpom, 2005, p. 73).
With respect to non-governmental actors, the roles of academics have always 
been prominent in Singaporean trade policy. However, PTAs have forced Thai policy 
makers to demand both macro- and micro-level studies on future PTAs. This is 
considered very important because Thai policy makers have rarely considered the impact 
of PTAs on marginal parts of society.
The role of business groups, on the other hand, has improved significantly. 
During PTA negotiations the Singaporean government realised the insufficient amount of 
information they had on the business community. This encouraged the PAP government 
to communicate, not merely with the business elites, but the wider business community, 
resulting in the creation of the SBF in 2002. Similarly, the Thai government also 
acknowledges the limited information on their local domestic businesses.
Furthermore, both the Singaporean and Thai governments realised how 
uninformed local businesses were on the benefits of the signed trade agreements. As a 
result Singapore established the FTA Optimisation Unit and Thailand setup the ISTA for 
disseminating information to local businesses and the general public. Thus, illustrating 
cases of forward forces, the creation of new disseminating agencies will become keys for 
local businesses to obtain further information on future trade agreements. Moreover, 
constant communication with local businesses will prove to be important for 
understanding businesses’ needs of making PTAs work.
On consultation with civil societies, there has been limited change in Singapore. 
On the other hand, Thailand has witnessed the emergence of FTA-Watch, which has 
become the main anti-PTA movement in the Kingdom. Trade negotiators believe this can 
bring both negative and positive impacts to the negotiations. NGOs are slowing being 
welcomed as familiar faces in the negotiation process, and they regularly provide 
revealing information to the negotiators. However, whether trade negotiators choose to 
listen is another matter. The backward force that could emerge is the possibility of the 
growth of an anti-free trade movement, as seen during the TUSFTA negotiations, which 
were completely derailed.
On implementation, there has been no change in the Singaporean judicial and 
legal system. Similarly, in Thailand, no substantive changes have occurred. This is partly
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because most trade negotiators are unwilling to commit their countries to any legislative 
changes at the macro level. However, there has been one interesting change, which can 
be seen as a forward force, the possible introduction of the Trade Negotiation Bill, which 
was pushed by Thai NGOs. Once this bill is passed, it should provide greater 
transparency for future Thai trade negotiations.
With respect to procedural implementation, new agencies were created to assist 
the Singaporean government, such as SPRING Singapore and AVA, but again, it is 
disputable whether PTAs directly caused the establishment of these institutions. In 
contrast, PTAs appear to have directly assisted the establishment of the ISTA in 
Thailand. As mentioned earlier, the positive spillover effects o f creating such an agency 
will benefit both inter-ministerial coordination and the dissemination of information to 
business as well. Thus, the ISTA is also an example of forward force which should have 
beneficial effects for future trade negotiations.
Moreover, the intensive negotiations in PTAs have assisted Thailand to re­
examine tariff schedules more frequently, as a result being able to realign tariff 
restructuring with current economic policies. Without the influence of PTAs, it could 
have taken considerable time before changes to tariff schedules could take place. 
However, this is perhaps not a case for forward force because it does not accumulate to 
spillover effects. It does, however, provide a case for backward forces because it 
illustrates that MOF have to readjust their tariff lines often, and that may lead to 
confusion and over burdening of the government agencies involved.
Finally, on creating new trade strategies, it is extremely difficult to argue that 
PTAs have influenced Singapore and Thailand in pursuing new economic strategies to 
become a regional service hub and the “Detroit of the East”, respectively. These policies 
were announced before Singapore and Thailand engaged in PTA negotiations. Thus, 
PTAs have limited influence on these areas.
Moreover, there are two additional interesting cases of forward forces to report. 
Firstly, prior to the USSFTA, the Singapore had plans to liberalise financial services, but 
without any firm dates. Since the USSFTA included financial liberalisation, the city state 
was forced to accelerate this reform. This is an example of forward force because once 
Singapore liberated its financial services, other trade partners can require similar benefits, 
and Singapore’s institutions will be ready to accommodate such requests.
Secondly, before engaging in PTAs, Singapore had always adopted the positive 
list approach in the services trade, however, after negotiating its two biggest PTAs with
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Australia and the US, Singapore suddenly realised the benefit of the negative list 
approach. From that moment on, Singaporean trade negotiators have always requested 
the negative list approach from potential trade partners, thus, allowing the possibility for 
future liberalisation on non-excluded sectors. This may merely illustrate a change in trade 
policy position, however, the movement to more liberalising policy -where future trading 
partners can also benefit- is considered an institutional improvement towards more 
liberalising policies.
To sum up, some form of evolutionary pattern appears to be emerging in the 
composition and the way trade negotiations are handled in Singapore and Thailand. It is 
possible to argue that some form of government capacity has been enhanced in both 
Southeast Asian states, where PTAs may have played some form of helping hand. 
Singapore had a head start on comprehensive trade issues, whereas Thailand is 
attempting to catch up with the city state; nevertheless, Thailand is not far behind.
However, the issue of outsourcing and establishing a new agencies has raised 
some question marks. Interestingly, outsourcing appears to be a logical course of action, 
however, it takes time for several departments to master the art of negotiation. By 
allowing new or alternative agencies that are unaccustomed to international trade 
negotiations to be responsible for important tasks could pose problems. PTAs may have 
accelerated Thailand’s adoption of outsourcing, however, does outsourcing lead to 
increased government capacity? What about micro issues? These questions will be 
illustrated in the two horizontal case studies.
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5 Chapter V 
Comparative Micro Structures' Facilitating Trade
In other fields o f Economics, the poor performance of a major [economic] theory leads to ... 
new theories that can accommodate anomalies. Yet in international economics, such 
important facts as “the case o f missing trade"... have gone unnoticed.
“Case of Missing Trade and Other Mysteries” (Trefler, 1995)
5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter illustrated the changes Singapore and Thailand have undertaken in 
their general macro trade policy making structure, which could be attributed to inter­
regional PTAs. This chapter will follow a similar route but from a different perspective. 
Rodrik (2000) argued for a need to distinguish between institutions that operate at the 
macro-economic level and those at the micro-economic level. Consequently this will 
allow a closer examination of a particular horizontal trade policy, bring forth regulatory 
aspect of trade, as well as governmental agencies which were traditionally uninvolved 
with trade policy making in the process. This chapter, as a result, will focus on the first 
micro level, namely facilitating trade.
Given a choice, after structural reform policies aimed at reducing tariff barriers, 
trade facilitation is one of the key areas most countries are willing to liberalise 
afterwards. It is generally proclaimed that facilitating trade would bring the most benefit 
at the least cost for global trade because such barriers do not generate any tariff revenue 
or economic gain, and the liberalisation would provide benefits reaching both the 
consumer and producers within and outside the borders. However, complex customs 
procedures have been a significant hindrance to the movement of goods across borders 
because they involve interaction of customs authorities from different countries and 
exchange of information. Consequently, some commentators believe it is easier to pursue 
this at the bilateral rather than the multilateral level. The stated objective for trade 
facilitation in most PTAs also requires the liberalisation of trade in goods, through closer 
customs cooperation and mutual recognition of standards and conformity assessment. 
This suggests facilitating trade generally requires strong institutional structure and 
cooperation to provide the desired results (World Bank, 2005). Consequently, it is
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assumed that when countries sign comprehensive PTAs they should also undertake 
institutional restructuring in order to accommodate further trade facilitation.
This chapter will focus on domestic institutional changes in facilitating trade. 
However, the chapter will adopt a wider definition for facilitating trade, which 
encompasses customs procedures, ROO, TBT and SPS.
Moreover, this chapter will provide a timeline narrative of domestic institutional 
changes in Singapore and Thailand. More importantly, the chapter will aim to argue that 
inter-regional PTAs have provided inspiration for the evolution of domestic institutions 
involved with facilitating trade. Some of the changes may have occurred more in 
Thailand than in Singapore. Nevertheless, Singapore has undertaken some additional 
improvements due to her PTAs as well.
Accordingly, the outline of the chapter will begin with the definition of trade 
facilitation and its significance. The second section will discuss the PTAs Singapore and 
Thailand have signed which contain provisions on trade facilitating measures. The third 
section will discuss the changes in domestic institutions, which can be attributed to the 
signed trade agreements. The chapter will finally conclude with some comparative 
comments under the lens of the institutional trade capacity framework.
5.2 Facilitating Trade
The reduction in global tariff barriers, implemented during various rounds of trade 
negotiations, led both academics and practitioners to notice the emergence of procedural 
trade barriers. These transaction costs supplement the cost to both business and 
consumers, and they are obstacles to effective market access. As a consequence, there has 
been interest in eliminating these barriers. Moreover, various studies on the subject 
support the enormous benefit in liberalising trade facilitation (Desker & Liang, 2003, p. 
2). For example, an OECD study suggested that developing countries stand to gain two- 
thirds of world welfare benefits from trade facilitation (OECD, 2005a, p. 3)
Interestingly, there is no standard definition for trade facilitating, different 
organisations have different interpretations. Traditionally, in a narrow sense, trade 
facilitation simply addresses the logistics of moving goods through ports or efficiently 
moving documentation associated with cross-border trade. However, due to varying 
reasons, this simplistic definition must be expanded. This will be followed by the 
relevance of facilitating trade under varying definitions.
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5.2.1 Defining Facilitating Trade:
At the multilateral level, trade facilitation has always been a subject of concern. Rules 
relating to trade facilitation can be found in various articles of GATT, such as Article V 
(Freedom of Transit), Article VII (Value of Customs Purposes), Article VIII (Fees and 
Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation), Article IX (Marks of Origin), 
Article X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations). In addition there are 
also specific WTO agreements such as Custom Valuation, Pre-Shipment Inspection, 
ROO, TBT, SPS Measures, and Import Licensing Procedures. All o f the above 
agreements can be seen as means to simplify trade procedures that could facilitate the 
movement of goods, but they were scattered all over GATT.
Trade Facilitation was first explicitly mentioned in 1996 during the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference. Consequently, the WTO now defines Trade Facilitation as “the 
simplification and harmonisation of international trade procedures” covering the 
“activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating 
and processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade” (WTO, 
2002; Par 27, Art V, VIII, X).
However, as public awareness of trade facilitation has changed, so has the nature 
of trade facilitation. During the past decade the definition has been broadened to include 
transparency, professionalism of customs and regulatory environments. Accordingly, the 
modem definition of trade facilitation needs to draw from a broader perspective.
In the light of the contemporary changes, this chapter defines trade facilitation as 
“facilitating trade”, in order to broaden the definition to include the simplification of 
trade procedures in the form of customs cooperation, mutual recognition of standards, 
and streamlining regulatory procedures. Consequently, in this chapter, facilitating trade 
incorporates reforming customs administrations through technological changes; and 
streamlining domestic regulatory procedures to accommodate trade, including SPS and 
TBT measures.
5.2.2 Why Facilitate Trade?
Traditionally, goods crossing borders are required to comply with varying forms of 
customs procedures. The increase in traffic and needless procedures has strained the 
bureaucratic officials involved. Unnecessary, complicated paperwork can overstretch and
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overburden officials, which can lead to inefficient or unsatisfactory border procedures; 
becoming costly for governments, business, and consumers.
Inefficient border procedures can lead to governments losing revenue. When 
governments fail to determine the origin of products, for example, some goods will 
simply slip thought the net without paying the appropriate tariffs. Simultaneously, the 
business community is increasingly aware of the cost associated with goods failing to 
cross borders properly. Examples could be the cost in supplying information and 
documents to the relevant government agencies. Due to bureaucratic paperwork and 
procedural delays from government agencies, these unpredicted costs could result in 
opportunity cost to companies. The lack of predictability in regulatory procedures can 
lead to a non-level playing field.
Generally, everyone gains from making the process of trade easier. Improved 
transparency of administrative and regulatory requirements leads to greater predictability. 
Governments gain because an efficient border procedure enables them to process more 
goods and improve control of smuggling, which could lead to an increase in government 
revenue. Countries that have carried out reforms in this area have achieved a substantial 
increase in customs revenue, despite the reduction in duties brought by trade 
liberalisation (World Bank, 2005). Businesses also gain by delivering goods more 
quickly to their customers at the appropriate cost. Consumers gain too because they are 
not paying the costs of lengthy border delays (OECD, 2005a).
Despite the benefits associated with increasing the facilitation of trade, there are 
some drawbacks. Firstly, reforming the facilitation of trade will require new legislation or 
amendments to existing laws. Secondly, some facilitation of trade measures require 
setting up new units, such as a risk management team or regulatory testing agency. 
Thirdly, once the new institutions are in place, additional staff are required to operate 
them. Investing in new technology may help to improve efficiency and effectiveness, 
however the recruitment and training of new experts is the most costly and lengthy 
process.
Generally, however, most developing countries do not have the appropriate 
funding to improve the facilitation of trade procedures. As a result, governments rarely 
undertake trade facilitation by itself, unless it is part of a wider reform. However, 
although customs reforms are complicated to implement, for countries with poor customs 
procedures even modest improvements will bring considerable relative gains. Some 
studies on developing countries reveal that the benefits exceed the costs. Some countries
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may even find an increase in customs revenue by 150% and a reduction in customs 
procedures to 24 hours, on average (OECD, 2005a, p. 5) Similarly, an APEC study 
concluded that the estimated gains from a facilitating trade programme would almost 
double the expected gains from tariff liberalisation (Wilson, Mann, Woo, Assanie, & 
Choi, 2002, p. 76).
Overall, despite the costs associated with facilitating trade, there appears to be 
benefit in implementing them, especially for developing countries. Accordingly, this 
chapter will pursue the definition of facilitating trade mentioned above, and focus on the 
following issues:
Customs Procedures includes the monitoring of goods entering a country, they are 
the first inspectors of foreign goods. However, there are concerns that sometimes there 
are several technical problems for inspecting the goods, which could delay the entry of 
goods, resulting in adverse effects for both consumers and producers. Thus, some trade 
agreements have aimed to find means of streamlining the entry of goods. This includes 
the introduction of electronic devices and other means of cooperation between customs 
officials.
Rules of Origin (ROO) are a means of establishing that the product was produced 
in the preferential trade partner country. Unfortunately, in the age of globalisation, a 
product is no longer produced in a single country, such that the origin of the product is 
relatively easy to establish. Customs officials must determine that the product has been 
subject to minimal processing from a non-qualifying country. However, in reality there is 
no simple standard rule of origin. There are a number of different rules, each having 
different implications. Three main methods are: (i) Change in Tariff Heading (CTH),65 
(ii) a minimum amount of national or regional Value Added (VA),66 or (iii) a specific 
Technical Requirement (TR)67 (Brenton, 2003b; Garay & De Lombaerde, 2006)
Technical Barriers to Trade: In general, countries have the right to establish 
protection for humans, animal or plant life, health and the environment. Countries may 
take measures necessary to ensure those levels of protection are met, through testing and 
certification procedures. TBTs are agreements aimed to ensure that technical procedures 
and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Thus, most agreements
65 A change in tariff heading is a change in the manufacturing process compared to the foreign input and 
materials used in their production. For example, a CTH  at the level o f  the first four digits o f  the 
Harmonized System  o f  T ariff Nom enclature constitutes the basis for the system  o f  preferential ROO.
66 V C sets out the maximum percentage o f  foreign content from third parties perm issible to be considered  
as originating in the PTA.
67 A specific manufacturing process or inputs required to benefit from the PTA.
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encourage members either to use a transparent method, or to adopting international 
standards so goods may flow freely between partner countries.
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures: When consumers are being supplied with 
food from other countries, there are certain health and safety standards the government 
must consider for the citizens. However, trading partners are concerned whether those 
strict health and safety regulations are an excuse for protecting domestic producers. SPS 
measures will set out the rules ensuring trade is not hindered by these food health and 
safety standards. It allows countries to set their own standards, but they should be based 
on science. Thus they should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, and they should not arbitrarily discriminate against the flow 
of agricultural produce between partner countries.
Therefore, contemporary issues have broadened the definition of facilitating trade 
beyond the confines of customs procedures, to include regulatory barriers in trade. As a 
result, they shift the prominence of politics into international trade policy making, since it 
is only politics which decides regulation and standardisation. Moreover, most of the cost 
connected to facilitating trade appears to be an institutional matter, such as creating new 
agencies and new legal documents, and seeking qualified expert assistance. As a result, 
the focus of facilitating trade efforts lies inside the border of domestic politics and 
institutional structure, where capacity building can play an important role (Wilson, Mann, 
& Otsuki, 2003, p. 4). In order to observe these changes, we should explore some 
examples of trade agreements with provisions on facilitating trade.
5.3 PTAs with Facilitating Trade Provisions
As mentioned above, due to the costs, governments rarely take unilateral facilitating trade 
improvements, and multilateral negotiations have become stagnant. Nevertheless, some 
countries have attempted to resolve this problem in their bilateral PTAs by improving the 
speed and efficiency of customs clearance of goods by streamlining and simplifying 
existing procedures.
This section aims to highlight the trade facilitating provisions Singapore and 
Thailand have signed in their inter-regional PTAs, followed by observation of their 
domestic institutional changes. The section will begin with Singapore’s PTAs, which 
may appear to have little need of improving facilitating trade provisions, being an 
entrepot state. Nonetheless, several novel provisions have emerged. In contrast, Thailand
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is not as developed as Singapore in facilitating trade, however, Thailand has also 
included some non-traditional trade facilitating provisions in its PTAs.
It must also be understood that most of the provisions on facilitating trade do not 
have a wide coverage; however, due to this limitation in the coverage these agreements 
appear to be weak.
5.3.1 Singapore’s PTAs:
In terms of goods, unless one is an exporter of alcohol, cigarettes or chewing gum, there 
should not be any problems in exporting to Singapore. Nevertheless, Singaporean law 
still contains several stringent rules to protect consumers under health and safety reasons. 
Consequently, the city state was required to introduce novel rules to ensure the smooth 
flow of goods for its preferential trading partners.
5.3.1.1 Customs and Electronic Systems
One novel feature in Singapore’s customs procedures is the inclusion of electronic 
customs and trading ystems. Despite the creation of new technologies, international trade 
is still heavily paper-based and countries still rely on postal and courier services for the 
transfer of documentation. However, most PTA partners desire to improve the speed and 
efficiency of customs clearance of goods. Thus, Singapore has been working towards 
introducing paperless trading for faster customs clearance, thereby facilitating the flow of 
bilateral merchandise trade, under TradeNet. This should also introduce measures clearly 
verifying that the ROO correctly complies with the preferential tariff treatment.
Consequently, Singapore included electronic systems with trading partners in 
order to reduce the burden of customs procedures. The Electronic Trade Document 
Exchange System (ETDES) allows electronic transfer of all trade-related information and 
documents between traders. The document exchange assists traders by depositing all the 
necessary information and documents to a particular trade transaction, this information 
will then be electronically channelled to the relevant parties. Moreover, the system also 
safeguards the confidentiality of the information exchanged, thus assisting Singaporean 
customs to streamline procedures in an efficient way.
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Unfortunately, the deadlock at the multilateral level has prevented the spread of
/TO
this technology to all countries. Nevertheless, Singapore’s PTAs have successfully 
pushed TradeNet to Singapore’s trading partners. Moreover, the city state has been able 
to broaden the acceptance of new technologies in the international arena. Most of 
Singapore’s PTA partners, such as Australia, India, Japan, and the US, have duplicated 
the system; providing an opportunity to push this WTO-plus agenda, as a ‘best practice’ 
(Woolcock, 2003, p. 338) system for facilitating trade at a multilateral level.
Moreover, there is also greater interaction and exchange of information between 
Singaporean customs authorities and their bilateral trading counterparts. Officials believe 
it is easier to pursue this at a bilateral level than at the multilateral level. Thus, besides 
liberalisation of trade in goods, facilitating trade flows through closer customs 
cooperation is also a stated objective in Singapore’s PTAs (Sen, 2006, p. 572).
5.3.1.2 ROO
Moving to the more technical details of ROO, Singapore’s PTAs with Australia and New 
Zealand use the regional VA, whereas others, such as the US, Japan, EFTA, Jordan and 
India apply a mix of TR as well as local VA rules to determine preferential treatment for 
a product. For example, the CECA between India and Singapore takes into account 
Singapore’s unique production pattern, coupled with India’s fear of circumvention of 
cheap products from China under the EHP. Consequently, under Annex 3 A of the CECA, 
the trade agreement adopts three phasing-in periods, before fully adopting the CTH with 
four-digit codes.
One of the complicated preferential ROO agreements is the P4, the trans-regional 
agreement woven between four different countries -Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and 
Singapore. Under the P4, in terms of customs procedures, some goods require the use of 
CTH, with a four-digit code, whereas some goods use the regional VA rule. The 
complication in adopting different rules is a result of creating a PTA that encompasses 
three different continents, each familiar with a different method.
The USSFTA also presents a complicated custom agreement. During the 
negotiations, much of the problems stemmed from the difference in their customs 
systems. The difference is understandable given the dissimilarity in size and government 
structure. Nevertheless both trading partners have similar customs philosophies, such as
68 N evertheless, Singapore has provided som e technical assistance by im plem enting sim ilar TradeNet 
system s with partner countries, such as Mauritius, Ghana and Saudi Arabia (A SE A N , 1995b).
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applying risk management and transparent perspective to customs. Ultimately, both sides 
encountered problems agreeing on a customs procedure, which resulting in the USSFTA 
using a CTH for most goods; however, for electronic products the VA rule of 30 to 60 
per cent was applied.69
Moreover, the USSFTA also imposes TR criteria in the textile industry. Under the 
chapter on textiles and apparel, the USSFTA permits the immediate elimination of tariffs 
for products that meet the “yam forward rule of origin”. In order to enjoy tariff reduction, 
the yam used to produce fabric must be formed either by US or Singaporean originated 
yam, with certain exceptions. As a consequence, Singapore was required to established 
an additional system to monitor the import, production and export of textiles and apparel 
goods, so that only eligible goods will benefit from the PTA.70 Moreover, Singapore’s 
textile industry needs to work with US yam suppliers, and restructure their 
manufacturing operations to benefit from the USSFTA (Low, 2003, p. 12).
Overall, Singapore's preferential ROO is a complicated affair, in some trade 
agreements the ROO section could run up to almost 300 pages. Some of Singapore’s 
bilateral PTAs range from general VA criteria of 30 to 60 per cent to detailed product- 
specific TR rules.71 The rationale for preferring a ROO range from general value added 
criteria, or regional value content, of between 30 to 60 per cent is due to Singapore’s 
familiarity with the system, which it has always used since AFTA. More importantly, 
Singaporean negotiators have constantly pushed hard for this template because the city 
state has virtually no natural resources and must fight for low percentages. Interestingly, 
most commentators regard a ROO of 40 per cent single country or 40 per cent cumulative 
regional value content for products to qualify for tariff concession as an acceptable 
average threshold for ROO (Brenton, 2003a; WTO, 2002).
69 The ROO heading is so com plicated, under the U SSF T A , that virtually every product has at least one  
corresponding change in tariff heading.
70 The U S has also expressed its commitment and w illingness to introduce more liberal rules o f  origin for 
textiles in U SSF T A  once further liberalisation on rules o f  origin are achieved at the multilateral level.
71 To illustrate, under SA FTA , products must be w holly  produced in Australia, or a value content ranging 
from 30% for selected products including electrical and electronic equipment and precisions instruments to 
50% for m ost products. Under the PTA with EFTA, utilises the CTH at the 4-digit level. For som e  
products the V A  rule ranging from 40% to 80% is required to qualify for preferential tariff treatment.
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5.3.1.3 TBT and SPS
Regarding regulatory standards, Singapore has stringent rules on goods entering the city 
state. However there have been developments to streamline these health and safety 
requirements under her PTAs.
The SAFTA was one of the first agreements that permitted more variety of goods 
to enter Singapore freely. Previously, electrical and electronic equipment manufactured 
in Australia could not be sold in Singapore unless Singapore’s statutory board approved 
the products. During the negotiations, Singapore was encouraged to recognise Australia’s 
standards and conformity assessment procedures. Consequently, the SAFTA resulted in 
a MRA on conformity assessment activities in three sectors: medicinal products, 
electrical and electronic equipment, and telecommunications equipment. The MRA on 
conformity assessment is seen as a framework for Australia and Singapore working 
towards harmonisation of their mandatory requirements consistent with international 
standards and guidelines. Specifically, the MRA enables the assessment of products to be 
performed in Australia prior to export, equivalently the agreement also ensures the 
product conforms to standards and legal requirements in Singapore; thereby reducing the 
risks, time delays and costs associated regulatory approvals in the importer country.
Singapore has also extended MRAs with other trading partners although this still 
remains limited. An interesting example of Singapore’s MRA commitments on goods is 
with India. In the CECA there are two sectoral MRA in the annexes for trade in electrical 
and electronic products, and telecommunication equipment. The MRA allows the testing 
and certification standards to be done at the source country. They do not have to be 
further tested or re-certified on arrival in the importer’s market. The rationale for 
Singapore to except this MRA was mainly due to India’s vast number of certifying 
agencies. Singapore’s electrical products exported to India would face various levels of 
inspection from the Indian bureaucracy, including Indian customs officers, officials at the 
state level, and there are possibilities of encountering officials at the councils level as 
well. Thus, it was logical for Singapore to negotiate a MRA that cuts down the number of 
bureaucratic channels.
Moreover, the CECA also includes health and safety measures for agricultural 
trade, which is shown in the food sectoral annex of the CECA. In order to increase the 
sources of food supply to the resource-limited Singapore, the agreement facilitates the 
import of egg products, dairy products and packaged drinking water from India.
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Singapore’s other preferential SPS provisions include the trade agreement with 
Australia, which streamlines compliance and inspection arrangements for approved 
products. For example, the sectoral annex on horticultural goods resulted in Singapore 
accepting Australia’s phytosanitary certificates, treatment certificates and test reports. It 
is now easier to import orchids and foliage from Singapore, as they will no longer be 
subject to mandatory fumigation upon entry into Australia, provided no actionable pests 
are detected. The streamlining of SPS measures is particularly important for many 
Australian exporters because Singapore is a major market for Australian meat and other 
food products. This is equally important for Singapore, as it prepares to become the 
world largest exporter for horticultural products and ornamental fish and aquarium plants. 
Interestingly, the sectoral annex on food standards of the SAFTA requires Singapore to 
accept Australia’s food standards as determined by the Food Standards Australia New 
Zealand (FSANZ). Furthermore, Australia and Singapore’s standards agencies are to 
further negotiate conformity assessment arrangements for food products which will lead 
to further MRA for conformity assessment certificates.
Interestingly, despite Singapore’s interest in regulating health and safety on food 
produce, and concluding PTAs beyond her WTO commitments, Singapore’s other trade 
agreements do not contain any SPS arrangements. For example, Singapore’s PTAs with 
Japan and Korea merely reaffirm their multilateral commitments, understandably because 
agriculture is still a sensitive sector in these countries. Surprisingly, the USSFTA is 
another agreement which hardly discuss SPS measures; it is briefly discussed in the 
environment chapter, which merely reaffirms commitments to their own domestic laws.
5.3.2 Thailand’s PTAs:
Thailand is a country with substantially high tariffs and quantitative protection, above the 
average of the ASEAN-6 members (Chirathivat & Mallikamas, 2004). Consequently, 
most of Thailand’s PTAs have mainly focused on the reduction of tariff measures. Like 
most small developing countries, Thailand only has a limited number of standards and 
quality protections. As a result, most of Thailand’s trade agreements have limited 
emphasis on standards. Nevertheless, the lack of standards in the domestic sphere does 
not imply that there are no provisions on facilitating trade.
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5.3.2.1 Customs and Electronic Systems
Thailand’s customs are considered weaker than Singapore. The Thai negotiation team 
were, initially, concerned they were unable to commit to the negotiated preferential ROO 
provisions with Australia and New Zealand. However, all parties found means of 
providing technical assistance as well as providing greater cooperation amongst customs 
officers to assist each other. Thus, Thailand’s PTAs with Australia and New Zealand 
include provisions on cooperative arrangements. Consequently, a MOU between 
Customs Departments was created to ensure cooperation and formation of an ad hoc 
review committee of the Customs Department which endeavours to simplify existing 
customs procedures, information sharing between counterparts, and allowing the 
predictable flow of goods between countries. In addition, under normal circumstances the 
relevant customs administrations will immediately release any goods imported which are 
accompanied by a certificate of origin. However, when the customs administration 
doubts the validity of a certificate, it may require the payment of a security until an 
investigation is conducted.
With respect to electronic system trading, through the cooperation of its trade 
partners, Thailand has slowly improved its customs process by adopting new 
technological improvements and procedures such as the electronic data interchange (EDI) 
system. Similar to Singapore, such a system was already adopted without any assistance 
from PTAs. As a member of the World Customs Organisation, Thailand has constantly 
updated its customs procedures to the latest requirements of the organisation. However, 
Thailand was forced to act faster as a result of PTAs. It could be argued that Australia 
may have been enthusiastic in adopting electronic systems, given their experience with 
such systems with Singapore. Consequently, EDI is now currently being widely used in 
almost all of Thailand’s customs activities. More importantly, it has also assisted 
Thailand’s customs procedures.
5.3.2.2 ROO
Thailand does not have specific laws, judicial decisions or administrative rulings relating 
to non-preferential ROO. However, Thailand’s PTA partners are subject to the signed 
PTA provisions on ROO. To date the most complex ROO agreements for Thailand are 
the TAFTA and JTEPA. JTEPA uses the product specific coverage by using the CTH. 
One of the similarities of Thailand’s trade agreements with both Australia and New 
Zealand is the combination of the CTH and regional VA for specific products, especially
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for textiles and footwear.72 Compared with Singapore, Australia and New Zealand’s 
willingness to allow both methods can be seen as allowing more flexibility for Thailand. 
This is understandable since most of Thailand’s products can be locally produced, unlike 
Singapore. Interestingly, compared with the WTO, Thailand’s commitments under its 
PTAs are wider than its multilateral commitments.
5.3.2.3 TBT and SPS
With respect to health and safety issues in food produce, both Australia and Thailand are 
major agricultural exporters, but with different environmental factors, especially for the 
control of pest and diseases. The TAFTA between Thailand and Australia includes 
several pages on SPS measures. Annex 6 of the TAFTA lists current SPS and 
certification priorities for both countries. However, overall the TAFTA mainly affirms 
that their decisions affecting quarantine and food safety will continue to be made on the 
basis of scientific assessments, as required by international obligations. Furthermore, the 
agreement promotes the creation of an Expert Group on SPS Measures and Food 
Standards, which will meet at least once a year to facilitate consultation and cooperation 
between Australia and Thailand on quarantine operation and other regulatory processes 
affecting agriculture and the food trade.
An example of where the TAFTA deals with facilitating trade and SPS provisions 
is the case of exporting Thai durians73 to Australia. Previously 98 per cent of Thai 
durians had to be screened for worms before they could enter the Australian market, this 
is normally done by opening the fruit at the customs. However, the TAFTA has 
streamlined the screening process down to a more acceptable level by breeching only 50 
per cent of the fruits before they are sold, thus providing a relatively rapid process as well 
as minimising the damage to the Thai produce.
Furthermore, under the TAFTA, if a Thai product, such as chicken, which has 
followed the correct procedures, finds difficulties in entering the Australian market 
within 12 months due to technical barriers, the Australian government must find 
alternative channels for Thailand to export its poultry products into Australia.
In the PTA between New Zealand and Thailand, under chapter six, both countries 
agreed to establish a Joint SPS Committee to cooperate and review the process and 
measures for trade in food products. Under the Side Letter on Product Priority for SPS
72 Furthermore, the TA FT A  also agrees to clear low-risk goods quickly.
73 A type o f  fruit indigenous to Southeast Asia.
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market access, New Zealand will undertake the process of pest risk analysis and develop 
an Import Health Standard under its biosecurity regime for some Thai fruits.74 Thailand, 
on the other hand, has adopted measures to facilitate the importation of New Zealand’s 
potatoes and dairy products.
5.4 Institutional Developments
The preceding section highlighted elements of trade agreements that contained provisions 
on facilitating trade. However, some of the provisions also coincided with some 
interesting developments at the domestic level. Some provisions on SPS require setting 
up government agencies with particular specialisations, in both negotiations and 
implementation. This section will illustrate the domestic institutional changes, and link 
those changes with the developments in the signed agreements.
5.4.1 Singapore: Improving Regulation
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Singapore has undergone some organisational 
changes in the international trade policy making structure, such as the internal 
restructuring in MTI. One of the most notable institutional changes was the emergence of 
SPRING Singapore,75 established in April 2002, responsible for developing and 
establishing national standards. It is also the national authority on consumer product 
safety and it is responsible for accrediting conformity assessment. SPRING Singapore 
also administers mandatory technical regulations as part of the Consumer Protection
1 f\(Safety Requirements) Registration Scheme. Since it came into existence, the list under 
the scheme has increased from 31 to 45 categories of electrical, electronic and gas home 
appliances and accessories.
Furthermore, the Standardisation Department, under SPRING Singapore, 
coordinates the National Standards Council, which is normally a voluntary committee 
under the guidance of industry-led businesses. The Council, which includes
74 These include longans, lychees, m angosteen, ginger and durian.
75 This statutory board under MTI, headed by a Chairman o f  a Board o f  Directors representing industry, 
trade unions, governm ent, and professionals.
76 Adm inistered under the Consumer Protection (Safety Requirements); under the schem e, goods on the 
controlled list m ust be registered with SPRING Singapore before they m ay be advertised, traded or 
displayed for sale in Singapore.
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representation from the private and public sectors, formulates and establishes strategies 
on Singapore's Standardisation Programme in ten identified areas.77
Moreover, SPRING Singapore has also become an important member of 
Singapore’s negotiating team. The mentioned statutory board, under MTI, represents 
Singapore, and sometimes heads the negotiating team, on regulatory negotiations; as well 
as carrying the implementation process forwards. To illustrate, the negotiations on 
standards for electrical equipment under the MRA on conformity assessment providing 
for mutual recognition with Australia, and various other MRAs, were mainly 
accomplished by SPRING Singapore. This illustrates the significance of this organisation 
under the period of PTA.
With respect to health and safety on food produce, SPS measures were previously 
carried out by the Primary Production Department in the MND. Since 2000, SPS 
measures have been implemented by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority (AVA). In 
2002, AVA also incorporated the Food Control Division, from the Ministry of the 
Environment, paving the way for AVA to be responsible for regulating the safety of fresh 
as well as processed foods; thus allowing AVA to facilitate the supply of stable, safe and 
wholesome meat and meat products, fish and fish products, fresh fruits, and vegetables in 
Singapore.78 Moreover, AVA aims to facilitate trade in primary products and is 
responsible for inspecting all imported, and domestically produced, primary produce, 
livestock and processed foods.
When interviewing Singaporean officials on the rational of creating AVA, they 
mostly cited the need to regulate the importation of food, in order to safeguard the health 
and safety of food for the Singaporean public. However, some trade officials indicated 
that the need to create the department was motivated by the city state’s trading partners, 
such as Australia, the EU and the US, who have similar agencies to regulate and 
implement trade on SPS measures. As a consequence, they believe it is in Singapore’s 
interest to establish a comparable regulating body.
Similar to SPRING Singapore, AVA sometimes plays an integral part in the 
Singaporean negotiating team, especially in terms of SPS regulation. AVA was the main 
player during the negotiation on the sectoral annex on food standards with Australia, as
77 This includes: electrical and electronic standards; building and construction standards; information  
technology standards; services standards; chem ical standards; m edical technology; general engineering  
and safety standards; quality m anagem ent standards; environmental m anagem ent; and food standards.
78 A V A  administers the Anim al and Birds Act, Control o f  Plants Act, W holesom e M eat and Fish Act, Sale 
o f  Food Act, Endangered Species (Import and Export) Act, W ild Anim als and Birds Act, the Fisheries Act, 
and the Feeding Stuffs Act.
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well as the negotiation on the conformity assessment arrangements for food products, 
with New Zealand and Australia. This built up the prominence of the statutory board as a 
significant player in terms of negotiation and trade policy making.
Another important government agency is Customs Singapore, which has not 
undergone any significant changes. Nevertheless, Customs Singapore regularly 
participates in both multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. However, Customs 
Singapore has demonstrated the benefits of developing an effective system of facilitating 
trade measures by pioneering e-Trade. As a trade negotiators told me:
“By creating a paperless trade facilitating system, it has streamlined 
workflow, improve efficiency and productivity”.
Through TradeNet, information can be used as clearance procedures and the revenue for 
the customs office collected by automatically deducting from the traders’ bank account, 
and without the need for traders to compile documents for other government agencies. 
Consequently, TradeNet has facilitated and simplified the flow of goods into Singapore. 
More importantly, the system also facilitates the communication between Singapore’s 
customs department and other government agencies. Consequently, some trade 
negotiators believe the implementation of TradeNet illustrates how Singapore has 
successfully leveraged on IT to speed up the application and approval of trade 
documentation (Desker & Liang, 2003).
5.4.2 Thailand: Outsourcing Players
Similarly, Thailand underwent several restructuring programmes, which allowed 
governmental agencies to become involved with international policy making, thus 
permitting more players in the negotiating room with direct decision making powers.
Beginning with MOF, and the rising prominence of the Customs Department. 
Previously, matters relating to ROO were negotiated by MOC, and the Customs 
Department merely implemented polices and acted as a tax collector. However, some 
trade negotiators believed PTAs had overstretched MOC, making it rational to relieve 
MOC of this technical burden. Moreover, some trade negotiators realised that ROO 
would become a dominant issue in future trade negotiations which deserves a 
governmental body directly overseeing technical matters of negotiating and 
implementing ROO. The most logical choice was the Thai Customs Department, which
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already represents Thailand at the World Customs Organisation (WCO),79 thus providing 
them with multilateral negotiating experience. Moreover, at the domestic level, they 
regularly deal with ROO in their day-to-day business. Thus, by allowing the Customs 
Department to take the lead in the negotiation process o f preferential ROO, the Customs 
Department was transformed from being a silent tax collector to a decision making 
agency on international trade issues. As one trade negotiator expressed:
It is better for MOC to concentrate on specific issues, and I believe it is 
always better to bring other people into the negotiating team .... Also,
ROO is becoming more complicated and the Customs Department is 
no longer an archaic organisation, it has evolved and becoming more 
specialised on technical issues.
As a consequence of PTAs, the Customs Department established a Committee 
and a Subcommittee on ROO to review the progress of harmonisation, improvement, and 
simplification of non-preferential ROO. However, there are concerns amongst 
negotiators, including specialists in the Customs Department, about whether they are 
qualified to negotiate such a complex task. Nevertheless, other negotiators still have faith 
in the Customs Department and believe it is best to delegate and outsource this inevitable 
matter now, rather than later. Supporters believe it is a matter of climbing the steep 
learning curve.
Remaining with the Customs Department, unlike Singapore, Thailand is not an 
entrepot with a highly developed port system. However, Thailand follows the 
recommendations of the WCO to accelerate customs clearance in a transparent way. As a 
result, in 1999, customs authorities adopted the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
system. Since 2004, about 85 per cent of declaration forms are currently processed 
through the EDI system. The time required for the collection of duties and taxes as well 
as physical inspection averages less than an hour, compared with three to four hours 
through non-EDI, or manual process. Furthermore, in November 2002, the Customs 
Department introduced an internet-based declaration system mainly for small and 
medium-sized enterprises. According to the World Bank survey, the introduction o f the
79 The Custom s Department is also responsible for other international trade facilitating agreements, such as 
the International Convention on the Sim plification and Harmonization o f  Custom s Procedures (The Kyoto 
Convention).
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electronic customs has reduced Thailand’s processing period and lowered costs for 
traders, improving Thailand’s standings in the World Bank’s ranking (World Bank, 
2007). Moreover, government officials believe the introduction of a transparent 
electronic system has significantly reduced bribery and corruption, thus instilling 
confidence in traders.
Another recent change in the Customs Department was the introduction of the 
Voluntary Audit Programme in 2005. Since signing PTAs, there have been concerns 
regarding the recent rise in trade volumes. In order to facilitate the flow of goods and 
increase efficiency, the department invites importers to check for any unintentional errors 
in the process. In return, they will enjoy the benefits of being exempted from customs 
penalties and surcharges. Businesses welcome such opportunities, which allow firms the 
opportunity to re-evaluate their compliance systems and limit the risks of customs 
exposure. Government officials also concur:
As the Customs Department has been putting more focus on a post­
audit programme to recover potential revenue loss and monitor 
compliance with customs law, management should take a more 
proactive outlook in adapting business systems to meet requirements in
O A
order to maximise cost-saving opportunities and avoid penalties.
Moreover, because of PTAs, the Customs Department has been actively engaging 
with Thailand’s PTA partners, such as the ad hoc committee meetings and the vigorous 
negotiations under the MOUs on customs procedures. The exchange of information 
allows the cross-pollination between Thai Customs officials and their counterparts, which 
has proven to be useful, as a Thai trade official claims these meetings have helped raised 
awareness of unexpected complex problems.
To illustrate the merits of the ad hoc bilateral Customs Departments meetings, in 
February 2005, the first spark of disagreement in the TAFTA emerged over a dispute
o  1
regarding some aluminium ore. The ore in question was originally mined and wholly 
processed in Australia, however, the invoice of the finished product was issued from 
Switzerland, as a result there was a dispute whether the ore fell under ROO of the
80 There are, how ever, dow nsides to voluntary auditing, for exam ple, w hen technical issues are unclear. 
“Grey areas” will be interpreted in favour o f  the Custom s Department and importers m ay be convinced to 
settle and pay duty shortfalls.
81 This is a type o f  aluminium covered under the chapter o f  harm onised code 76.
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TAFT A. It was only after a several rounds of consultation, especially with the assistance 
of the ad hoc committee between the Customs Department, and a letter from the chief 
trade negotiators, that the conflict was resolved. This signified the benefits of establishing 
the committee and how the Customs Department has evolved and become a more 
credible player in Thailand’s PTA strategy.
On standards, Thailand’s products are regulated by the Thai Industrial Standards 
Institute, under the Ministry of Industry.82 Between 1999 and 2003, 692 Thai industrial 
standards were established, of which only 4.8 per cent were enacted mandatory.83 Trade 
negotiators believe the recent increase in standards can be attributed to globalisation, 
rather than domestic forces. There has been greater awareness of the rise in regulatory 
standards from Thailand’s trading partners, creating further obstacles for Thai exports. 
As a Thai negotiator noticed, the increase in Thai standards has increased ever since 
Thailand began to negotiate the EHP with China. The same negotiator noted that during 
China’s accession into the WTO, China has carefully inserted around 390 new items into 
her regulatory standards list. This has also affected Thailand because the kingdom is 
negotiating a PTA with China, and would like these standards to be reduced in the 
ACFTA. Thus, overall, several globalising forces have turned Thailand into a latecomer 
to NTBs, by recently revamping and augmenting number of compulsory standards. 
Nonetheless, Thailand has aligned its general standards in priority areas with relevant 
international standards, such as electrical products and electronics, rubber products, 
machinery, food labelling, and standards and guides on conformity assessment.
The controversial issue of toxic waste has recently raised prominence due to 
Thailand’s PTAs. In Thailand, toxic waste must be processed in accordance to
Q A
international standards. However, there have been concerns from the local public 
regarding Thailand’s PTA, and the possible use of Thailand as a dumping ground for 
toxic waste. As a result of PTAs, especially the JTEPA, new rules were introduced to 
manage toxic waste. Waste-generating industries must now share responsibility with 
waste collectors for any accidents, misplaced or smuggled waste dumping, and returns of 
hazardous waste by waste collectors until it is handed over to waste processors. As a 
result, in order to build institutional infrastructure to support these requirements, the
82 In accordance to the Industrial Products Standards Act B.E. 2511 (1968).
83 Thailand’s health standards are set by the Food and Drug Administration (F D A ), under the M inistry o f  
Public Health, which m onitors and regulates the production, sale, and import o f  tobacco products, 
cosm etics, drugs and narcotics, medical devices, and psychotropic and volatile substances.
84 H owever, on certain issues, in order to do business with the EU, Thailand m ust also com ply with the EU  
directive on W aste Electrical and Electronic Equipment.
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Ministry of Industry has promoted the use of systematic waste management and assisted 
small operators to obtain the internationally recognised environmental standard.85 
Consequently, 400 small recycling operators, 15 large waste-burning operators and four 
major waste incinerator operators were established in 2002-2006.
On SPS measures, Thailand has signed the WTO agreement on SPS measures,86 
however, the kingdom has only recently realised the importance of SPS, thanks to the 
escalating food health and safety disputes. Recently, the EU raised health and safety
0 7
measures against Thai shrimps, which was also followed by the US, thus severely 
disrupting Thailand’s shrimp exports. Domestically, no governmental organisation was 
directly responsible for foodstuffs, fertilizers, live animals, plants and seeds, they have 
traditionally been under MOAC and the FDA. In 2002, during the comprehensive 
bureaucratic reform, the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards 
(ACFS) came into existence, under the MOAC. ACFA aims to facilitate the supply of 
stable, safe and wholesome meat and meat products, fish and fish products, fresh fruits, 
and vegetables in Thailand. More importantly, the body is authorised to formulate and 
implement policy on SPS regulations. Unfortunately, this fairly young agency may still 
require more expertise on setting food safety rules. This predicament can be observed in 
Thailand’s lack of SPS agreements with inter-regional trading partners, especially when 
compared with Singapore’s SPS agreement with both Australia and New Zealand. 
However, ACFS has risen in prominence and is becoming a regular face at the 
negotiating table. Moreover, this infant agency should play a more prominent role with 
Thailand’s intra-regional PTAs, as it will be revealed in chapter 7.
Finally, in 2005, after observing Thailand’s trade partners, some policy makers 
have recently decided to create a single network that will bring all standards together 
under one roof, from electrical to food standards, and reduce the overlapping standard 
settings. This will be under the National Standards Council, which aims to increase the 
competitiveness of industries both domestically and internationally, by ensuring that Thai 
goods can also meet international standards, as well as being equivalent to the standards 
of its trade partners. This news is welcomed by the Federation of Thai Industries because
85 Specifically , the ISO 14000 environmental standard.
86 Prior to PTAs, Thailand active participant o f  the FAO /W H O  Joint Codex Alimentarius Com m ission, the 
FAO International Plant Protection Convention, the World Animal Health Organization, and the W TO SPS  
Committee.
87 Currently, this exact issue is still being d iscussed back and forth betw een B russels and Bangkok, such 
that it has becom e permanent work for the Thai trade negotiators.
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it should assist Thai exports; but at the same time, some industries may require time to 
adapt to the rising cost of these requirements.
5.5 Conclusion: Comparative Analysis
This chapter provided a narrative on Singapore and Thailand’s PTAs, which facilitate the 
flows of trade in goods. The chapter defines facilitating trade as a means of improving 
customs procedure and regulatory standards, such that goods can enter the country 
swiftly. It must be remembered, however, that the coverage is limited to a few sectors 
because Singapore is an entrepot with an efficient customs, but Thailand is merely easing 
the liberalisation of its protective market. However, the central theme is the removal of 
the regulatory barriers to trade and how this changes a country’s domestic institutional 
trade capacity. Again, this will be assisted with the timeline diagram below, which 
compares developments of key PTAs with the micro institutional developments in 
facilitating trade.
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From the timeline perspective, it can be seen that most o f S ingapore’s key 
institutional developments were conducted after most o f her PTAs, with the exception of 
TradeNet and AVA. However, the electronic customs system was intended to spread 
globally, but PTAs assisted this spread; whereas AVA only incorporated the Food 
Control division, after its first PTA, transform ing AVA into the system that totally 
controls the regulation o f  food and livestock. S ingapore’s other development only came 
in during CECA negotiations with India.
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In Thailand, the electronic customs system was introduced before PTAs, and 
ACFS was introduced by the Thaksin administration. However, other institutional 
developments, such as the National Council Standards, waste management infrastructure, 
and developments in the Customs Department only emerged after PTAs.
Nevertheless, to observe how the new procedures introduced by PTAs have 
influenced domestic institutions, the institutional trade capacity framework is required in 
order to understand the lasting positive and negative spillover effects as well.
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Area of Impact Singapore Thailand
Negotiating Capacity
Additional recruitments 
into new agencies.
Outsourcing to the 
appropriate authority, such as 
ROO, ACFS.
Customs department become 
more involved in 
negotiations. But 
inexperience could be 
negative
Coordination
Within ministries Limited change, but there 
is more coordination due 
to electronic system.
Creating new departments to 
coordinate within the 
ministry.
Between ministries No change No change
NGO Consultation
Academic institutions No change No change
Business society Business expresses 
concerned about NTBs 
outside Singapore, such as 
India.
Business has become 
involved with ROO and 
NTBs. This might lead to 
using NTBs as protectionist 
policies.
Non Profit agencies No change. Concerns on toxic waste
Implementation
Judicial and legal system Change in Singaporean 
law on customs and ROO
PTAs have helped 
Singapore become more 
transparent on rules.
Use of electronic systems 
have reduced corruption
Procedural and establishing 
new agencies.
New government 
departments were 
established to observe 
standards, such as AVA, 
SPRING Singapore
New procedures and systems 
were introduced to 
streamline customs, such as 
electronic systems, voluntary 
audit, internet declaration 
system.
Creating the National 
Standards Council
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Creating New Trade 
Strategy
No change. Still supports 
Singapore’s regional 
service hub programme.
No change. SPS still supports 
the Kitchen o f the World 
Programme.
Table 4: Institutional Trade Capacity Framework and Facilitating Trade
Regarding the negotiating capacity, Singapore introduced new players for 
regulatory rule making, especially in areas which brought in new statutory boards. In 
Thailand, initially, the Customs Department was not directly involved in the negotiating 
process, however during the negotiating of the JTEPA and the TUSFTA the role of the 
department changed. The Customs Department did not merely became a part of the 
negotiating team, they also lead some of negotiations on ROO. It is uncertain whether 
this significant change will bring forward or backward forces. However, to date, the Thai 
Customs Department appears to be working effectively without any major problems, and 
they have played a role in defusing a probable dispute between Thailand and Australia. 
Accordingly, this may be an example of forward forces, exemplifying how PTAs may 
assist the development of this department.
With respect to coordination, most of the enhanced coordination has been 
conducted at the macro level, leaving little room for coordination improvements at the 
micro level. However, some Singaporean officials believe the introduction of the 
electronic system, which has allowed traders to proceed much faster with a one-stop 
service system, enhances the flow of information between governmental agencies.
In consultation, very little has changed in both countries. In terms of academic 
consultation and communication with NGOs, most of the developments were carried out 
at the macro level. However, in Thailand, the Constitution has laid the ground work for 
civil movements to be vocal and, for example, to voice concerns oyer the possibility of 
Thailand becoming a dumping site for toxic waste, thus pushing forward the 
infrastructure for processing toxic waste in Thailand.
On the other hand, there has been greater interaction with the business 
community. Previously businesses believed international trade negotiations would not 
affect their affairs. However, they are becoming more involved and voicing concerns on 
regulatory barriers to trade. Most of the business community have called for a more level 
playing field and demanded the Thai government to act either by negotiating the 
elimination of standards used by trading partners or greater uses of NTBs domestically. 
This illustrates that PTAs with regulatory provisions have encouraged business to
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become more active in international trade policy making, however, it is uncertain 
whether this would foster forward or backward forces.88
The greatest change has come from the implementation stage. Under the judicial 
and legal system changes, some domestic laws were changed in accordance to 
Singapore’s PTAs. For example, the chapters in the USSFTA dealing with ROO have 
been adapted into Singaporean law. Some of the changes have not been too onerous, such 
as adopting the preferential list of goods under the USSFTA, to name a few.89 The same 
can also be said with standards, but they are not deemed too intrusive.90
In addition, due to the CECA, an explicit list of goods subject to SPS and TBT 
measures were outlined by Singapore. According to a Singaporean trade negotiator, the 
Indian delegation insisted on the mentioned list. Singapore has never explicitly created 
such a list because virtually all of Singapore’s trade partners enjoy the same rights, and 
any changes would have been explicitly outlined in the respective PTAs. Nevertheless, 
when the list was outlined, Singapore’s trading partners had a clearer and better 
understanding of the goods which are not subject to SPS or TBT measure. Thus, 
according to a trade negotiator:
“this required greater work for Singapore, but it at least helped us to 
become more transparent, and a result, other countries found it easier 
to trade with Singapore”.
Unlike the macro level, where Thai trade negotiators where unwilling to negotiate 
on legislative changes, they are compelled to negotiate such matters when it related to 
regulatory matters at the micro level. Consequently, Thailand has decided to change its 
domestic laws to accommodate ROO provisions in its preferential trade agreements, as 
well as its standards.
Moreover, some Thai officials believe the introduction of the electronic customs 
system and the voluntary auditing scheme have reduced the amount o f corruption in the
88 Som e o f  the smaller businesses in Thailand believe Thailand does not have a sufficient amount ofN T B s. 
M oreover, som e businessm en believe “there are no N T B s for importers, there are only N T B s within  
Thailand” [between the governm ent and businesses].
89 The preferential list o f  goods under the USSFTA is under chapter 3. The obligation to cooperate with the 
U S in sharing information relating to circumvention is under chapter 4. Prohibiting custom s duties on 
electronic transmission o f  digital products is under Chapter 14.
90 With the exception o f  authorising the importation and sale o f  chew ing gum for the first tim e in 
Singapore. In order to implement this obligation, Singapore had to amend ten various p ieces o f  legislation  
relating to the sale and supply o f  chewing gum (O ng, 2004)
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Customs Department because the system brings in transparency, leaving little room for 
fraud. Thus, from the perspective of the legal system, there seems to be some positive 
spillover effects. However, at this time, there is little data to identify whether the legal 
changes will be forward or backward forces. Some of the changes in the legal system 
may have prepared Thailand for future liberalisation, resulting in forward forces, 
provided they do not contradict with future liberalisation rules.
With respect to implementing procedures and agencies, Singapore has hardly 
introduced anything since it is already an efficient, world class port. The introduction of 
TradeNet may have little to do with PTAs, but the effective spread of such a system can 
be attributed to PTAs. Singapore’s trading partners are adopting such a system because it 
is effective and has been incorporated in PTAs, either legally or by setting bilateral 
committees to adopt such procedures.
Thailand, on the other hand, has also recently established an electronic system 
together with the voluntary auditing system. Similarly, Thailand has also established a 
bilateral committee on customs procedures with Australia and New Zealand in order to 
improve their customs knowledge and procedures.
In the past, Thailand was not as effective as Singapore in its customs procedures. 
However, according to the World Bank report, Thailand’s customs procedure has been 
slowly improving. Nevertheless, according to the survey by the international accounting 
firm, Grant Thornton's (2006), red tape is not a significant problem in Thailand because 
most businesses have learned how to work around government processes. In fact, 
Thailand’s poor standing in the survey was due to a lack of a skilled workforce. 
According to the survey, both the government sector and Thai companies need to 
improve recruiting and training of workers related to customs procedures. The report 
believes customs would be cleared more efficiently if the appropriate individuals were 
selected to operate the new electronic systems. This suggests that Thailand still needs to 
develop its institutional capacity, not only the infrastructure, but the human resources as 
well.
In terms of establishing governmental agencies for standards, both Singapore and 
Thailand have established new agencies for testing and regulating the health and safety of 
goods. The introduction of these new government agencies can be seen as forward forces 
that should strengthen the negotiating teams. The inclusion of both the AVA and ACFS 
will assist both countries in their health and safety standards. SPRING Singapore and the
161
Thai Industrial Standards Institute should also play a vital role as forward forces in the 
future negotiations of standards.
Most trade negotiators in Singapore argue that these regulatory agencies were not 
a result of PTAs. However, interestingly, they were all established after Singapore’s first 
PTA negotiation. One can make a case, arguably, that the lessons learnt from Singapore’s 
first encounter with PTA negotiations have shaped the structure and organisation of these 
governmental agencies. For example, the recent inclusion of the Food Control Division in 
AVA can be seen as an addition to strengthen AVA’s position after Singaporean policy 
makers attended their first PTA negotiation.
As for Thailand, some of the governmental agencies were created before its first 
PTA negotiations. However, in addition Thailand also introduced the National Standards 
Council, which aims to eliminate the overlap of Thai regulatory standards, by placing 
them all under one roof. However, given the infancy of this agency, we are unable 
observe and explain whether this will develop into a forward force that streamlines 
regulatory standards, or become a backward force creating more NTBs.
Have PTAs changed the two countries’ strategies? Singapore already possesses a 
well developed trade facilitating system, with little room for improvement. Thailand, in 
contrast, has only began to carry out the government’s strategy for improving its customs 
system, which also includes the strategy to adopt the latest technological trend. With 
respect to standards, Singapore’s several new standards agencies are consistent with her 
strategy to become a regional hub for services. Thailand’s fresh interest in standards, 
especially in the standards of its agricultural produce and SPS is in line with “Kitchen of 
the World” Programme. Thus, little connection can be made between PTAs and 
Singapore and Thailand’s strategies on facilitating trade.
To summarise, the similarities in Singapore and Thailand’s recent developments 
are a result of their aims to improve customs facilities with the latest state of the art 
technologies. However, Singapore had a significant head start; whereas Thailand has just 
begun to catch up. The difference is also significant in standards: Singapore’s grand 
strategy has prompted it to construct several institutional agencies that regulate the 
standards of goods. Thailand has also shown interest, but possibly more on agricultural 
standards and some standards on toxic waste, which were called for by NGOs. More 
importantly, it can be argued that PTAs filled in these gaps and helped improve these 
institutions. However, the subsequent question is whether such institutional
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developments have been met in other areas aside from goods? What about trade in 
services?
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6 Chapter VI 
Comparative Micro Structures- The Temporary 
M ovement of People
Some trade barriers can be removed by GA TS, However, there are also socio-cultural
barriers, such as the knowledge o f foreign languages, 
these socio-cultural barriers cannot be reduced by the GATS.
A Singaporean Chief Trade Negotiator
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter illustrated how Singapore and Thailand’s facilitating trade 
commitments under bilateral PTAs brought domestic institutional changes. This chapter 
will endeavour to convey a similar narrative, however in order to widen the net of our 
analysis on PTAs and institutional trade capacity, this chapter will broaden the scope 
beyond trade in goods by exploring trade in services.
According to the GATS, the range of interactions between suppliers and 
consumers is broad and they are separated into four categories. The first is transactions 
associated with cross-border trade, where a country imports services from abroad (mode 
1). The second is transactions from individuals consuming services in foreign markets 
(mode 2). The third is foreign suppliers establishing a commercial presence in a country 
(mode 3). Finally, the GATS also includes the temporary movement of people into a 
country for the purpose of providing services (mode 4). Recently, mode 4 has been 
viewed as a vital component for the other modes of service supply, from call centres 
(cross-border supply) to health service and tourism (consumption abroad), including 
commercial presence abroad. The gains from liberalisation in all of these other modes of 
supply depend partly on the progress of mode 4.
Recently, in their inter-regional bilateral PTAs, Singapore and Thailand’s 
provisions on service trade have placed emphasis on the temporary movement of people 
and the recognition of qualifications. Traditionally, this has rarely been discussed at the 
regional nor the multilateral level, however, there have been several pro-active proposals 
by both countries on this front.
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In parallel to the previous chapter, the structure of this chapter will begin by 
outlining the definition of the movement of labour under the GATS, which 
predominantly deals with the temporary movement of service providers. The subsequent 
section discusses the inter-regional bilateral PTAs Singapore and Thailand have signed 
that include provisions on the movement of people. Attention will be turned towards the 
institutional changes undertaken due to the bilateral PTAs. Finally, the last section 
concludes with a comparative analysis of Singapore and Thailand’s institutional change.
6.2 Liberalising the Temporary Movement of People.
Before outlining the findings of the bilateral PTAs concluded by Singapore and Thailand, 
we will discuss the definition of the temporary movement of people, which entails a 
broad variety of issues. Furthermore, this section will also discuss the relevance of mode 
4, which has recently become a contentious issue in the international context because it 
overlaps with national security, yet there are great economic benefits for such trade 
liberalisation.
6.2.1 Defining the Liberalisation o f the Temporary Movement o f People:
According to the GATS (Article 1.2(d)), mode 4 is defined as the supply of a service by a 
supplier of a member state, through the presence of natural persons of a member state in 
the territory of any other member on a temporary basis. However, one of the debates 
under mode 4 is what constitutes temporary movement. The agreement draws no clear 
lines beyond the exclusion of permanent migration; discretion is left in the hands of the 
individual states. The timeframe set out varies, for example, business visitors are 
generally allowed 90 days, whereas, in Japan intra-corporate transferees tend to be 
limited between two and five years (Carzaniga, 2003, p. 23). Nevertheless, in general, 
service suppliers gain entry for specific purposes, such as fulfilling a service contact, 
either as self-employed or as an employee.
The definition of the temporary movement of people, according to this thesis, is 
principally the liberalisation procedures that allow service providers to enter a foreign 
country. However, there are several forms of restrictions that can prohibit the mobility of 
service providers, other than visa entry. The liberalisation of the movement of labour can 
be accomplished in the following main areas, namely: in the formalities of visa entry; the 
regulatory requirement pertaining to qualifications; and quantitative restrictions or
165
discrimination through internal measures, such as local language or citizenship 
requirements. The first issue relates to national security measures. The latter, however, 
are regulatory directives which seek to protect domestic producers and consumers, 
market failures, and other distortions. Sector specific regulations involve assessment and 
maintenance of standards among professionals in the receiving countries (Manning & 
Sidorenko, 2007, pp. 1086-1087). As a result, this chapter will broaden the scope of 
Mode 4 to include the recognition of qualifications into the temporary movement of 
people. Like all regulatory barriers, they can be resolved through trade agreements that 
bring greater transparency and predictability. However, given the problems of 
liberalisation, why is it necessary to liberalise the movement of service providers?
6.2.2 Why Liberalise the Temporary Movement o f  People?
Despite recent technological developments in various industries, natural human resources 
still remains an important ingredient for a wide range of industries, especially the service 
industries. For example, significant numbers of Indian professionals in both the 
healthcare sector and the software industry who are temporary exporting overseas 
(Manning & Sidorenko, 2007). In most cases, it is generally assumed that in developed 
countries, as the population ages and the average levels of training and education 
increases, given the current demographic shifts, developed countries will face an 
increasing scarcity of less skilled labourers, whereas around 700 million young people in 
developing countries will join the labour market (OECD, 2003c, p. 2). Given that there is 
no substitute for natural human resources, especially for a wide range of professional 
services, the demand for liberalisation and better regulation of mode 4 is likely to 
increase over time (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, & Self, 2004, p. 2; OECD, 2002, 2003a).
However, there are several constraints preventing the liberalisation of the 
temporary movement of people. One of the main concerns, for host countries, is that the 
temporary service supplier will attempt to relocate permanently in the host country. 
However, it must be understood that mode 4 of GATS was not devised to accommodate 
permanent migration and entry into the labour market. Some commentators believe the 
problem rests in the hands of the host countries in framing policies that prevent the 
temporary movement to become the first step to permanent residence, legally by 
changing visa categories.
From another perspective, developing countries are also concerned that talented 
individuals might consider permanently relocating to developed countries, depriving
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developing countries of their much needed skills. However, again, mode 4 was designed 
to be free of such problems. Recent studies on the issue of brain drain have shown a 
steadily growing rate of return home by highly qualified workers, with the short term 
costs of temporary movement of skilled people offset by the benefits to their home 
country when they come back with enhanced skills and international contacts. As a 
result, it is argued that mode 4 could contribute to “brain circulation” (OECD, 2003c, p. 
5). More importantly, recently there appear to be signs that the advanced developing 
countries are aiming to find ways to take advantage of the opportunities offered by mode 
4 (Francisco, 2003). “Several developing countries, as the largest suppliers o f temporary 
labourers, are intensely interested in the effects of such reforms on their own welfare” 
(Walmsley & Winters, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, the movement of workers can also create 
an environment for the exchange of knowledge, which could also lead to growth.
Nonetheless, some believe mode 4 could improve the organisation and 
infrastructure of the immigration system in the host country. For example, the increasing 
utilisation of mode 4 could discourage employers from illegally using undocumented 
foreign workers. Mode 4 may also serve as a useful pre-selection of candidates for future 
permanent migration. Moreover, with respect to fears of a brain drain, empirical research 
has shown that well designed provisions on mode 4 have little impact on increasing 
migration, especially for countries which have similar income levels and close proximity, 
because there are limited incentives for permanent migration (World Bank, 2005, p. 117).
Unfortunately, in the current climate, any attempt to facilitate the mobility of 
people will be confronted with concerns of national security. The liberalisation of mode 4 
requires security clearance to be quick and reliable. The challenge is to find a balance 
between measures that facilitate the entry of foreign workers and the enforcement of 
immigration controls, which prevents the entry by illegal or undesirable individuals. 
Ultimately, the temporary movement of people must not override general immigration 
and security requirements.
Empirically, at present, there are no reliable figures on the movement of service 
providers which can be attributed to mode 4, this is mainly due to limited abilities to 
separate mode 4 workers from broader groups (Winters, 2003). However, some of the 
recent studies, such as Walmsley and Winters (2003) estimated that if a temporary visa 
system were introduced in developed countries that permitted the movement of up to 3 
per cent of their labour force, world income would rise some $160 billion. Moreover, 70 
per cent of the global welfare gains from increased migration would be a result of the
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movement of unskilled workers alone. Unfortunately, progress under the GATS Mode 4 
negotiations has been, at best, limited. More importantly, although mode 4 should cover 
service suppliers at all skill levels, the WTO commitments are limited to higher skilled 
specialists. As a consequence, some PTAs which go beyond the scope of the GATS 
might offer a more promising route.
6.3 Preferential Trade Agreements
PTAs take a variety of approaches to labour mobility. Some trade agreements cover the 
mobility of all persons. Some offers are limited to facilitate the movement of certain 
kinds of trade or investment related activities, which are tied to liberalisation in modes 2 
and 3. Some PTAs cover workers at all skill levels, while others are limited to the highly 
skilled service suppliers, whereas some PTAs merely confirm their GATS commitments 
(Nielson, 2003a). The difference in the degree of liberalisation in PTAs arises from 
various factors, including cultural and historical ties. However, the agreements signed 
between countries of close geographical proximity and similar economic development 
tend to have more liberal approaches to labour mobility as compared with agreements 
between geographically distant countries of differing levels of development (Nielson, 
2003b).
Before we begin examining the PTAs Singapore and Thailand have concluded on 
deeper economic integration in the temporary movement of labour, it must be first 
understood that, for advanced developing countries, sending human resources to work 
abroad temporarily is seen as a key export ingredient. As a result, when discussing PTAs 
with provisions on the temporary movement of persons, this is not merely limited to 
regulations that permit foreign service suppliers to enter Singapore and Thailand, it also 
includes positive provisions that allow them to gain market access abroad. Moreover, the 
coverage on the temporary movement of persons is limited to some sectors, and they are 
mostly tied in with modes 2 and 3 of the trade agreement. Nevertheless, some of the 
provisions contain WTO-plus provisions, which should provide interesting implications 
on domestic institutional trade capacity.
6.3.1 Singapore’s PTAs
As mentioned earlier, Singapore is a cosmopolitan state that aspires to become a regional 
hub for multinational corporations. As a result, the city state has a well developed system
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to facilitate the entry of service providers. More importantly, currently, foreigners 
account for a quarter of the population of Singapore and they mainly play a prominent 
role in Singapore’s service industries, which accounts for two-thirds of Singapore’s GDP 
(Manning & Sidorenko, 2007, p. 1090). Traditionally, however, Singapore has been a 
closed society in terms of allowing foreigners to work in certain service sectors. As a 
result, nowadays Singapore needs to foster the development of the service sector, but at 
the same time balance this need with Singapore’s domestic interests in protecting certain 
service sectors.
Singapore’s first PTA is the CEP between Singapore and New Zealand, which 
entails a chapter on the temporary movement of service suppliers. Unfortunately, since it 
was Singapore’s first PTA, it merely repeats much of the language in the GATS, with 
some additional elements (Nielson, 2003a). The CEP facilitates entry into Singapore on a 
temporary basis, either as business visitors, or as senior or specialist employees working 
in the Singapore offices of a New Zealand firm, provided the individual has been with the 
firm for at least a year.
With respect to the professional qualifications, the CEP aims to facilitate trade 
where recognition of qualifications and professional registrations are required. The 
government has agreed to facilitate discussions between industry bodies, regulatory 
agencies, and educational institutions, to reach agreement on mutual recognition. Under 
part 5 of the agreement, both sides have agreed to make it progressively easier for certain 
service providers to gain access to the Singaporean market, such as architecture, 
engineering, telecommunications, finance, education and environmental services.91
The overall process of encouraging Singapore to give better access to New 
Zealand professional service providers is an ongoing one, with a provision in the CEP for 
consultations on an issue-by-issue basis.
Similarly, the seemingly complicated P4 agreement is a weak agreement, 
comparable to the New Zealand-Singapore CEP, because it merely confirms their 
commitments under the GATS Mode 4. Nevertheless, there is a commitment to review 
this provision after the agreement has been into force for two years. Moreover, 
interestingly, with service trade, the agreement allows for service suppliers to choose 
either to adopt the CEP or the P4 agreement.92
91 Further details can be found under Annex 2.2 o f  the CEP.
92 Interestingly, in the entire service agreement, the Singapore-N ew  Zealand CEP adopts a positive list 
approach, whereas P4 adopts a negative list approach.
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Singapore’s evolution in the movement of service suppliers can be observed in 
the JSEPA. Several sections of the agreement contain language familiar to the GATS, 
such as the Article XIV on exceptions,93 other similarities can also be found from the 
Annex, such as the definition of nationality, residence, and measures regarding entry and 
length of stay (Nielson, 2003a, p. 52). Nevertheless, overall, the agreement provides 
greater market access for certain groups, the groups that benefit will obtain the GATS- 
plus provisions (Nielson, 2003a, pp. 51 -53). The relevant provisions are under chapter 9, 
which allows for service suppliers to enter and operate in Singapore either as short term 
business visitors, or as intra-corporate transferees who are managers, executives or 
specialists linked to mode 3.94 Individuals who are investors and independent service 
suppliers are allowed to stay up to eight years; however, the period may be extended 
indefinitely, provided they meet the domestic regulatory criteria.95 This is especially true 
for engineers, who are allowed to bid for contracts with any company or organisation in 
the host country, as long as they satisfy domestic laws.
In addition, both countries have also agreed on the importance of a built-in work 
programme aimed towards creating a mutual recognition of professional qualifications. 
When completed, the trade agreement will ensure that qualified Japanese professionals 
will be able to practise in Singapore and vice versa.
Under SAFTA, Australian business persons and professionals can now stay in 
Singapore for an initial period of up to three months, compared with one month 
previously. Long-term business residents working for Australian companies in 
Singapore are granted an initial period of two years, extendable on application up to 14 
years. Furthermore, accompanying spouses and dependants of long-term business 
residents now have a guaranteed right to work in Singapore in job categories defined as 
managers, specialists and office administrators.
On the other side of the coin, SAFTA also makes it easier for Australians to 
provide national treatment and market access to Singaporean services suppliers.96 The 
SAFTA provides certainty for Singaporean services suppliers at the federal level, in a 
number of sectors, such as real estate distribution, tourism, energy, and professional 
services including legal, engineering, and architectural services.
93 Excluding X IV (d) and (e) relating to taxation.
94 Covered under A nnex VI Part A.
95 Covered under A nnex VI Part B.
96 The exceptions to this rule are listed in A nnexes 4-1 (A ) and 4-II (A ) o f  SA FTA .
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Regarding professional recognition, there are improved commitments on 
residency conditions for Australian professionals. Under the SAFTA, residency 
requirements for Australian professionals such as architects, engineers, accountants and 
auditors have been removed or eased. However, in order to practise in Singapore, they 
are still required to register with certain regulatory bodies, depending on professions and 
qualifications. Similarly, Australia and Singapore will encourage their relevant 
professional bodies to enter into negotiations on mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications. The Architects Accreditation Council of Australia and the Board of
Q7Architects of Singapore, were the first MRA to be concluded between the two nations. 
Under the MRA, Australian architects with ten years of post-graduate experience will be 
able to register and practise in Singapore, and vice versa.
Similarly, there are also benefits for the legal profession. Under Singapore’s 
existing regulatory system, foreign law firms may set up offices in Singapore to advise 
clients only on the laws of their home country or international law. Foreign law firms are 
also allowed to enter joint ventures or establish formal alliances with Singaporean law 
firms. Under SAFTA, conditions on the establishment of joint ventures in Singapore 
involving Australian law firms have been eased. These conditions include the number of 
foreign lawyers permitted to work for foreign law firm in Singapore, and how many 
years of experience those lawyers are required to have. Moreover, the recognition of law 
degrees from Australian universities has increased from four institutions to eight,98 
thereby enhancing the attractiveness of Australian universities for Singaporean students.
With respect to the education services, under SAFTA, Singapore has provided 
full national treatment and market access commitments for universities, vocational and 
technical education. With a few limited exceptions, Australian education providers can 
operate virtually freely in Singapore. The SAFTA also provides a framework for both 
governments to encourage cooperation between Australian and Singaporean educational 
institutions in a number of areas, including technical education, vocational training, 
distance education and teacher training.
Similarly, the USSFTA also has deeper integration provisions for the movement 
of persons. This illustrates Singapore’s ability to further develop this provision from
97 B O A  Singapore is the statutory authority established in Singapore to adm inister the Architects Act, 
which sets out the general qualifications and requirements for registration. It is responsible for evaluation  
o f  applications to the Register o f  Architects.
98 These universities are the Australian National University, Flinders U niversity o f  South Australia, 
M onash U niversity, the University o f  M elbourne, the University o f  N ew  South W ales, the U niversity o f  
Queensland, the University o f  Sydney, and the U niversity o f  W estern Australia.
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weaker agreements with New Zealand into more complicated agreements with Australia 
and now the US. In the USSFTA, under chapter 11, the benefit on the movement of 
service suppliers appears to tilt in favour of Singapore. With respect to the duration of 
stay for temporary service suppliers, the US has made two changes to its visa entry 
system for Singaporeans. The US will extend its E l and E2 visa for Singaporeans." The 
El and E2 visa holders and their spouses are eligible to extend their stay in the US 
indefinitely. In addition, the US will grant Singapore a special quota of 5400 visas 
(H1B 1) per year. This category applies to professionals such as IT personnel. Unlike the 
H1B visa, employers of such visa holders are not required to satisfy the market test, in 
other words, they are not required to prove that no other local citizen are able to provide 
similar services. Furthermore, the visa is renewable on an annual basis with no limit. 
Singapore was the first country to which the US has granted such privileges in a trading 
agreement, with the exception of Chile, which was granted a quota of just 1400 visas 
(Chaudhuri et al., 2004, pp. 13-14).100
For professional services, Singapore will ease conditions on US firms creating 
joint ventures to practise law in Singapore, similar to the SAFTA. Furthermore, due to 
the USSFTA, the tightly closed Singaporean legal profession now recognises 
undergraduate law degrees earned from four additional US law schools for admission to 
the Singapore bar. This is extremely rare because the legal profession has traditionally 
opposed foreign lawyers entering the Singaporean legal system.
Aside from recognising legal professionals, there are other similarities with the 
SAFTA, the USSFTA also emphasises the liberalisation of the architectural profession. 
The agreement also reduces the board of director requirements for architectural and 
engineering firms. There are also provisions that allow phasing out of capital ownership 
requirements for land surveying services. Moreover, both American and Singaporean 
professional bodies will engage in consultations to develop mutually acceptable standards 
and criteria for licensing and certification of professional service providers in the 
architecture and engineering professions.
Overall, Singapore has included the temporary movement of persons and the 
recognition of qualifications in her PTAs. Singapore’s liberalisation on the temporary
99 The E l visa is available to traders with enterprises engaged in trade with the U S. The E2 visa is available 
to investors w ho have invested or are actively in the process o f  investing a substantial am ount o f  capital in 
the US.
100 In fact, several Singaporean trade negotiators speculate that without the TPA, the U ST R  might not have 
been able to pass the controversial H1B1 in the H ouse o f  Representatives.
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movement of labour can also be represented by a linear progression: the more PTAs 
Singapore signs, the more deeper integration the city state is willing to commit. This can 
be seen in the JSEPA, SAFTA and the USSFTA, which have been “mode 4 plus” 
agreements. Both the USSFTA and the JSEPA have devoted separate chapters on the 
issue with more detailed offers, while the EFTA-Singapore FTA and the ANZSCEP have 
included this in a separate article with much less specificity. Some PTAs, such as the 
Korean-Singapore FTA, merely replicate the GATS model.
6.3.2 Thailand’s PTAs
Thailand, unlike Singapore, does not have a high inflow o f foreigners entering the 
country for employment, as a result, it does not have an effective or appropriate system 
for dealing with foreign workers. Currently the number of foreigners working in Thailand 
has climbed to 40,000 people, but the numbers are still marginal. Thailand’s positive 
interest in mode 4, on the other hand, is akin to other advanced developing countries, 
they perceive it as a vital export in terms of service trade and prefer not to import service 
suppliers. Consequently, Thailand must pick and choose her exporting service industries 
carefully. However, several developing countries are keen to learn from Thailand’s 
Concluded agreements because these better reflects the economic infrastructure of most 
developing countries.
TAFTA was Thailand’s first PTA, nevertheless, this extensive trade agreement 
includes provisions relating to the temporary movement of persons. Under chapter 10 and 
Annex 8, the trade agreement contains provisions which reduce the procedural 
requirements for the temporary movement of Australians and Thais. To illustrate, there is 
a loosening in the conditions relating to visas and work permits allowing Australian 
business professionals to enter Thailand, for both short and long periods of stay. 
Accordingly, Australian service professionals, especially APEC Travel Card holders,101 
no longer require a work permit for stays of up to 15 days or 90 days. In addition, for 
Australian citizens being transferred to work in Thailand as intra-corporate transferees, 
Thailand will grant extended visas and work permits, from one to five years, which can 
be renewed annually. The agreement also increases the work permit to three years for 
contractual services suppliers in Thailand. This was an improvement from previous
101 The APEC B usiness Travel Card was established to facilitate the entry o f  business"visitors, it is valid for 
three years and provides m ultiple short term business entries, with stays o f  up to three months. This makes 
the TAFTA com m itm ents consistent with APEC, but GATS-plus.
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conditions which permitted both categories to stay only for a year. The agreement also 
became more practical and less stringent; for example, Australians who hold work 
permits, are allowed to participate in business meetings anywhere in Thailand, including 
locations not specified in their work permits.102
TAFTA also streamlined the procedures for the temporary movement of people 
including a reduction in the number of documents required for Australians to obtain work 
permits and the renewals of work permits. More importantly, Thailand allows all 
Australian business visitors to utilise the one-stop visa and work permit services, which 
were previously restricted to major investors. In essence the one-stop service allows 
foreign applicants to submit their application to just one government authority, instead of 
three separate government bodies, namely, MFA, Ministry of Labour, and the 
Immigration Bureau, thus, facilitating the movement of people, as well as maintaining 
transparency.
With respect to the recognition of qualifications, Thailand has aggressively aimed 
to gain market access for its service suppliers, specifically in the restaurant and catering, 
and the beautician industries. Thais who want to engage in the mentioned industries, both 
investors and the individuals supplying the services, will enjoy similar benefits beyond 
other service sectors, such as the streamlining of documentation. Furthermore, under 
TAFTA, the Australian government now recognises certified Thai chefs, who are 
permitted to work in Australia for four years with an option to extend indefinitely. In 
addition, all service providers under the restaurant and catering industry no longer have 
to satisfy the labour market test, provided they have an employer in Australia coupled 
with the recognised certificate under this industry. Interestingly, this is not considered an 
MRA, but rather a unilateral agreement only recognised by the Australian government.
The JTEPA is Thailand’s latest and most comprehensive bilateral trade 
agreement, which also contains provisions on the temporary movement of people. The 
agreement also streamlined several procedures for Japanese service suppliers aiming to 
gain access into the Thai market. Japanese business visitors are allowed to enter without 
any permits and all Japanese service suppliers are permitted to use the one-stop service 
procedure, thus facilitating the movement of people by eliminating the need for Japanese 
business professionals to submit documentation with three differing government 
agencies.
102 Previously, work permits had to be changed i f  any work was to be conducted in a location not specified  
in the permit.
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Aside from the duration of stay in Thailand, the JTEPA also includes MRA and 
the recognition of qualifications from a limited number of undergraduate institutions 
from Thailand, such as engineering. Although it is not guaranteed that acquiring a skilled 
degree from a recognised institution will lead towards employment, at least it is one of 
the first steps towards employment in Japan, and the same for Japanese seeking 
employment in Thailand.
Thailand has also gained access for the unilateral recognition of some qualified 
professionals in the restaurant and catering industry in Japan. There are plans to expand 
the benefits for skilled service providers by creating a committee of professional bodies 
to establish mutual recognition of Thai architects and engineers. Regarding semi-skilled 
professionals, such as chefs and other service providers in the catering industry, provided 
the semi-skilled service providers have the appropriate qualification and have been 
offered a job in Japan, the process during immigration will become quicker, and the 
Japanese immigration officials have less restricted discretion. Moreover, the semi-skilled 
service professionals also have the option to stay indefinitely.
Overall, with respect to the temporary movement of people, the JTEPA appears to 
favour Thailand. The agreement merely simplifies the procedures for Japanese to 
temporary enter Thailand; whereas Thais also enjoy similar benefits. However, Thailand 
has also gained more access in some specialised services. One of the reasons why the 
Japanese negotiating team appear to be more generous is the current shortage of semi­
skilled professionals in Japan, especially in the caring and nursing industries, which 
Thailand has decided not to include in the JTEPA due to technical and cultural 
differences.
Overall, Thailand has signed trade agreements which are, at best, consistent with 
the GATS. Thailand’s first PTA, with New Zealand, was a trade agreement that excluded 
the liberalisation of service trade, but the negotiation on the temporary movement of 
people is scheduled to commence in 2008. The same is true of the trade agreement 
between Thailand and India.
6.4 Domestic Institutional Changes
The preceding section illustrated provisions Singapore and Thailand undertook in their 
bilateral PTAs. This section will now discuss the effects those provisions had on their 
domestic institutions. Aside from investigating changes in the domestic institutions, this
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section will also provide some analysis on why these provisions were created and what 
were the motivations behind some of these provisions.
6.4.1 Singapore: A Highly Educated Island
In Singapore, the principal governmental agency responsible for negotiating the 
temporary movement of service suppliers is the Ministry o f Manpower (MOM), 
however, due to the sensitive nature of this subject the security dimension requires the 
Ministry of Home Affairs to be involved. One of the statutory boards which regularly 
participates in the negotiations is the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority. MOM also 
works very closely with the negotiating team, being the focal point for issuing the 
appropriate paper work for foreign workers entering Singapore. The lead ministry, in 
both multilateral and bilateral trade, negotiations is still MTI, where the other mentioned 
ministries merely play a supporting role.
Since Singapore began to engage in PTAs, an additional agency has been 
established under MOM, the International Relations Unit. However, several government 
officials argue that the Unit was not created specifically in response to PTAs, rather the 
Unit was establish to assist MOM respond to the current international dimension; since 
Singapore desires to become a regional hub for services, which must accommodate the 
influx of diverse service personnel. Thus, it could be argued that institutional changes in 
Singapore might have coincided with the Singapore’s ambitions and its pragmatic nature.
However, some of these changes would not have occurred without the prompting 
of PTAs. There now appears to be more willingness to allow foreign workers into some 
of Singapore’s closely guarded service sectors, such as the legal and architectural 
profession. Previously, the legal profession in Singapore recognised less than a handful 
of undergraduate law degrees globally. The PTAs with Australia and USA have 
increased the number of foreign graduates who are eligible to practice law in Singapore. 
Moreover, Australian and American law firms are now permitted to enter the 
Singaporean legal market.
Traditionally the liberalisation of professions and the movement of people was 
not a pressing matter for Singaporeans. The professional bodies in Singapore have 
lobbied hard to maintain a closed door policy. As a Singaporean academic commented:
176
“If it had not been due to such trade agreements, the liberalisation on 
professional services might not have risen so quickly... free trade 
agreements have paved the way for the liberalisation of professionals”.
Why has there been a sudden change? During the 1980s, in order to protect these 
professions, there was a tightening of professional bodies. Like most ASEAN economies, 
professional services were shielded from foreign competition by stringent registration 
procedures (Manning & Sidorenko, 2007, p. 1104). Lately, however, there appears to be 
a shortage of key professions in Singapore, as a consequence, the Singaporean
• 1 A*2
government believed it was in their interest to liberalise these professional services.
Singapore has also opened its domestic markets to other professions by adopting 
MRAs for the engineering and architectural professions in the SAFTA and the JSEPA. 
This is considered a significant improvement, especially in the closed service sector 
society. As a consequence, there are several liberalisation connections between modes 3 
and 4, which permit foreign companies into Singapore, at the same time allowing these 
companies to employ service providers from the company’s home nation.
This view is not merely restricted to foreigners entering Singapore, but Singapore 
has also become aware of offensive positions as well. According to one of the business 
lobby groups, during a general meeting with various business groups, a representative 
from the government asked what issues the business community wanted from the PTA 
with India. One of the rare responses from the docile crowd was not a demand for a 
reduction in tariff for goods or better market access for any particular industry, instead 
they would like to obtain quicker and more reliable access to India during business visits. 
This indicates a change in perspective and the rising prominence for these contemporary 
issues.
Nevertheless, others believe this might lead towards a slippery slope. Individuals 
who wish to seek employment abroad can do so, provided they have the correct 
qualifications. However, what would happen to the individuals who fail to obtain the 
correct qualifications? They might be completely left out from the benefits of the PTAs. 
Although this may not be an ideal system, however, this is perhaps the best balance 
between the faster access and safeguarding national security.
103 To illustrate, in 2 0 0 5 ,1 1 3 ,3 0 0  jobs were created, although 63 ,500  went to Singaporeans, the number o f  
new work permit holders soared to 43 ,000 , the highest since 1997.
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When asked why Singapore has made progress in the area of temporary 
movement of persons, some trade negotiators believe this issue has never been a 
contentious issue for Singapore. The movement o f persons was never perceived to be a 
deal breaker, this allowed such provisions to included in their PTAs. Nevertheless, for the 
Singaporean negotiating team to select a profession to liberalise required great 
coordination between the negotiating team and non-governmental bodies as well. This 
interaction probably would not have occurred now if Singapore had not engaged in 
PTAs. For a small and centralised state, such as Singapore, it might not appear to be 
difficult to coordinate and formulate a position on the movement of persons. 
Nevertheless, the willingness to liberalise such guarded sectors demonstrates a desire to 
further liberalise, which can be carried forward to future trade agreements.
6.4.2 Thailand: Recognition fo r  Non-Professional Workers
In Thailand, the ministries responsible for negotiating the temporary movement of 
persons are MOC, Ministry of Labour (MOL), Ministry of the Interior (MOI), and MFA. 
Previously, as in most cases, MOC assumed overall responsibility during the negotiation 
stage. However, recently, the negotiations on mode 4 have been outsourced to varying 
ministries, providing no clear indicators which ministry now has supreme authority on 
this matter. Different chief trade negotiators have assigned the lead negotiating role for 
mode 4 to different ministries. However, the latest and most ambitious comprehensive 
PTAs, the JTEPA and TUSFTA, have placed the burden on the MFA. Some trade 
negotiators believe MFA should assume responsibility because that is the authority 
retaining the first level of restriction, namely visa entry, thus serving as a first point of 
contact before workers are required to complete other quantitative restrictions. Moreover, 
some negotiators believe MFA has more experience and technical ability in international 
negotiations.
The prospect of utilising semi-skilled workers as a source of exports has recently 
focused Thailand’s attention on the temporary movement of persons. The recent attention 
to the subject matter has forced bureaucrats to adopt a new form of thinking, resulting in 
uncertainties regarding which domestic institutions need to be enhanced. The overlapping 
authority between differing governmental agencies has also increased the confusion in 
the current system.
Nevertheless, the creation of the one-stop service, which places three differing 
regulatory requirements under one roof, has been the only new governmental agency
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created to facilitate the movement of persons. Another minor change was found in the 
Immigration Bureau, which opened a call centre to answer queries for foreign workers 
regarding visas and work permits; assisting the dissemination of information to the public 
swiftly and efficiently, and providing a better understanding of the procedures. This 
service was motivated by Thailand’s decision to promote e-govemment, which illustrates 
that this cannot be attributed solely to PTAs. Arguably, due to the kingdom’s willingness 
to promote the temporary movement of persons, the development of such institutions was 
seen as natural.
Nevertheless, one area that has significantly changed is the interaction between 
government agencies and non-governmental organisations. Some of Thailand’s trade 
agreements aim to gain market access for its professional service providers. Similarly to 
Singapore, in order to negotiate MRAs for certain professional qualifications, the 
government sought consultation with and coordination of the professional bodies in 
Thailand. Thus, arguably PTAs have helped bridge the gap between the two entities, 
building a stronger institutional capacity for Thailand.
As a consequence, the Thai negotiating team has consulted with several 
professional bodies. Similar to Singapore, there were concerns that the liberalisation of 
professional services will bring about negative effects for professional operators in small 
and medium-sized business. However, as a member of the Architects’ Council in 
Thailand confessed:
Given the current state of globalisation, it is inevitable to open up, but 
international competition must be regulated by fair agreements and 
rules... we must find ways to negotiate with our partners such that we 
will not be significantly hurt by FTAs, but at the same time turn then 
into a win-win situation for all.
In other words, PTAs have brought Thai professional bodies into the negotiating process. 
Moreover, PTAs forced professional bodies, such as the Architects’ Council, to 
understand the dilemmas and details of liberalisation, which forced them to choose the 
path for the foreseeable liberalisation of their profession, such as establishing joint 
projects or formulating a training programme to become more competitive 
internationally.
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Interestingly, there appears to be limited reciprocity for the recognition of the 
qualifications. For example, Thai architects are quick to insist on having their 
qualifications recognised by their trading partners, however, understandably they are less 
willing to accept foreign architects into their own market. This form of unilateral 
acceptance can be seen in almost all of Thailand’s PTAs, including the JTEPA. This 
applies to semi-skilled service providers as well. However, in the case of the JTEPA this 
one-sidedness can be attributed to the structure of Japanese society; the aging Japanese 
population is currently facing a shortage of professional carers and nurses. As a result, 
the Japanese delegates regularly requested Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries 
to include such professions in their trade agreements. Unfortunately, in the JTEPA, the 
nursing profession was excluded because the professional bodies of nurses showed little 
interested in providing health care in Japan, for various reasons including language and 
cultural barriers.
Nevertheless, introducing the recognition of professional qualifications is a 
significant development brought about by PTAs, and it has improved the willingness for 
domestic professional bodies to become more involved and understand the current 
dynamics of the global system.
Interestingly, the bond between government and non-governmental organisations 
would have also materialised if multilateral negotiations had materialised, however, they 
did not due to several reasons. One of the reasons was because the WTO never went as 
far as PTAs in introducing the temporary movement of labour to the negotiating table. 
More importantly, several key WTO members were not keen on introducing semi-skilled 
workers into the multilateral framework due to the possibility of them seeking permanent 
migration. Thus, countries such as Thailand never managed to develop the close 
relationship between government and professional bodies which later developed into an 
understanding for the inevitable liberalisation for the movement of persons.
The interesting question is why have trade negotiators decided to choose this 
route? As a Thai trade negotiator recalls, negotiations on service trade would normally be 
one of the last issues on the agenda for negotiation. This provided little room for 
Thailand to negotiate and exchange concessions with other industrialised countries, 
which were mainly interested in Thailand’s service industries. Consequently, Thai trade 
negotiators only negotiated on the temporary movement of persons as a possible topic 
under the heading of services, however, it also coincided with the kingdom’s 
contemporary economic programmes.
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The recognition of Thai semi-skilled service providers was not driven solely by 
external forces from Thailand’s trade partners. Thailand has also gone on the offensive 
on this issue. Domestically, the industries which have visibly gained the most from the 
recognition of Thai qualifications are the restaurant and catering industries. This also 
coincides with the government’s strategy in promoting Thai cuisine. The programme 
aims to promote and maintain the quality of Thai food by issuing standards for the 
foreign-based “Thai Select”104 restaurants. This will also be supplemented by sending a 
number of Thai chefs overseas. The quality of chefs will be guaranteed by a government 
agency which provides the accepted applicants with English language training, as well as 
professional food standards training. The agency also helps applicants to select 
destinations, and with their employment contracts. Initially the “Kitchen o f the World” 
programme was seen as a means for securing a market for exporting Thai chefs and other 
service suppliers in the catering industry. However, some Thai officials acknowledged 
they were uncertain how to obtain the recognition of Thai chefs in foreign countries. 
Only after PTAs became en vogue, did the negotiators realise how the dilemma could be 
solved.105 Thus, it can be argued that PTAs have played a helping hand here.
PTAs also brought another benefit, they provided opportunities for Thai 
authorities to review and revise existing legal provisions. Specifically, PTAs allowed 
Thai authorities to review the binding commitments of the APEC Travel Card Holder 
scheme, which was extended under the TAFTA. The APEC agreement was signed by 
MFA, however, the delegate failed to consult with the MOL, as a result the signed 
agreement contradicted Thailand’s Alien Employment Act. Under Thai law, 
procedurally, the APEC Travel Card could not supersede the Alien Work Act. This fault 
was never fully debated until the negotiation of the TAFTA, which bought MOC, MOL, 
and MFA together, thus providing the opportunity to review and redraft domestic 
legislation according to the regional APEC and bilateral TAFTA agreements.
Moreover, Thailand also made changes in its procedures for the temporary entry 
of individuals. Generally, applicants are required to be registered with the relevant 
professional body in their home country. If the professional training and experience of 
the applicant are recognised, a temporary registration certificate is issued allowing the
104 “Thai Select”, created by the National Food Institute o f  Thailand, aim s to prom ote confidence am ong  
custom ers that the quality o f  the food served m eets the standards o f  real Thai cuisine from professional 
chefs. M OC prom otes “Thai Brand”, which covers a wider range o f  goods.
105 For exam ple, originally, the TAFTA did not include the recognition o f  the catering and restaurant 
industry, how ever, only after realising the potential o f  such a benefit, which cam e during the negotiation o f  
the JTEPA, was it included in TAFTA.
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professional to practise in the receiving country. As a rule, the foreign professional must 
pass the “economic need” test, which is often time consuming and creates extra cost for 
employers through additional advertising and administrative expenses. After this process 
is completed, normal immigration application procedures can begin. However, after 
signing PTAs, citizens of the signatory countries can enjoy the streamlining of the 
mentioned procedures, such as the one-stop service,106 including the limitation of certain 
regulatory requirements used in the economic need test for foreign professionals. Overall, 
the government is very keen to support this initiative because it permits service suppliers 
entering to support the domestic industry, as well as spreading their technical know-how 
to local service providers, which will nurture their domestic industry.
Overall, it seems that PTAs have made more impact on Thai domestic 
institutions; without PTAs little progress would have occurred in this direction. Unlike 
Singapore, which has sufficient infrastructure facilitating the movement of foreign 
workers, Thailand had to build such infrastructures from scratch, this includes the 
streamlining of procedures, creating agencies such as a call centre, and legislative review. 
This illustrates how PTAs have influenced Thailand’s attitude and domestic institutional 
capacity towards the temporary movement of persons.
6.5 Conclusion: Comparative Analysis
Both Singapore and Thailand have adopted very different approaches in tackling barriers 
in the temporary movement of persons. This is chiefly due to the difference in their social 
and economic structures. Singapore is a very small state with a very highly educated 
population. As a result, most of Singapore’s trade agreements include the recognition for 
skilled professionals, such as architects, engineers and lawyers. On the other hand, 
Thailand has a comparative advantage in semi-skilled workers. Consequently, Thailand 
may have made efforts to gain market access for skilled professionals, such as architects, 
but its main exports are semi-skilled professionals in the catering industry. However, the 
central theme of this chapter is the removal of the regulatory barriers to trade and how 
this changes a country’s domestic institutional trade capacity. Again, this will be assisted
106 The one-stop service was so effective that it was utilised during the Tsunami crisis in 2004-5 . When the 
bodies o f  foreign visitors had to be identified and claim ed, the fam ily members involved had to com plete  
several docum ents from three separate governm ent agencies: the M inistries o f  Interior, Foreign Affairs, and 
Public Health. Due to the overw helm ing number o f  cases, M FA suggested im plem enting a similar one-stop  
service to reduce the bureaucracy. This indicates another area in which such agreem ents have helped 
dom estic governm ental institutions.
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with the timeline diagram below, which compares developments o f key PTAs with the 
micro-level institutional developments in facilitating trade.
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Figure 18: Singapore’s M ovem ent o f  Persons Tim eline
From the timeline perspective, it can be seen that most o f  Singapore’s key 
changes occurred during 2001-2002, which coincides with Singapore’s first PTAs and its 
bureaucratic restructuring. For example, the International Relations Unit might have been 
established in 2002 to accommodate the influx o f  foreign workers, however it seems 
clear that this unit was established as part o f  the bureaucratic restructuring in Singapore, 
and to facilitate the city state’s escalating number o f foreign workers. However, certain 
changes appear to have materialised as a result o f  PTAs, such as the involvem ent o f  
professional bodies in the latter part o f the SAFTA negotiations, and the greater 
participation from the business community providing inputs during the CECA.
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In Thailand, a few new domestic institutions were introduced, this included the 
expansion o f the one-stop service and the establishment o f the call centre to facilitate 
entry o f foreign workers. Most o f these institutional developm ents are not novel. 
However, other developments, such as professional service bodies, inputs from the 
business community, and the possibility to review T hailand’s treaties and legislation on 
the movement o f persons can be attributed to the involvement o f  PTAs.
Consequently, it can be observed that from a timeline perspective, both countries 
have made minor contributions to domestic institutions that facilitate the movement o f 
persons, but most o f the improvements appear to have come from greater participation 
from the business community and the professional bodies. Let us turn our attention to the 
institutional trade capacity.
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Area o f Impact Singapore Thailand
Negotiating Capacity
Recruitment of lawyers 
into the negotiating team.
MOC outsourcing 
negotiations to other 
ministries, such as MFA.
MRA negotiations are now 
conducted by professional 
bodies.
Coordination
Within ministries No change No change
Between ministries No change No change
NGO Consultation
Academic institutions No change No change
Business society Professional bodies deal 
with the negotiation for 
qualifications.
The business community 
has pushed the faster 
immigration access
Professional bodies deal with 
the negotiation for 
qualifications.
Non Profit agencies Limited involvement Limited involvement
Implementation
Judicial and legal system Limited changes in 
domestic law. Changes 
include the recognition of 
professional qualifications 
abroad and changes that 
minimise Needs test for 
foreign workers.
Streamlining regulatory 
requirements for PTA partner 
citizens.
Allows review of 
contradictory legislation.
Procedural and establishing 
new agencies.
International Relations 
Unit under MOM, but 
little attribution to PTAs
Extending the One-Stop 
Service to streamline the 
system for foreign workers.
Call Centre under the 
Immigration Bureau
Creating New Trade 
Strategy
No change to Singapore's 
existing policy on 
movement of natural 
persons.
No change. Exporting 
qualified chefs and personal 
of the catering industry 
under the “Kitchen of the 
World” programme.
Table 5: Institutional Trade Capacity Framework and M ovem ent o f  Persons
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Overall, when comparing institutional trade capacity, given the limited amount of 
change in Singapore, its institutions appear equipped to handle the influx of foreign 
workers; whereas Thailand has just started the implementation of such institutions, hence 
there have been relatively greater changes.
With respect to negotiating capacity, Singapore has already recruited lawyers to 
strengthen its legal position in drafting trade agreements, whereas Thailand has just 
begun to outsource the negotiation to a more specialised group within the government. In 
theory, these changes should bring forward forces, because they are preparing negotiators 
who will have gained experience to contribute to future negotiations.
Regarding coordination, no changes have occurred either within ministries or 
between ministries. Again, most of the coordination has already been enhanced at the 
macro level instead, thus providing little room for improvement at the micro level.
With respect to consultation, there appears to be a great deal of similarity between 
the two countries. Compared with previous practice at the multilateral level, both 
Singapore and Thailand hardly utilise their academic institutions to analyse the impact on 
the movement of persons. Similarly, there has been little impact from the non-profit 
making members of civil society. During their negotiations with the US, both countries 
were concerned with the US’s proposal to introduce labour standards, however, there was 
a limited civil liberty movement in Singapore and in Thailand the trade agreement 
reached a full-stop.
Moreover, in Singapore, there appears to be little or no resistance from local 
businesses to allowing foreign workers to work temporarily in Singapore; it seems that 
the business community encourages such activities. This, however, does not mean there 
have been no resistance from the business communities. In fact there has been resistance 
from liberalising the movement of persons, some of it from the professional bodies, 
adamant about protecting their own domestic markets. Nevertheless, negotiations on the 
liberalisation of professions have already taken place. In the case of Singapore, the 
liberalisation of professional services reflects Singapore’s manpower needs. In Thailand 
and Singapore, there appears to be awareness amongst the professional bodies that they 
cannot hide from the inevitable liberalisation of professional services. More importantly, 
this will bring forward forces: by bringing local professional bodies onboard they help 
create a transition period to assist local professionals to become competitive.
This illustrates a vital improvement PTAs have brought to domestic institutions, 
one that has positive spillover effects for future trade agreements as well. This, however,
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poses an interesting question, why was this not developed under GATS? One of the 
possible reasons, already mentioned above, was the lack of interest in developing 
countries’ desire to liberalise the movement of semi-skilled professionals, exemplifying 
how distant the GATS negotiations are from the needs of developing countries. 
Moreover, unlike inter-regional bilateral PTAs, developed countries cannot directly 
coerce every developing country to adopt provisions on service trade. When 
industrialised countries aim to gain access to developing countries’ service industries, 
there is little developing countries can offer in exchange, the temporary movement of 
persons represents one of the possible avenues developing countries can choose to 
liberalise.
With respect to implementation, some significant changes were introduced into 
the law of both countries. Both Singapore and Thailand had to introduce changes in 
domestic law in permitting the recognition of certain professional qualifications, such as 
permitting individuals from certain Australian and American law schools to enter local 
law exams. Moreover, both Singapore and Thailand have streamlined procedures and 
documentation for citizens of the signatory countries entering for short stay periods, as 
well as provisions permitting them to extend their stay for a longer period. However, 
there cannot be a complete elimination of documentation to fully facilitate the temporary 
movement of people due to national security, which has become significant in recent 
years.
PTAs also give Singapore and Thailand the opportunity to update their legal 
provisions. The heavy burden of negotiations provided Thai officials with the opportunity 
to coordinate, communicate, review, and revise previous agreements that contradicted 
domestic laws. In fact both countries believe their bureaucratic agencies have been given 
a rare opportunity to stand back and work together as a team to revise their outdated legal 
provisions relating to the movement of persons and foreign workers. This clearly 
illustrates a positive effect of PTAs on domestic institutions because without PTAs, the 
old legal provisions would remain in place and it could take considerable time before 
they became updated. Moreover the revised version can be beneficial for other trading 
partners as well.
There have also been improvements on the procedural side of implementation as 
well. In Singapore, some of the improvements included establishing the International 
Relations Unit under MOM, however, as mentioned earlier, it merely coincided with 
Singapore’s PTA era, and we cannot attribute this development solely to PTAs. In the
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case of Thailand, improvements include the expansion of the one-stop service. The 
service may have already existed before, but it was restricted to business officials. The 
service now accommodates other professions and can be enjoyed by all citizens of the 
trade agreement. As one trade official explained:
“the expected higher volume of traffic from PTAs has forced us to
adopt such changes”.
More importantly, the changes at the procedural implementation level can result in 
forward forces that would facilitate the movement o f persons. Once the infrastructure is 
in place, it can be utilised for future liberalisation, whether in bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.
The introduction of PTAs with provisions on the temporary movement of people 
has not resulted in any changes to Singapore and Thailand’s trade strategy. Again, 
Singapore already has a long term strategy to become a regional hub for services. 
Furthermore, a quarter of the cosmopolitan city-state’s population are foreign, as a result 
there are proper institutions and procedures to control and monitor the large amount of 
foreigners entering Singapore. Conversely, in Thailand, the attention towards PTAs also 
coincided with the government’s strategy to export Thai culinary expertise, in the forms 
of ingredients, investment in restaurants abroad, and service suppliers with recognised 
qualifications. Naturally, PTAs did not initiate the “Kitchen of the World” Programme, 
however, it did provide an alternative route towards accelerating the recognition of Thai 
trained chefs abroad.
In sum, among the biggest transaction costs associated with trade in services are 
the barriers that prohibit people from providing services in foreign countries. The 
problem here is the incalculable cost business bears in not allowing, or delaying, the 
appropriate personnel to enter a country. Without the appropriate personnel, all other 
modes of services may be derailed as well. Aside from enhancing service trade, the 
movement of persons is desirable because they could also lead towards the transfer of 
knowledge to local suppliers, which could stimulate growth. However, a complete 
liberalisation is not to be desired, due to the current global environment, a balance must 
be struck between facilitating the movement of people and preserving national security. 
Singapore and Thailand have aimed to resolve this predicament by concluding PTAs 
which streamlined the procedures and documentation required. This is accomplished by
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reducing the bureaucratic workload and institutional transaction cost in domestic 
institutions to better facilitate the movement of people. Concurrently, liberalisation of the 
movement of people is a vital ingredient for achieving regional economic integration. 
This will be the main subject of discussion of the next chapter.
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7 Chapter VII 
Building Institutional Capacity for Intra-Regional PTAs
Foreign investors rarely look at a particular ASEAN country on its own;
I f  they want to invest in ASEAN, they must observe the entire region under one context.
Former Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry.
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapters illustrated the commitments Singapore and Thailand have 
undertaken in their inter-regional PTAs with developed countries. Some provisions on 
facilitating trade and the movement of persons are WTO-plus; consequently, Singapore 
and Thailand have adopted some domestic institutional changes in the trade policy 
making structures. This chapter will continue to study the provisions in their trade 
agreements and how such change affects their domestic institutional capacity, by 
focusing on Singapore and Thailand’s intra-regional PTAs.
By studying Singapore and Thailand’s intra-regional PTAs, this chapter aims to 
demonstrate whether inter-regional PTAs with developed countries have helped 
Singapore and Thailand develop their domestic institutional trade capacity to undertake 
WTO-plus provisions in their own intra-regional PTAs. As this chapter will illustrate, 
Singapore and Thailand have attempted to tackle some regulatory barriers to trade in 
their intra-regional PTAs, some of which are different from their inter-regional 
agreements. More interestingly, the approaches adopted by the case study countries may 
be suited for developing countries, which could become seeds towards Asian 
regionalism.
Accordingly, the chapter will observe the intra-regional PTAs Singapore and 
Thailand have signed. We will begin with the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) which has 
the potential to become Asian’s largest regional PTA project. Interestingly, within the 
Early Harvest Programme (EHP) there exist some novel approaches in removing NTBs 
under facilitating trade. The second PTA to be placed under the microscope is ASEAN, 
which has recently undergone a mini-revival, pushing forward significant developments 
in the movement of persons. Thirdly, there is the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced 
Economic Relationship (STEER), sometimes viewed as the Two plus-X approach for
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ASEAN integration (Dent, 2006a). All of the above PTAs will be analysed in terms of 
domestic institutional developments, and how the mentioned institutions support these 
changes. This is followed by the conclusion, providing some comparative discussion on 
key variables on domestic institutional capacity, which allows such changes to 
materialise.
7.2 ASEAN-China FTA: A Case for Facilitating Trade
In 2000, during the ASEAN summit, the Chinese Premier surprised everyone by 
proposing the creation of the ACFTA. Like most of ASEAN agreements, the negotiations 
were separated into four pillars: Trade in Goods Agreement, Trade in Investment, Trade 
in Services, and the Dispute Settlement Committee. However, unlike most trade 
agreements, ACFTA have chosen not to adopt the customary “Single Undertaking 
Approach”, instead they have embraced the “Sequential Approach”, which involves 
concluding the pillars which can be negotiated at the most convenient moment. As a 
result, progress has only been made in the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation ASEAN and China 
(Trade in Goods Agreement), which was signed in November 2004, together with a
107chapter on arbitration panel that resolves disputes when consultation fails. The 
agreement on goods consists of a normal track and a sensitive track, the new ASEAN 
members have an extension to 2015 and 2020 to comply with normal-track and sensitive- 
track obligations, respectively. The intention of the normal track covers 90 per cent of 
China-ASEAN trade, which should comply with the interpretation of GATT Article 
XXIV to encompass substantially all trade.
In the goods agreement, products that qualify for tariff concession under the 
ACFTA must meet the 40 per cent cumulative regional VA rules. In other words, if a 
product has at least 40 per cent original value, after being processed within China or an 
ASEAN country, the product can enjoy the reduction in tariffs under the ACFTA. 
Interestingly, the motivation behind this was based on AFTA’s ROO requirement. 
Consequently, since a majority of ASEAN members were familiar with this method, and 
with the natural-resource limited Singapore behind the scenes, the 40 per cent regional 
VA approach was adopted in ACFTA.
107 W hich cam e into force in July 2005
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Currently, ASEAN desires to extend the scope of the agreement to include service 
and investment liberalisation. However, the two pillars on Service and Investment are 
still under negotiation.108
Accordingly, since the ACFTA remains incomplete, most of the focus in this 
chapter will be placed on the accelerated Early Harvest Programme (EHP). The 
programme has accelerated the reduction of tariffs on certain products before the onset of 
the ACFTA. Moreover, the EHP reduces tariffs on selected products over three years,109 
covering products from Chapters 1 to 8 of the Harmonised System Code as well as a list 
of 130 specific manufactured goods, which can be found in Annex 2 o f the Framework 
Agreement.
Prior to the EHP, tariff rates on agricultural produce between China and ASEAN, 
as a whole, were relatively high. Since Singapore fails to engage in much agricultural 
export trade, most of the action was in the EHP between China and Thailand. Previously, 
Thailand’s average tariff rates on vegetables and fruits were 35.4 per cent and 32.4 per 
cent respectively, while China’s was 11.8 per cent and 20.1 per cent (Oxfam, 2004, p. 8). 
Consequently, this motivated both sides to liberalise agricultural trade.110 Between the 
start of the EHP, the value of Thailand’s vegetable and fruit exports to China was just 
under US$200 million, an increase of 54 per cent compared with the same period a year 
later. Similarly, China’s export of fruit and vegetables to Thailand was US$88 million, or 
an increase of 150 per cent from the same period (Oxfam, 2004, p. 8).
7.2.1 Customs Procedures
Since the conception of the EHP, there have been several problems with the trade 
agreement, which requires constant improvements. For example, Thai exporters found 
thorny complications in exporting agricultural produce to China, chiefly due to a wide 
range of recently introduced NTBs, such as stricter SPS measures and increased 
administrative burdens of export permits. Moreover, due to China’s vast size there have 
been inconsistencies and misunderstandings between the centralised government and the
108A SE A N  and China also signed pacts on agriculture and information com m unication technology, paving 
the w ay for Southeast A sian com panies to gain greater access to the growing Chinese banking, information 
technology, real estate, health, engineering, education, transport and construction industries.
109 The schem e is 10% by 2004 , to 5% by 2005 and zero tariffs on these products by 2006.
110 This consisted o f  live animals; meat and edible meat offal; fish and crustaceans, m olluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates; dairy produce; bird’s eggs; natural honey, edible products o f  animal origin; live trees 
and other plants; cut flow ers and ornamental foliage; edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible  
fruits and nuts; peel o f  citrus fruits.
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provisional authorities. The central government may have signed the trade agreement, but 
the provisional governors are the agents with virtually full control over the customs 
authorities in their provinces. As a consequence, some Thai traders have proclaimed that 
China has “opened their doors, but not their windows”. There have been several 
occurrences where provisional customs officers failed to recognise Thai produce that 
qualified under the EHP, resulting in Thai agricultural produce being held in Chinese 
ports for weeks. As one Thai trade said:
“Before exporting to China, Thai exporters need to look at China not 
as a whole country, but rather region by region, given the geographical 
differences in consumer behaviours and regulations in the mainland 
[China]” .
In order to resolve this setback, the heads of the negotiating teams and the 
recently empowered Customs Departments met and created procedures for clearing 
customs more rapidly. As a result, the “Green Lane” was created to provide priority for 
goods from partner countries to clear customs faster. This procedure, which has not been 
incorporated into the signed trade agreement, has significantly facilitated the clearance of 
Thai produce in Chinese customs. Presently, Thai fruit and vegetables will be cleared 
within three days, whereas the process would have otherwise taken, at best, seven days. 
Chinese produce, prior to the introduction of the green lane, would take three to four days 
to clear, currently faces a delay of only 24 hours.
The physical presence of the green lane may have facilitated the flow of goods 
between China and Thailand. However, the method of reducing delay time in customs is 
not full proof, traders still face delays in certain provinces. In order to avoid such 
problems, both governments have also established a “hot line”, a communication line 
between the governmental trade officials and the customs officers. If goods meet the 
health and safety standards requirements, but have been treated unfairly, the hotline can 
be utilised, where the counterpart must assist the facilitation of the goods in a smooth and 
predictable manner in accordance with the agreement.
The introduction of the trade facilitating methods between Singapore and 
Thailand has been so successful that it has resulted in some negative side effects for other 
ACFTA members. For example, Indonesia fruit exporters also face similar discriminatory 
obstacles. Most Indonesian fruit exports have sought the assistance o f a third country,
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such as Thailand and Hong Kong, to bypass the discrimination from the Chinese 
customs. Consequently, other ASEAN members who failed to sign the EHP are 
attempting to circumvent Chinese Customs as well.
7.2.2 Health and Safely Standards
Similarly, the EHP also encountered problems relating to health and safety standards. 
The dispute on standards assisted Thailand and China to discover alternative approaches 
to resolve this predicament. Continuing with fruit and vegetables, all agricultural produce 
entering China must obtain import permits from the Chinese Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ).
Consequently, aside from delays from Chinese customs, there are also strict 
health and safety requirements for fruit and vegetables. To illustrate, during the initial 
stages of the EHP, Thailand’s exports of longans, which accounts for 70 per cent of its 
fruit exports to China (Oxfam, 2004, p. 10), faced stringent health and safety rules 
regarding insecticide residue permitted in the fruit.111 The mentioned regulatory rules 
resulted in lengthy inspectional delay that could end up taking 30 to40 days, depending
I 1on the province, resulting in Thai fruit rotting in Chinese customs offices. A Thai 
trader interviewed for this thesis had the following warning for future exporters:
“Fellow traders who are thinking of exporting fruits to China, under 
the Early Harvest Programme, must study various factors, aside from 
consumer behaviours, which are different in every province, traders 
must also closely examine the health and safety regulations in 
difference province as well.”
The tension created through this stringent inspection by Chinese officials resulted 
in formal discussion between trade officials. The end result was a MOU that facilitates 
Thai produce without sacrificing Chinese safety measures. Issued in May 2005, the MOU 
requires health and safety officials from both sides to inspect a portion of the partners’ 
produce before it arrives on their home soil, once entered it must be free from further
1,1 According the C hinese regulation, the residue o f  sulphur dioxide in longan m ust not exceed  50ppm  
which is more stringent than m ost OECD countries.
112 It must also be noted that in spite o f  Thai exporters’ com plaints about new  C hinese N T B s, according to 
the Thai Custom s Department, the quantity o f  Thailand’s longans exported to China has increased  
dramatically. The volum e o f  fresh longans has doubled from 20 ,0 0 0  to 4 0 ,0 0 0  tonnes.
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imspection at the borders.113 In other words, the MOU allows Chinese officials to enter 
Thailand and inspect some of the produce before it is packed and shipped to China. After 
am inspection, Chinese officials will provide a certificate which permits Thai fruits and 
vegetables to enter China without further health and safely inspections. Recently, there 
hias been a desire to limit the number of trips for Chinese officials. With the assistance 
from the Thai ACFS, some Thai farms were declared suitable for export without the 
frequent visits from AQSIQ. Chinese officials would provide a AQSIQ certificate for 
farms which follow the correct health and safely procedures. Currently only a handful of 
Thai farms can enjoy the AQSIQ certificate; and only a few types of fruit and vegetables 
are covered under the MOU.114 Similar to Thailand’s other PTAs with developed 
countries, the coverage is limited. Nevertheless, the aggregation will lead to a reduction 
o f the time delay at the Chinese and Thai borders.
7.2.3 Industrial Standards
With respect to standards, similar problems prohibit Singaporean and Thai goods 
entering China freely. Standards for electrical products is an example which has yet to be 
resolved. According to Chinese regulations, all electrical appliances and automotive 
components must have the CCC mark in order to be deemed safe for the Chinese market. 
This requirement has caused dreadful delays for Singaporean and Thai exporters, mainly 
because the application process itself is very time consuming and the documents are only 
in Chinese. Moreover, from August 2005 the Chinese government has expanded the list 
of products which require the CCC mark to include solvent coating for wood ware, 
porcelain tiles and concrete mixtures. Currently, ACFTA members are struggling to find 
ways to resolve this problem. SPRING Singapore and the Thai National Standards 
Council aim to work with the Chinese AQSIQ to construct a solution. A probable 
solution is to create something similar to the MRA on conformity assessment, which was 
inspired by the Australia- Singapore PTA. This would enable an assessment of the 
manufactured products prior to export, and ensuring they conform to standards and legal 
requirements in China. Nevertheless, it is still a proposal and little progress has been 
made on this front.
113 Thailand was w illing  to accept this because it hardly had any SPS m easures for prohibiting the 
importation o f  fresh fruits and vegetables.
114 Currently there are only five types o f  fruit that can enter the C hinese market freely: durian, longans, 
lychees, m angoes and m angosteens, how ever, the number w ill expand to 23 products; whereas Thailand 
provides a similar list for 31 types o f  Chinese produce.
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7.2.4 Domestic Institutional Trade Capacity
Imterestingly, in both the ACFTA and the EHP standards, health and safety issues were 
hardly mentioned in the signed trade agreement, nor were they officially referred to as 
NTBs. Nevertheless, both sides were willing and determined to resolve regulatory 
barriers to trade. According to one trade negotiator, one of the key reasons why these 
barriers were not acknowledged as NTBs was because the multilateral system did not 
officially refer to them as NTBs. Another interesting explanation is that both parties did 
not want to classify certain methods as NTBs because they wanted to reserve these 
methods for future protectionist usage. Nevertheless, the willingness to tackle some 
NTBs at such an early stage is very encouraging and could be viewed as setting an 
example of best practice (Woolcock, 2003).
It is even more interesting to observe how the newly established regulatory 
agencies have become an integral part and played an active role in resolving regulatory 
trade problems. Agencies such as AVA and ACFS, were both in the negotiating team. 
Arguably these agencies have exerted forward forces by attempting to eliminate 
regulatory barriers to trade, whether it is the creation of the Green Lane, AQSIQ 
certification, or MRA on conformity assessment. Some of the solutions may not be 
novel; however, this could be the agencies’ first attempt at tackling NTBs, without an 
industrialised trading partner imposing regulatory approaches. More importantly, these 
approaches should have lasting positive effects for future trade agreements.
Another vital group of actors which have played an integral part in tackling 
regulatory barriers to trade are the profit making NGOs. Their desire to penetrate the 
Chinese market has been a significant factor. Their active involvement, by reporting the 
NTBs they encounter, has played a vital role. As a Singapore negotiator urged, it is 
businesses that will make PTAs work. Without input from the business community prior 
and after negotiations, the government and negotiators would have no specific issues to 
negotiate.
Interestingly, much of the discussion up to now has been focused on the 
difficulties in exporting to China. However, the ACFTA was also designed to assist 
ASEAN importers who struggle with the flow of goods from China. On the domestic 
front, the massive flood of cheap Chinese produce has significantly lowered the price of 
goods, driving small-scale farmers out of the market. The interesting question is why has 
Thailand decided not to retaliate and erect NTBs of its own? A probable answer is the
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desire to maintain the status quo. Despite suffering from Chinese imports, the business 
community, as a whole, are unwilling to mobilise against PTAs because they benefit 
from the trade agreement as well. The larger traders believe there is greater benefit for 
them, at the expense of the smaller farmers. Sadly, only with the aid of civil society will 
smaller producers be heard.
Since the implementation of the EHP there has been extensive research by local 
and foreign NGOs calling for trade negotiators to be more prudent and considerate 
towards smaller producers, they have also called for a mechanism to protect the 
livelihoods of small local farmers, such as a social welfare system. Consequently, this has 
sparked NGOs to become more active and demanding towards trade negotiators, which 
has presented some positive effects, as governments have taken greater notice of NGOs. 
The forward force brought by NGOs has forced the Thai government to commission 
more feasibility studies on the effects of PTAs on small producers, and they have 
implemented a Structural Adjustment Fund to assist local businesses adversely affected 
by PTAs.
7.3 ASEAN: A Case for the Temporary Movement of Persons
As discussed in chapter three, ASEAN begin its trade liberalisation in 1993, aiming to 
become a single market and production base for the* free flow of goods, services and 
investments across the region, building on the three main pillars of AFTA, AIA and 
AFAS. ASEAN leaders aspired to accomplish a single market for the region by 2020, 
however, increasing competition from China and India prompted greater enthusiasm to 
speed up the process. In 2006, during the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister claimed the region had little choice but to accelerate economic 
integration. According to the Malaysian Ministry for Trade, in 2005 FDI into ASEAN 
reached a record US$38 billion, and this figure was forecast to rise if businesses could 
gain access to a single market of 530 million people. This prompted the Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Badawi, to reiterate:
“If we do not hasten the creation of that regional single market,
ASEAN may run the risk of losing its position as an important
investment destination”.
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As a consequence, economic ministers from all the ASEAN countries have laid 
down the nuts and bolts of an accelerated plan for an ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC). They also reviewed the ongoing trade liberalisation in goods, and will push for 
the liberalisation of the services sector by 2015. Moreover, the economic ministers and 
academics believe the AEC should become a PTA-plus, as opposed to being just a 
regular customs union, by incorporating the free movement of factors of production, such 
as labour and capital (Hew et al., 2005, p. 307).
However, amongst academics and practitioners alike, there are doubts whether 
this goal can be achieved given the wide economic disparity, the trade disputes, and 
conflict of national interest amongst the ten ASEAN members. This underscores the 
difficulties ASEAN will confront in attempting to achieve a common market. This 
includes the need to harmonise a wide range of variables from trade facilitation to 
services and investment, including the temporary movement of persons, which will be the 
main focus of this section.
7.3.1 Liberalising Services: Mode 4
The limitation of the AFAS stems from the little progress made in GATS. Without clear 
guidance from the WTO, there will traditionally be reluctance amongst ASEAN trade 
negotiators to define and push the liberalisation on trade in services. However, some 
policy makers are beginning to realise that:
“If there are no changes from the WTO, then offers from our trading 
partners will be small. Significant opportunities will be lost for both 
domestic reforms and better access to other markets.”
The statement is becoming more accepted given the significant role of service trade in 
ASEAN economies. According to Figure 20 (Manning & Sidorenko, 2007, p. 1090), 
services accounted for about two-thirds of Singapore’s economy, and the sector accounts 
for almost half o f the economies of more populous ASEAN members, such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam (Manning & Sidorenko, 2007, p. 1089).
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Figure 20: Share o f  GDP by Major Sectors in A SE A N  2003
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This is especially so in the area o f  service Mode 4, which is becom ing a common 
position for the advanced developing countries. Generally, most developed countries are 
concerned that trade agreements that allow workers to move freely will lead towards 
perm anent migration. However, others argue that this might not be the case for 
developing countries. Most o f  the workers in ASEAN are low and m iddle-range skilled 
workers who are not hired for the long periods that possibly lead towards permanent 
migration. Consequently, there is a possibility that an agreem ent could emerge for this 
mode o f supply (Findlay, 2005, p. 189).
From the point o f  view o f facilitating the movem ent o f  natural persons under 
AFAS, both Singapore and Thailand have limited concessions for business travellers 
from other ASEAN countries.115 The AFAS schedule contains horizontal or cross- 
sectoral commitments on Mode 4 made for intra-corporate transferees and business 
visitors. In other words, visa rules in Singapore and Thailand perm it business travellers 
from certain ASEAN countries to enter the country without a visa. Sim ilar concessions 
have been extended to Singapore and Thailand by other ASEAN countries like Malaysia, 
Brunei and Vietnam, which includes tourist visitors as well.
Thus, arguably there has been limited progress in the tem porary movement o f 
persons under AFAS. There are three closely related explanations for this. Firstly, most 
o f the benefits for business executives have already been developed under the APEC 
Business Travel Card Holder scheme, where all ASEAN m embers benefit. ASEAN
115 In Singapore, there is an exception for M alaysian workers, who are exem pted from paying the security 
deposit, which is not a significant concession given that the cost o f  repatriating a M alaysian worker across 
the border from Singapore is not large.
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members consider this as major development for the temporary movement of persons and 
they are unwilling to liberalise further beyond this point.
Secondly, there has hardly been any development for Service Mode 4 in any 
inter-regional PTAs. Most of the comprehensive trade agreements, such as the SAFTA, 
merely confirm the commitments of the APEC Travel Card Holder scheme. As a result, 
there has been little impetus or incentive to push domestic governmental agencies to 
liberalise their intra-regional commitments further beyond the current system.
Thirdly, a new position amongst the newer ASEAN members is emerging. Some 
states no longer want the temporary movement of people to benefit only business 
executives and a few selected occupations. The newer ASEAN members prefer the 
facilitation on horizontal movement of persons to benefit all sectors. The demands to 
broaden sectors to incorporate a greater variety of occupations has not been welcomed by 
the older members. Consequently, negotiations on the temporary movement of persons 
within ASEAN has come to a halt, but much of the concentration is now focused on the 
other areas, such as the recognition of qualifications.
7.3.2 Recognition o f Qualifications
More progress has been made in the recognition of qualifications in ASEAN. Several 
advanced developing ASEAN economies are eager to facilitate the movement of skilled 
and semi-skilled persons within ASEAN, because it is slowly becoming accepted as a 
vital part of their export in services trade.
For example, the ASEAN MRA on Nursing Services was brought up during the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in August 2006, which was later signed in 
December that year. 116 Specifically, nurses registered with their home professional 
councils and with the appropriate work experience can gain a temporary registration 
certificate that allows them to practise in the receiving country. The nurses would be 
evaluated and placed under the supervision of the nursing council in the host country 
until the council grants an extension for the applicant. In other words, the MRA will 
permit qualified nurses from any ASEAN member country to apply for employment in 
other ASAEAN member states. Thus the professional body for nurses in Thailand, the 
Thai Nursing Council, would assess the quality of the Singaporean and other ASEAN 
nurses employed in Thailand.
116 Som e A SE A N  countries, such as Indonesia, have not yet established a professional council/board for 
nurses.
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Originally, there were some concerns with this programme. As mentioned in 
chapter six, under the JTEPA, Japan offered to recognise the qualifications of Thai nurses 
if they wished to seek employment in Japan. However the Thai Nursing Council declined 
due to cultural barriers, and the negative impacts the programme would have on domestic 
hospitals. However, several policy makers dismissed the argument that scheme would 
lead towards such concerns. Within ASEAN, Singapore also has a shortage o f nursing 
staff because Singaporeans are seeking employment in more high-end services. 
Consequently, the city state has pushed for the ASEAN MRA on Nursing Services. 
However, Singapore has to provide further programmes aimed at training nurses from 
CLMV countries to overcome non-regulatory barriers, such as language and cultural 
differences, which should assist the mobility of professionals in ASEAN.
Other professional qualifications have also recently been recognised in ASEAN, 
such as the MRA for engineers. In 2005, during the Coordinated Committee o f Services, 
in the Working Group on Business, professional bodies for engineers, which included 
government officials and the Council of Thai Engineers and the Professional Engineering 
Board of Singapore, negotiated an MRA for ASEAN engineers. The MRA builds on the 
reciprocated recognition of qualified engineers from ASEAN states, individuals with a 
degree in engineering coupled with relevant work experience can apply for the same 
position in another ASEAN state. This is considered novel because professions such as 
engineering have traditionally been closed to foreigners. More importantly, this is an 
improvement beyond the regular multilateral agreements.
There are two motivational forces behind this MRA. A Thai trade official pointed 
out that the ASEAN MRA on engineers was a duplicate o f an older PTA, specifically 
from the APEC MRA on engineers. The APEC version was already under negotiation, 
however, it never materialised due to limited support from the industrialised APEC 
members. Consequently, the initial blueprint from APEC was the motivational source 
behind the ASEAN version. Since ASEAN members already participated in the APEC 
negotiations, they merely continued from the blueprint and completed an intra-Southeast 
Asian MRA for Engineers instead.
The second motivation behind the MRA comes from the current PTAs. Both 
Thailand and Singapore are separately negotiating an agreement with Australia and New 
Zealand that will recognise qualifications for engineers. Moreover, Singapore has already 
completed an understanding with Japan for the recognition of engineers. Thus, 
Singaporean and Thai negotiators are equipped with experience and knowledge in
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negotiating intra-regional MRA for engineers, and this may have enhanced their 
understanding of what is required from such negotiations.
Other MRAs for professional qualifications are also underway. ASEAN leaders 
have proposed the end o f2008 as a target to complete MRAs for accountants, architects, 
auditors, landscape designers, and medical practitioners. Interestingly much progress has 
been made in the negotiations for architects, such that a completed agreement could be 
reached before the 2008 target. Furthermore, it must also be noted that Singapore already 
has an MRA with Australia for architects, and Thailand is currently negotiating the same 
topic with Australia. Consequently, the recognition o f professional qualifications is 
becoming a serious subject matter amongst ASEAN members, but some of the 
motivation behind this can be attributed to inter-regional trade agreements.
7.3.3 Facilitating Trade
The facilitation of trade is a vital component in the success of the AEC. In 1997, ASEAN 
members signed the ASEAN Agreement on Customs, aimed to enhance customs 
cooperation and harmonisation of procedures. Thus ensuring consistency, transparency, 
and fair application of customs laws and regulation, procedures and other administrative 
guidelines within ASEAN member states. Moreover, in 2003, ASEAN members decided 
to include a customs classification system for ASEAN, referred to as the ASEAN  
Harmonised System o f  Tariff Nomenclature (ASEAN, 2003) fully implemented at the 
beginning of 2004.
These developments were established as part of the ASEAN Customs Vision 
2020117 (Hew et al., 2005, p. 305), Singapore and Thailand’s customs departments aim to 
slowly introduce minor customs agreements that will eventually lead to the 2020 
agreement.
7.3.4 Domestic Institutional Trade Capacity
There appears to be much development on the temporary movement of persons in the 
intra-regional ASEAN agreement. However, as appears from the previous chapters on 
inter-regional agreements, there have hardly been any developments in governmental 
agencies with respect to facilitating the movement of people. Singapore’s International 
Relations Unit, under MOM, was established to oversee the evolution of this matter,
117 For further details see  the Joint Press Statement on the Fifth A S E A N  Director-G enerals o f  Custom s 
M eeting, Brunei Darussalam , 22-23 M ay 1997.
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however, they have hardly played any vital role in the recent intra-regional 
developments. Similarly, Thailand’s improvements in the Immigration Bureau and the 
one-stop service virtually played no role because it only serves as a facilitator, and they 
did not participate in the decision making process. Interestingly, in Thailand most of the 
intra-regional negotiations and decision making are centred on MOC, and have not been 
fully assigned to any particular ministry. As a consequence, there appears to be a parallel 
stagnation in the new governmental agencies involved and of further liberalisation under 
service mode 4.
One of the compelling explanations is the mixed feelings about further 
liberalising the movement of persons. This could be attributed to the fact that most 
ASEAN members, especially the newer members, wish to see the horizontal 
liberalisation of service mode 4 to include all sectors. This may have triggered the 
deadlock in the negotiations with the more advanced ASEAN members.
In contrast, the significance of the recognition of qualifications has rapidly risen. 
Previously, Singapore hardly paid any attention to the recognition of professionals, 
however, after signing several PTAs, it has rapidly become an accepted issue. 
Understandably, both governments in Singapore and Thailand realised that professional 
bodies were the best actors to judge whether competitors were sufficiently qualified and 
whether their standards meet domestic benchmarks. This places professional bodies, 
which have never been involved in trade issues before, right in the centre of the 
negotiations as well as the implementation and tracking quality assurance. The 
contributions from professional bodies in both Singapore and Thailand have become 
more open, a Singaporean trade officials suggest:
Once professional bodies begin to internalise the effects of the 
changing world, it is inevitable for them to initiate the liberalisation 
process as early as possible.
By becoming involved in the negotiating process, professional bodies can decide 
when the liberalisation should begin and on what terms. There are also business groups 
with limited desire to liberalise their professions, which can be observed from their 
notable absence from the process. Nonetheless the ones which have chosen to liberalise 
have played an important role in liberalisation and can be considered as forward forces. 
Some of the developments in the inter-regional PTAs have unclogged some of the
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unnecessary obstructions and cleared the path for domestic professional bodies to ease 
their protectionist stance, leading to future MRAs for engineers and nurses in their intra- 
regional PTAs. Thus, forward forces, brought by the involvements of professional bodies 
are crucial due to their unique knowledge of their own profession in the economy. The 
involvement of professional bodies is required if there is to be any form of liberalisation 
of professions in both intra and inter-regional trade agreements. More importantly, it sets 
the scene for future liberalisation on similar fields.
Nonetheless, in order to achieve full integration, there needs to be harmonisation 
of domestic trade laws, which will result in changes in national legislation. Interesting in 
September 2006, members of ASEAN acknowledged for the first time the need to 
harmonise trade laws in order to achieve regional economic integration, but they also 
admit the complexities of achieving this ambitious goal, chiefly due to differences in 
legal frameworks. However, only by ironing out differences in their respective trade laws 
can ASEAN improve regional trade and security cooperation in the long run. The MRA 
on professional recognition is an example of harmonisation, and a vital ingredient for 
economic integration.
7.4 Singapore Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship
In 2002, ASEAN leaders agreed to explore the possibility of transforming ASEAN into 
an integrated AEC. However, ASEAN leaders also recognised that there is a disparity in 
the level of development amongst ASEAN members. As a result, they agreed to adopt the 
“Two plus X” approach, allowing two member countries that are ready to integrate in 
certain sectors to progress ahead. The first two countries eager to accelerate the economic 
integration process were Singapore and Thailand (Dent, 2006a; Hew, 2005).
This led Singapore and Thailand to deepen their economic cooperation by signing 
the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship (STEER), promoting the idea 
of “one economy, two countries”. The agreement envisages cooperation in many areas, 
including ways to facilitate trade, simplify customs procedures, promote investments, 
share resources and improve the regulatory environment for doing business.
STEER was motivated by globalisation forces and the rise of China. Furthermore, 
Singapore and Thailand believe such an agreement would create a positive demonstrative 
effect for other ASEAN states to follow suit, as argued by a Singaporean official:
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“STEER will not only drive greater economic cooperation between the 
two economies, it will also be a ‘pathfinder’ for greater economic 
cooperation within ASEAN as a whole.”
It is hoped that STEER will propel ASEAN into a “one economy, ten countries” 
agreement. Some trade officials described the bilateral effort as “tango dance” which they 
hope will persuade other ASEAN members to step onto the dance floor.
However, this approach entails two problems. Firstly, if two members wish to 
accelerate their integration process, in practice, they would not require consensus 
amongst other ASEAN members. Secondly, if a third country wishes to join the lead 
countries, they will be bounded by the first movers’ agreement, assuming the latecomers 
do not devise a divergent path of their own. As a result, some academics have voiced 
concern whether such an approach would converge or diverge ASEAN integration (Dent, 
2006a; Hew & Sen, 2004).
Nonetheless, in November 2005,12 MOUs were inked under STEER, four were 
govemment-to-govemment agreements, which includes investments for infrastructure, 
human resource developments for civil servants, facilitation of labourers, and the 
facilitation of agricultural produce, including a joint SPS agreement. The remaining seven 
were business-to-business pacts, this includes investment projects towards the
1 i o
development of: agricultural products, the automobile industry, finance, tourism, 
logistics and transportation,119 SMEs, and other joint ventures between Singaporean and
1 90Thai enterprises for investing in third countries. Some of them have contributed 
towards facilitating trade and the movement of persons.
7.4.1 Health and Safety Standards
An example of reducing regulatory barriers in goods under STEER is the recognition of
1 9 1regulatory standards on export of processed food, such as processed pork products. 
Under the framework of STEER, the Department of Livestock Development and AVA
1,8 Such as creating greater links betw een the Stock Exchange o f  Thailand and the Singaporean Exchange  
Ltd. There are also future plans to link both stock markets together and launch a SE T 50 futures contract.
119 For exam ple, the logistical developm ent aim s to create a freer flow  for cargo and im proved maritime 
operations within a year.
120 With specific  focus on the Pearl River delta in China and the Greater M ekong sub-region.
121 Form ally the agreement is known as “the M O U on the export o f  processed pork products between  
Thailand and Singapore”, which m ainly includes the export o f  pork dum plings, pork sausages, ham, pork 
buns and bologna sausages.
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closely worked with Thailand to establish the food safety requirements and procedures 
for the export of heated processed pork products between the two nations.
Normally, countries wishing to export processed pork to Singapore must conform 
to AVA’s standards and domestic legal requirements. However, under the MOU, similar 
to the EHP, AVA will visit processing establishments in Thailand to assess their food 
safety assurance programmes and sanitary standards. This method will reduce the risks, 
time delays and costs associated with regulatory approvals in the importer’s market, and 
it will also minimise the risk and cost for exporters.
Both countries saw the agreement as mutually beneficial because Singapore is a 
food-import dependent country, while Thailand is a major food exporter. Thus, the MOU 
was primarily composed for this purpose, bestowing a greater onus on Thailand. Thai 
negotiators were willing to accept this because it was seen as a means for increasing Thai 
food standards for exporters. Nevertheless, the MOU on heat processed pork products is 
merely the beginning of a broader and deeper relationship between Singapore and 
Thailand on the import-export of food, an area in which both countries can work together 
for mutual benefits.
7.4.2 Temporary Movement o f Persons
Aside from the recognition of standards, there have been developments in the temporary 
movement of persons as well. The two Southeast Asian nations have agreed to cooperate 
and find means of attracting travellers. STEER’s tourism promotion programme aims to 
attract one million tourists, especially from China, to visit ASEAN destinations. As a 
result, they have simplified the travelling procedures for both tourists and business 
travellers, by introducing a single visa entry for both Singapore and Thailand. The 
development means that non-ASEAN members who would normally require visas when 
entering Singapore or Thailand, are now permitted to continue their journey into the other 
country without the need to apply for a new visa. This limits the need for travellers and 
business persons to reapply for a visa, as well as promoting a more conducive and 
facilitating environment for investors.
During the signing ceremony of STEER, Thailand’s then minister responsible for 
trade, Dr Somkid Jatusipitak, declared:
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“such a joint initiative would be a showcase for other members of 
ASEAN and inspire them to join Singapore and Thailand for deeper 
integration”.
The free movement of people is one of the key components for economic 
integration which will bring Singapore and Thailand a step closer to the AEC. Moreover, 
both governments have established a special team to examine and prepare the necessary 
details and legal requirements for creating a single visa for all ASEAN countries.
7.4.3 Recognition o f Skills
STEER also facilitates the movement of persons by including an agreement on jointly 
setting labour skills standards. The agreement paves the way for Singaporeans and Thais 
who desires to work in the partner country to take a job skills test in their own country, 
instead of completing the test in the partner country. The previous procedure was 
considered very cumbersome because applicants who failed the test in the partner country 
would be forced to return home, at their own expense. Furthermore, aside from the 
guaranteed travel arrangements and the eligibility to work in the partner country there are 
plans to allow workers who have passed the jobs skills test to be treated as a domestic 
worker in the partner country. For example, a Thai worker who is qualified to work in 
Singapore will be entitled to full welfare benefits under Singaporean law.
This agreement was created because there are currently more than 50,000 Thai 
workers in Singapore. Most of the workers involved are in unskilled and semi-skilled 
occupations. As a consequence, both Thailand and Singapore agreed to change their 
domestic laws and cooperate in developing occupational skill standards for their workers, 
especially Thai workers. The agreement thus paves the way for Thailand to increase the 
export of semi-skilled workers to Singapore, especially qualified cooks and spa-workers, 
coinciding with Thailand’s “Kitchen of the World” programme. The agreement also 
permits some IT-oriented labour to enter Thailand and promotes technological and 
knowledge transfer.
Simultaneously Thailand and Singapore also created a MOU on education and 
cultural exchange promotion. The education agreement includes an exchange programme 
for language teachers at secondary and tertiary education levels. During the signing 
ceremony, the Singaporean diplomat Chan Heng Wing claimed:
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“Singapore has always recognised that education and worker training 
is the key to our development, and Thailand has also recognised this 
fact. That is why we laid great store on cooperation in education and 
training.”
More importantly, the MOU also encourages students and teachers under the programme 
to achieve a recognisable qualification that allows them to work in the partner country. 
This will allow Thais transferred to Singapore to be automatically qualified to work in 
Singapore.
7.4.4 Domestic Institutional Trade Capacity
The “one economy, two countries” approach towards ASEAN economic integration, 
propelled by Singapore and Thailand, appears to have ignited some small economic 
integration projects, however, they are very weak because they are non-binding MOUs, 
and the coverage is limited to a number of products. Nevertheless, these are the first 
infant steps which could become a blueprint for the wider AEC.
Nevertheless, to enable the MOUs to reach this far has required a lot of 
negotiation and coordination between the two economies. From the three cases above, the 
main players in negotiating and implementing process, aside from the ministries 
responsible for trade, have the new governmental agencies which have recently been 
empowered during the inter-regional PTA negotiations. The recently established 
Singaporean AVA and the Thai ACFS, for example, have been working together to 
formulate an agreement for processed food, as well as examining the quality and safety 
of the food products in the partner’s country before export. This cements the claim that 
new agencies created from inter-regional agreements have become forward forces in both 
the negotiating and procedural implementation. Other government ministries, such as the 
Singaporean International Relations Unit, and Thailand’s Immigration Bureau, have also 
become directly involved with the creation of the new ASEAN visa project.
Other domestic variables have also been encouraged to play a role in the 
integration process as well. As the Singaporean Minister for MTI suggested: the 
economic integration of Southeast Asia should not only be driven top-down, it should 
also be pushed from bottom-up. Generally politics moves slower than economics, and 
there are always groups opposed to change. As a result, the business sector cannot always 
rely on the government, ASEAN businessmen should organise themselves and play a
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greater role in pressuring their political leaders to move faster. STEER is an example 
where the business community moves faster. Although STEER is a government led 
programme, the agreement tilts in favour of the business community; seven of the 12 
MOUs were mainly investment and cooperation projects between the business sector. 
Why have local businesses welcomed this change? Singaporean businesses are keen to 
invest in new ventures; whereas Thailand welcomes the injection of foreign money and 
exchange of knowledge.
Nevertheless, more could still be achieved under STEER. Despite the ambitious 
development to move ahead of the other ASEAN members, the agreement, especially on 
the government side, remains limited. As one academic comments, the partial reason for 
the lag in the government MOU can be attributed to the limited willingness to deepen 
integration, without consent from other ASEAN members (Hew, 2005).
7.5 Conclusion
The previous chapter illustrated that signing inter-regional PTAs has enhanced Singapore 
and Thailand’s institutional trade capacity. Arguably, PTAs have provided the two 
Southeast Asian countries with a more structured negotiating capacity and experienced 
government officials and created governmental agencies which oversee the elimination of 
regulatory barriers to trade. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the newly 
developed institutional trade capacity, from inter-regional PTAs, serves as a platform for 
Singapore and Thailand to further develop their own intra-regional trade arrangements.
This will be illustrated in the institutional trade capacity framework table below. 
Unlike previous tables, the second column recalls some of the key institutional 
developments from inter-regional PTAs, whereas the third column explains the intra- 
regional developments; thus, acting as a summary of the findings in this chapter. 
However, since some of the intra-regional agreements were conducted at roughly the 
same time as inter-regional agreements, as a consequence, some of the institutional 
developments had not gained enough time to project any forward or backward forces to 
intra-regional PTAs.
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Area of Impact Domestic Development 
from Inter-regional PTAs
Developments in Intra- 
regional PTAs
Negotiating Capacity
Singapore: recruited new 
negotiators.
Thailand: outsourced to 
other ministries
New negotiators and agencies 
participated in all intra-regional 
PTAs
Coordination
Within ministries Singapore: none 
Thailand: creating or 
assigning new departments.
No significant contributions 
made.
Between ministries Singapore: FTA Fund 
Thailand: ISTA
No significant contributions 
made, but negotiators believe 
communications from previous 
trade negotiations played a more 
important role.
NGO Consultation
Academic institutions Singapore: No change 
Thailand: called to provide 
assessment on marginal 
parts of society.
No academic report on the 
impact of marginal segments of 
society. Mainly because the 
changes came in too late.
Business society In both Singapore and 
Thailand, greater 
contributions came from the 
business community, and 
professional bodies.
ASEAN: MRA for engineers 
and nurses
STEER: developed Singapore- 
Thai visa.
STEER: includes cooperation 
between business
Non Profit agencies Singapore: no change 
Thailand: FTA Watch
ACFTA saw limited movement 
from NGOs protesting for 
marginalised farmers.
Implementation
Judicial and legal system Several changes were 
bought into Singaporean and 
Thai laws, from ROO, and 
transparent means of 
customs procedures to allow 
foreign professionals to 
work.
ACFTA: Singaporean and Thais 
see greater transparency in their 
own customs authority.
ASEAN: as part of ASEAN 
Customs Vision 2020, 
improvements in ASEAN 
customs.
STEER: development of a 
Singapore-Thailand visa.
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Procedural and 
establishing new 
agencies.
Singapore: International 
Relations Unit, AVA, 
SPRING were established
Thailand: National 
Standards Council, one- 
stop-service were 
established.
ACFTA: creating, “green lane”, 
AQSIQ certificated farms, 
Moving forward to creating a 
MRA on conformity assessment
STEER: MRA process food.
Creating New Trade 
Strategy
No significant change Due to success of visa 
programme, STEER aims to 
develop a single ASEAN visa.
There are aims to explain 
STEER to other ASEAN 
members.
Table 6: Institutional Trade Capacity Framework on intra-regional developm ents
Beginning with the negotiating capacity, Singapore recruited several new trade 
negotiators and Thailand outsourced its negotiating power to more relevant ministries. 
This projected forward forces to the intra-regional developments, which includes new 
governmental and non-governmental agents in the negotiation process. The new 
governmental agencies, such as AVA and ACFS, played major roles in developing novel 
approaches in improving trade facilitation to China. Non-governmental agencies, such as 
the professional bodies, have also become involved in the ASEAN MRAs. This 
illustrates how important new agents have become, especially when compared with 
ASEAN’s previous negotiations, which did not include such trade issues and most of 
these new agencies.
Interestingly, for Singapore, governmental agencies have recruited several new 
lawyers, who will become the new breed of trade negotiators. However, it is surprising to 
discover that most of Singapore’s intra-regional trade agreements have resulted in 
MOUs, instead of more legal binding agreements. One of the possible reasons behind this 
is that Singapore’s trading partners, including Thailand, were reluctant to commit with 
legal binding agreements. Another possible point is because Singapore and Thailand did 
not seek to sign binding agreements that would prevent third parties from joining. 
Alternatively, this may also be a cultural phenomenon for Asian countries. More of this 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.
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Regarding coordination, several developments resulted form inter-regional PTAs, 
such as Singapore’s FTA Fund, Thailand’s ISTA, and new governmental departments 
designed to coordinate within ministries. However, it has been difficult to capture 
whether the FTA Fund or the governmental department have played any significant 
coordination role in the recent intra-regional PTAs. The reasoning behind this could be 
attributed to the recent rise of the department and funds, which may require more time to 
reach their true potential. Nevertheless, most trade negotiators believe the frequent inter- 
ministerial meetings during inter-regional PTAs have helped negotiators discover and 
understand other ministries faster than previous encounters. They believe the regularity 
of their meetings has played a more significant role in cementing their cooperation and 
coordination.
On consultation, Singapore and Thailand have not truly introduced any new 
procedures with academic consultation. Policy makers have expressed the desire to hire 
academic consultants assessing the effects of PTAs on marginal segments of society. 
However, this idea emerged after the EHP between China and Thailand, when Thai 
farmers were coping with the floods of cheaper Chinese produce into the Thai market. 
Unfortunately, Thailand’s remaining intra-regional PTAs, ASEAN and STEER, were 
focused on industries, rather than agriculture, thus failing to provide evidence that Thai 
policymakers have learnt from previous experience.
Inputs from the business community, on the other hand, have been in abundance. 
Since inter-regional PTAs, the possibility of greater competition has forced several 
business groups to become more vocal. Some still lurk behind the curtain of regionalism, 
which reflects the backward forces. Some business groups from the older ASEAN 
members have prohibited further liberalisation of the temporary movement of persons 
beyond corporate executives, this also registers as a backward force. However, some seek 
to embrace regionalism and the desire to expand their business, as observed under 
STEER, which contains more private sector cooperation than cooperation between 
governments.
More importantly, the introduction of professional bodies has been the greatest 
contribution. They have been integral in the creation of the ASEAN MRA for qualified 
engineers and nurses, and the possible introduction of other professions as well. 
Traditionally professional services has been a closely guarded sector, in both Singapore 
and Thailand. Commentators have argued that in ASEAN the stumbling bloc for further 
liberalisation has chiefly come from interest groups (Bowles & MacLean, 1996; Hew,
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2005, p. 7; Stubbs, 2000). However, interest groups which were previously hostile to 
liberalisation are currently more willing to liberalise. This is very apparent in both 
Singaporean and Thai professional bodies. Some have adopted an abrupt change in 
attitude towards trade liberalisation and regionalism.
By bringing the entrenched professional bodies into the process of inter-regional 
negotiations, they have reduced the frictional cost associated with trade barriers. This has 
loosened the tightly screwed jar of protectionism; once they have become involved, 
interest groups are more willing to discuss similar issues with other countries, including 
intra-regional agreements; thus illustrating a case of forward force. Some scholars argue 
that PTAs can actually lay the basis for promoting openness. In Oye’s view, 
discrimination stemming from preferential arrangements can mobilise and strengthen the 
politics of export-oriented and anti-protectionist interests, thereby generating domestic 
pressure to accept agreements that expands access to partners’ markets. Such agreements, 
in turn, are likely to contribute to more openness (Oye, 1992, pp. 143-4). Thus, the 
forward force brought both professional and industrial groups into the process, provides 
another form of reducing institutional cost, which smoothens the way for similar issues 
on professional qualifications to be negotiated at the regional level.
With respect to NGOs, during inter-regional PTA negotiations, Singapore did not 
experience any civil society movements, whereas Thailand saw the creation of FTA- 
Watch and other civil movements. However, Thailand’s experience during intra-regional 
PTA negotiations was very different -  initially there were hardly any movements from 
NGOs, but given time there were movements against ACFTA, but not for the other intra- 
regional projects.
This begs an interesting question on why civil movements have been active and 
vocally hostile towards inter-regional PTAs, but almost silent during intra-regional PTAs. 
There are several reasons behind this: firstly, there are less fears from intra-regional 
PTAs because the agreements are chiefly MOUs, so they are not considered legally 
binding. Furthermore, unlike inter-regional agreements, intra-regional agreements did not 
touch on contentious issues, such as intellectual property rights, which affected public 
health services. Secondly, provisions relating to regulatory barriers to trade were only 
concluded after the signing of the main agreement. For example, ACFTA concluded the 
Agreement on Goods, but the “green lane” was only conceived afterwards. As a result, 
some NGOs were completely unaware of the additional agreements. Thirdly, NGOs did 
oppose some intra-regional PTAs, however, this only occurred after some time lag. For
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example, in the EHP between China and Thailand, NGOs did not foresee the negative 
impacts on small scale local farmers, since they were more concerned about PTAs with 
industrialised economies. Only after the negative result on local producers did NGOs 
became highly vocal. Overall, local NGOs, at least in Thailand, were silent because they 
were in the dark. Furthermore, they were more concerned with countries that have greater 
leverage power, and agreements which could significantly change sensitive domestic 
issues. Thus, NGO’s could be considered as providing backward force because they lead 
countries towards less liberalisation.
On legislative implementation, inter-regional PTAs brought some changes in 
Singapore and Thailand’s legal systems. PTAs provided the possibilities to review 
existing laws on trade facilitation and the movement of persons. In both Singapore and 
Thailand, some domestic laws have not been reviewed for decades, but inter-regional 
PTAs which tackle certain domestic regulation gives civil servants the opportunity, not 
only to insert new laws from the PTA, but the possibility to revise the existing laws that 
were outdated.
The electronic customs system, which bought greater efficiency and speed in 
clearing customs have also had a positive effect in reducing the possibility for corruption. 
Some of these developments were also been introduced in their intra-regional PTAs as 
well. Currently, since the introduction of the green lane, Thai customs are able to clear 
qualified Chinese produce at much faster speed. More importantly, the confidence in the 
Singapore and Thai customs departments has raised their credibility such that other 
ASEAN members are willing to use Thailand as a platform for exporting their products 
into China. Furthermore, Singapore and Thailand’s customs departments have become 
significant players in their countries’ trade negotiations, and they have played a 
significant role in pushing the ASEAN Customs Vision 2020 agreement, by regularly 
introducing minor agreements to keep the momentum rolling.
Most of the intra-regional developments, between South-South countries, have 
materialised in the procedural implementation. Much of the inter-regional developments 
involve the development of domestic agencies and procedures, such as Singapore’s 
AVA, the International Relations Unit, SPRING Singapore; and Thailand’s National 
Standards Council, one-stop visa service, and ACFS. The mentioned agencies have 
played a positive role in intra-regional PTAs, thus, reinforcing the fact that the 
developments from external PTAs outside the region has assisted domestic institutional 
developments to adopt similar patterns in their own intra-regional trade agreements.
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For example, the EHP between China and Thailand encountered several problems 
on trade facilitation. Governmental agencies, such as the Thai Customs Department and 
the newly formed ACFS devised ways of improving trade facilitation to China, such as 
the green lane and the AQSIQ certified farms. Similarly, SPRING Singapore and 
Thailand’s National Standards Council still aim to facilitate export of industrial goods 
into China, by aiming to establish a MRA on conformity assessment with the Chinese 
AQSIQ. Similarly, in STEER, AVA and ACFS have created an MRA on processed food. 
Overall, governmental agencies were developed when Singapore and Thailand were 
negotiating their inter-regional PTAs; currently, they are capable of carrying out their 
duties in a constructive manner and seeking alternative solutions in their intra-regional 
agreements.
Finally on new strategies, from previous chapters, inter-regional PTAs failed to 
inspire changes in Singapore and Thailand’s trade policy. Nonetheless, intra-regional 
PTAs have inspired Singapore and Thailand to adopt new strategies, but they are 
unrelated to inter-regional PTAs. Firstly, the success of the Singapore-Thailand visa, 
permitting business travellers to enter both countries with one document under STEER, 
has prompted both countries to aim for an ASEAN-wide visa that should promote 
regional tourism and facilitate the movement of business people within ASEAN.122
Secondly, there are plans to expand STEER by introducing similar agreements 
into the region. In 2006, Singapore signed the Framework Agreement on Vietnam- 
Singapore Connectivity. The agreement aims to be an economic road map to encourage 
cooperation in trade and services, investment, education and training, technology, 
finance, and transportation, thus boosting bilateral trade between Vietnam and Singapore. 
Consequently, this has encouraged Singapore to push agreements such as STEER, and 
the Connectivity, with other ASEAN members, as a means of pressuring them forward to 
achieve the AEC.
Overall, there have been concerns from scholars whether PTAs complement the 
ongoing economic integration process in ASEAN (Sally & Sen, 2005, p. 108). However, 
from a timeline perspective, most of the recent developments in the intra-regional PTAs 
were created after the signing of, or in parallel with, the inter-regional negotiations. This
122 In D ecem ber 2007 , Thailand and Cambodia signed a single v isa  agreem ent enabling 
visitors to use one v isa  for the two countries. The pact is a pilot project under the A yeyaw ady-C hao Phya- 
M ekong E conom ic Cooperation Strategy. The joint developm ent schem e includes 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam , which aim s to achieve the “Four countries, One D estination” 
initiative.
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chapter aims to show how inter-regional PTAs caused Singapore and Thailand to 
enhance their instructional trade capacity. PTAs have also introduced deeper integration 
approaches for Thailand and Singapore that suit their intra-regional PTAs. Moreover, 
from the domestic institutional framework, it seems natural to believe there exists a link 
between the inter-regional PTAs and how it affects intra-regional outcomes. However, 
this chapter does not argue that the perception on liberalisation has changed as a result of 
the inter-regional PTAs; it would be stretching the story too far given that only a few 
sectors have been liberalised in intra-regional trade. Moreover, not all deeper integration 
issues from inter-regional agreements were carried forward to the intra-regional track; 
illustrating how Singapore and Thailand are still selective in the sectors they aim to 
liberalise.
Nevertheless, inter-regional PTAs have assisted Singapore and Thailand to build 
their domestic institutional trade capacity to find their own means of tackling NTBs, even 
if it is not full liberalisation, it is better than no liberalisation at all. However, this leads to 
an interesting question, what are the implications of the findings from intra-regional 
integration? This issue will be dealt in the final chapter.
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8 Chapter VIII 
Conclusion and Implications- 
An A lternative Route towards Regional Integration?
The sustained well-being and vibrancy o f East Asia 
also depends on its links with the other parts o f the world...
Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor of Singapore123
8.1 Introduction
Prior to this chapter, the thesis has provided a narrative in the evolution of Singapore and 
Thailand’s PTA policies. Much of the narrative emphasised facilitation of trade and the 
movement or persons. The differing chapters were tied together through a thread, which 
argued that Singapore and Thailand’s inter-regional PTAs with industrialised countries 
improved their domestic institutional trade capacity, providing them with knowledge and 
experience to formulate their own strategies and implement similar regulatory policies in 
their own intra-regional PTAs. Consequently, given the findings, this chapter aims to 
discuss the implications for regional economic integration, by applying the regional PTA 
integration framework outlined at the end of chapter two. Thus it elaborates the primary 
question of the thesis, the reinforcing relationships between preferential trade agreements 
and domestic institutional capacity related to trade.
This chapter also aims to address the three inter-related questions posed in the 
introductory chapter. This includes the question of how PTAs influence domestic 
institutions. Why have both Singapore and Thailand been able to complete more 
comprehensive intra-regional PTAs than their regional neighbours? and does this lead 
towards an Asian regional PTA model? Furthermore, this chapter aims to provide a 
conclusion as well as implications for the multilateral trading system.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first objective is to demonstrate how 
the empirical observations from the previous chapters, especially on the facilitating trade 
and the movement of persons, fits together with the institutional trade capacity 
framework and the deeper regional PTA integration framework. Moreover, this section
123 (Honorary doctorate speech at Korea University, Seoul)
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will expose the limitations of both analytical frameworks, as well as the methodological 
weaknesses, thus, refining, discarding, and supplementing the analytical framework; 
ultimately providing a better understanding of international trade and regional PTA 
integration. More importantly, this will be used to discuss the hypothesis of the thesis.
The second objective is to discuss the multilateral dimension o f the research. 
However, given the limited empirical evidence of Singapore and Thailand’s position at 
the multilateral negotiations, due to the stagnant multilateral trade talks,124 there is no 
evidence to support claims at the multilateral level. Consequently, this section aims to 
take a step back and illustrate how the findings of this thesis contribute to the traditional 
debate on PTAs, namely the implications of regional and bilateral PTAs on the 
multilateral trading system. The influence towards the multilateral system can be broken 
down into two differing forms: Firstly, since bilateral PTAs have influenced countries’ 
behaviours towards deeper integration, by providing experience to negotiate and 
implement WTO-plus, would this change countries’ perspective on trade policy making 
at the multilateral negotiations? Secondly, since PTAs also affect regional outcomes, 
would the dynamic at the regional level affect the multilateral level?
As a consequence, the outline of the concluding chapter will be as follows. The 
first section will elaborate the analytical frameworks by applying the empirical findings 
of the previous chapters, and exposing the weakness of the model, in order to refine the 
framework. The second part will attempt to expand the findings from the previous 
chapters, both from an individual country a regional bloc perspective, to provide some 
contribution to the literature and implication for the future of the multilateral trading 
system.
8.2 Findings and Revisiting the Analytical Frameworks
Much of the literature on PTAs aims to discuss the interaction between the multilateral 
and PTAs, and whether they are building blocs or stumbling blocs There has been little 
discussion on the influence of PTAs on domestic factors in countries; this thesis’s 
contribution to the literature is to address the mentioned question by providing a detailed 
narrative and analysis on the interplay between PTAs and the domestic mechanism.
124 According to the W TO , Singapore and Thailand have recently made revisions in their multilateral trade 
negotiations from 1996, how ever, the two countries have chosen not to d isclose  such information to the 
general public.
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This thesis has employed two analytical frameworks in order to illustrate the two 
level playing field in detail. The first is the Institutional Trade Capacity framework, 
utilised to observe and measure the improvements in institutions which may have 
resulted from comprehensive PTAs, in other words it explains how external forces affect 
domestic dynamics. The second is the Deeper Regional PTA Integration framework, 
which aims to illustrate how PTAs with deeper regulatory provisions could assist the 
development of regional PTAs, thus explaining the international dynamic. This section 
will observe both analytical frameworks’ weaknesses and clarify their positions.
8.2.1 Institutional Trade Capacity
The institutional trade capacity framework, employed in all the empirical chapters, shows 
how domestic institutional capacity related to trade, both at the micro and macro level, 
has changed since Singapore and Thailand engaged in PTAs. The framework also 
explains the first interrelated question of the thesis: how can PTAs influence domestic 
institutions? This can be observed from the forward and backward forces which 
supplement the framework. However, there are certain limitations in this framework 
which need to be addressed.
Firstly, an underlying weakness of the institutional trade capability framework, 
which affects all five areas of impact of the framework, is the degree of uncertainty about 
whether the changes in domestic institutions were a result of PTAs. It is difficult to say 
with complete certainty whether the developments in domestic institutional capacity were 
a result of the case study countries’ involvement with PTAs. In the case of Thailand, 
without the introduction of comprehensive PTAs, it is questionable whether new 
regulatory agencies and participation from the business community would have risen. In 
the case of Singapore, it is debateable whether the city state was already converging 
towards greater institutional trade capacity development without the aid of PTAs. This 
logic is cemented when we realise that the multilateral track is in a deadlock, thus there 
are no motivational forces to push Singapore and Thailand’s domestic institutions to 
progress towards this level. Thus, in the absence of deepening in the multilateral 
negotiations, inter-regional PTAs have triggered and accelerated Singapore and 
Thailand’s path towards developing domestic institutional capacity.
To raise a few examples, during the interviews, several Singaporean officials 
reiterated plans to create regulatory agencies, such as AVA or SPRING Singapore, before 
Singapore engaged in PTAs. However, most of these agencies were fully operational
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after the signing of the ANZSCEP. A specific example is the incorporation of existing 
regulatory departments in Singapore into AVA after its birth.125 Conceivably 
Singaporean policy makers may have developed further understandings from ANZSCEP 
and embraced some of those lessons into their regulatory agencies before engaging in 
further trade agreements. Another example is Singapore’s stance towards the 
liberalisation of financial services. Many Singaporean trade negotiators were aware that 
financial liberalisation plans existed, however, few knew the details of this plan. It was 
only after signing the USSFTA, that Singapore’s financial liberalisation plans came into 
existence, thus combining the acceleration of domestic institutional developments. 
Coupled with the sufficiency in the timeline, it is possible to argue that PTAs have 
influenced the formation and composition of Singapore’s domestic institutional capacity. 
Unfortunately, the difficulty lies in measuring the degree o f influence PTAs have on 
domestic institutional capacity.
The second limitation of the institutional trade capacity framework is whether any 
additional areas of impact can be included into the five areas o f impacts. One of the areas 
of impact that was purposely excluded is the observation of remedies when parties enter a 
dispute. The discussions in the previous chapters include informal remedies, which was 
under the implementation row, this includes the hotline in the EHP between China and 
Thailand. However, there has been no discussion on formal procedures when a dispute 
requires arbitration. Both Singapore and Thailand have adopted similar templates of 
dispute settlement procedures in most of their PTAs, namely international arbitration; 
however, most of the PTAs studied are still in their infancy, as a result, there are limited
1 "Jf\number of disputes to report.
Conversely, from the five areas of impact there appears to be scope to drop one 
impact. The fifth area of impact, which is the development of new trade strategies as a 
result of PTAs, is a possible candidate. Despite changes in both facilitating trade and the 
movement of natural people, there have been no dramatic changes in the case study 
countries’ strategies, illustrating a case for dropping this area of impact. Nevertheless, 
there is also a reason to preserve this variable because it illustrates that PTAs do not act 
as a driving force for further liberalisation. In the institutional trade capacity tables, it can
125 W hen A V A  incorporated the Food Control D iv ision , from the M inistry o f  the Environm ent, A V A  
becam e responsible for regulating the safety o f  fresh as w ell as processed foods. This illustrates that they 
have learnt from their counterparts on how to reduce the overlap o f  regulatory agencies under one roof.
126 So far, there is just one dispute between Australia and Thailand, w hich was resolved through informal 
rem edies, through the m ediation o f  governm ent m inisters and the custom s department.
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be seen that both countries have merely maintained the same trade strategies after signing 
inter-regional PTAs, suggesting that countries sign PTAs only in areas in which they 
have a competitive edge, and excluding the possibility for further liberalisation. This 
reinforces the arguments of opponents of PTAs who believe they are merely quick-fix 
sectoral deals, where politically sensitive sectors in goods and services are carved out 
(Sally, 2006, p. 308). The strategic variable may expose a critical weakness of PTAs, 
however, this only represents the macro picture of PTAs. There are other domestic 
institutions to consider, such as creating stronger governmental agencies, corporation and 
consultation from non-governmental actors. Moreover, other domestic institutions have 
adopted the forward force of “rule making rather than rule taking” (Birdsall & Lawrence, 
1999, p. 139) instead. This can be observed in their intra-regional PTAs, which resulted 
in a slight change in strategies involved, such as the single visa programme.
To summarise, from the previous case study chapters, there are instances where 
PTAs have influenced domestic factors in the economy. Thus, the institutional trade 
capacity framework has answered the first interrelated question on how PTAs influence 
domestic institutions. The framework allows us to pin-point changes in the domestic 
system brought by PTAs. It illustrates that PTAs infiltrate the domestic system though 
the trade negotiating team, which then spreads to other governmental agencies through 
coordination. This, in Singapore, results in creating more regulatory agencies, employing 
more legal experts into the negotiating team, providing more financial funds for the inter- 
ministerial coordination, and bringing government departments traditionally not directly 
involved in international trade to the negotiating table. Moreover, PTAs do not merely 
influence governmental agencies, in Thailand, the comprehensive nature of PTAs has 
raised awareness amongst businesses of the inevitable future, accelerating their 
involvement in international trade making. Likewise, NGOs have become a familiar face 
at trade negotiations, having constantly pushed governments to adopt a more transparent 
procedure before signing international trade agreements.
8.2.2 Deeper Regional PTA Integration
The second framework is the deeper regional PTA integration framework, which can be 
employed to explain how signing deeper integration trade agreements can facilitate 
developing countries’ ability to sign future trade agreements with deeper integration 
provisions. Moreover, this framework also aims to answer the second interrelated 
question of the thesis: why have Singapore and Thailand been able to accelerate their
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PTAs, especially their intra-regional PTAs, more than their Southeast and East Asian 
neighbours?
Recalling some important facts about the framework, firstly, the framework 
represents a particular policy area, rather than the entire trade agreement. The vertical 
axis of the matrix determines the strength of the institutions involved in a particular 
policy area, such as the temporary movement o f persons, rather than the strength of the 
entire case study country. Moreover, it might be misleading to argue that because 
Singapore was one of the original Asian Tigers, she has a more “robust state capacity”, 
unlike the second generation Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), such as Thailand 
(Weiss, 1997, pp. 4-5). From the evidence in chapters five and six, arguably Singapore’s 
institutional trade capacity is more developed relative to Thailand, but only in some 
areas, such as the city state’s advanced customs procedures. However, there are some 
policy areas in which Singapore was equally as weak as Thailand, such as the recognition 
of qualifications of professionals, both countries have never undertaken any liberalisation 
on this front before. As a result, when discussing the strength of a state’s institutions, it 
must be observed under a particular policy provision and whether they have negotiated 
and implemented liberalisation policy for those provisions before.
The horizontal axis of the matrix discusses the options states have for conducting 
bilateral PTAs. The left side of the horizontal axis are states which have signed PTAs 
with deeper integration provisions; whereas the right hand side are states agreeing 
shallow integration provisions. Consequently, after signing the trade agreements, the 
matrix will yield four possible dynamic path, each with differing scenarios for regional 
economic integration.
Initially, the signing of PTAs with deeper or shallow integration provisions varies 
according to the states’ domestic institutional capacity. Starting on the bottom right 
comer, the signing of PTAs with weak provisions could be a result of government’s low 
domestic institutional capacity, permitting some governments to sign only shallow 
agreements. On the contrary, on the top left comer, some countries initially have 
developed domestic institutional capacity, which allows them to sign trade agreements 
with deeper integration provisions (Hamilton-Hart, 2003). The top right comer is for 
states with strong domestic institutions that have signed bilateral PTAs with weak or 
shallow integration provisions. It should be safe to assume that thanks to their strong 
domestic institutional capabilities, regardless of the level of commitments in their PTAs, 
these states have the ability to engage in deeper integration, depending on domestic
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factors. Finally, the bottom left comer represents states with weak domestic institutions, 
but they have signed PTAs with deeper liberalisation provisions. It is possible to 
hypothesise that the signing of PTAs with strong provisions could reinforce change. 
PTAs with deeper provisions may induce more forward, than backward, forces; thus 
enhancing domestic institutional capacity to better coordinate and create clearer policies. 
More importantly, these institutional developments could also lead to a higher quality of 
future trade agreements, including regional trade agreements.
8.2.2.1 Filling in the Gaps
After reviewing the theoretical aspect of the analytical framework, it is time to 
supplement the framework with some empirical evidence, under Figure 21 below. This 
section will aim to fill the gaps of the four possible outcomes in the framework with the 
empirical findings from the previous chapters.
Inter-Regional (Bilateral) PTAs 
Deeper Integration Shallow Integration
Domestic
Institutional
Capacity
Strong
Weak
Resulting in deeper regional 
Integration (Singapore’s 
customs procedures, 
Singapore’s MRA)
Could lead to deeper regional 
integration (Singapore’s 
agreement on temporary 
movement of persons)
Leading to strong regional 
agreements (Thailand’s 
MRAs for professionals. 
Health and safety MRAs)
Leading to weak regional 
agreements (Thailand’s 
e-commerce commitments)
Figure 21: F illing in the Deeper Regional PT A  Integration Framework
8.2.2.2 Two Obvious Cases
Beginning with the bottom right comer: states with weak domestic institutions are likely 
to sign trade provisions which are also weak. In our case, this would be Thailand’s 
limited reference to the liberalisation of e-commerce. Understandably, most developing 
countries, such as Thailand, do not identify e-commerce as a key priority area. As a 
consequence, Thailand lacks the institutional infrastructure to monitor and regulate e- 
commerce, which results in accepting weak provisions on e-commerce. This is reflected
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in the TAFTA, the agreement contains a chapter on e-commerce, however, the chapter 
merely reaffirms their multilateral commitments. Thus, it coincides with one of the 
extreme cases of the analytical framework; countries with weak institutional ability in a 
particular area, will have limited interest, and capacity to negotiate, and weak capabilities 
to implement necessary steps for deeper liberalisation of that particular policy area; thus 
this has not been translated into Thailand’s intra-regional PTAs.
The top left comer illustrates countries with strong institutional capacity in a 
particular policy area, resulting in the ability to sign trade agreements with deeper 
integration provisions in such fields. Examples would be Singapore’s custom’s 
procedures. Due to the city state’s dependence on trade flows, its customs procedures are 
highly developed. Accordingly, in the framework, Singapore should be capable of 
signing trade agreements that contain deeper integration provision in customs procedures; 
this is confirmed in most of Singapore’s inter-regional PTAs. Given Singapore’s 
developed trade facilitating system, the city state found little difficulty in adapting to new 
requirements on customs procedures of the USSFTA. This result matches with the 
framework: countries with high institutional capacity will find fewer complications in 
signing deeper integration provisions in their own trade agreements. However, this has 
not been extended to the intra-regional level, the reasoning behind this will be explained 
later.
Similar stories can also be expressed with Singapore’s SPS agreements, since 
Singapore is solely depending on food imports; the city state has stringent standards and 
regulatory requirements for the importation of food products. Clearly Singapore has a 
developed institutional trade capacity on SPS measures, which has allowed Singapore to 
negotiate trade agreements with industrialised countries on SPS provisions smoothly, as 
shown in the SAFTA. Moreover, Singapore’s SPS negotiations have also been translated 
into its intra-regional trade agreement as well, such as the STEER, where Singapore and 
Thailand have a MRA on processed food, thus providing an example that matches the 
analytical framework.
8.2.2.3 A Natural Route towards Integration
The top right comer of the analytical framework is countries with strong domestic 
institutional capacity that have signed PTAs with weak provisions. The analytical 
framework allows the possibility for countries in the top right comer to have multiple 
outcomes for intra-regional trade: states with strong institutional capacity in such fields
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jcould lead towards deeper intra-regional integration, but it could equally lead towards no 
intra-regional integration as well.
To illustrate results with no deeper regional PTA integration outcome, we 
consider the case of Singapore’s temporary movement of persons. The city state is 
considered to have efficient infrastructure and facilities to accommodate the inflow of 
foreign visitors. Since it is attempting to become a regional hub for foreign enterprises, it 
must establish the appropriate security and necessary systems to facilitate the temporary 
movement of persons. As a result, the city state was able to complete the negotiations and 
carry out the appropriate changes for the temporary movement of persons with limited 
difficulties. This can be observed in Singapore’s PTAs with Australia and the US, which 
includes WTO-plus provisions on the temporary movement of business persons.
At the intra-regional level, however, some of Singapore’s provisions on the 
temporary movement of persons were considered weak agreements, merely confirming 
the existing multilateral commitments, this included ASEAN’s provisions on the 
temporary movement of business executives. Specifically, some ASEAN members have 
demanded the expansion of the temporary movement of persons beyond the free 
movement of business people, turning this into a WTO-plus provision. Unfortunately, 
there are some reservations amongst the older ASEAN members, creating a backward 
force preventing such liberalisation. Thus, this provides a case where no deeper intra- 
regional integration will occur, thus remaining in the top right hand box of the analytical 
framework.
However, there is also a converse case for the intra-regional outcome, remaining 
with the example of temporary movement o f persons, but shifting to another intra- 
regional agreement, such as STEER. There appears to be strong forward force from the 
political elites which favours both Singapore and Thailand to develop a single visa 
system for entering both countries. According to the analytical framework, when signing 
deeper integration provisions at the inter-regional level coupled with countries subject to 
with strong institutional capacity, this could lead states to push for deeper intra-regional 
integration. Moreover, both Singapore and Thailand now aim to expand the single visa 
documentation to encompass the entire ASEAN region. This is clearly an example where 
states with developed institutional capacity can move towards greater intra-regional 
integration, without any push from inter-regional PTAs, provided they have the necessary 
domestic factors and a strong institutional capacity.
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8.2.2.4 Building an Alternative Route towards Regionalism?
The final analysis refers to the bottom left box of the analytical framework: countries 
with weak domestic institutional trade capacity, but which have been compelled to sign 
PTAs with deeper integration provisions, which could lead to changes in their domestic 
institutional capacity. The ideal example would be Singapore and the listing of service 
trade in its trade agreements. Initially, the city state had always adopted a positive list 
approach in all of its PTAs with service provisions. However, after being compelled to 
sign the USSFTA and the SAFTA with a negative list approach, Singapore realised the 
effectiveness of this approach.127 Afterwards, Singaporean trade negotiators have always 
requested a negative list approach in all of the city state’s PTAs, thus, clearly illustrating 
the effects of forward forces brought by PTAs. However, this can also be applied to the 
analytical framework with some of the case studies providing multiple outcomes for the 
intra-regional level as well.
As a result, three examples will be put forward. The first will point out a negative 
outcome for the region, whereas the latter two will exemplify positive outcomes. The 
first example involves Thailand. Initially the country had weak or incoherent policies on 
the temporary movement of persons; in fact some of the existing policies were so 
incoherent that the international trade agreement signed in APEC contradicted domestic 
Thai law. However, it was only during the negotiation of the TAFTA that Thai officials 
noticed the contradictions. Consequently, the TAFTA bought about two significant 
changes. Firstly, this was due to complaints from the Australian business community, 
who were required to apply for differing documentation from various government 
agencies. Thailand introduced the one-stop service, which simplified the immigration and 
work permit application procedure for the eligible workers and placed it “under one 
roof’. Secondly, and more importantly, the negotiations on the temporary movement of 
persons gave Thai bureaucrats the possibility of re-examining some of the outdated laws 
and replacing them with coherent legislation on the temporary movement of persons. 
This is clearly an example of a country with weak institutional capacity benefiting from 
trade agreements with deeper integration.
Unfortunately, the improvements from deeper integration PTAs did not propel the 
same momentum for intra-regional integration. The lack of enthusiasm from local
127 Again, I am not suggesting the negative list approach is good or better, but it id generally perceived to 
provide more liberalisation outcom e because new  sectors which are not included in the negative list must 
be liberalised and this enhances more competition.
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business groups acted as a backward force in Thailand’s intra-regional trade agreements. 
Both ACFTA and ASEAN made little progress on this policy issue, with the exception of 
STEER. As a consequence, this provides an example of where countries in the bottom 
left box do not necessary move forward towards greater intra-regional integration. The 
varying reasons for the failure at the intra-regional level will be discussed in the 
subsequent subsection.
The second example is the regulation on food standards, it is difficult to argue 
that Thailand has a strong institutional trade capacity for agricultural produce. Its major 
exports are mainly agricultural, however there has been limited emphasis on the health 
and safety standards of imported agricultural produce. Consequently, Thailand has 
limited experience with regulatory policies for agricultural produce.128 Arguably, 
Thailand has weak institutional trade capacity on the regulatory aspect of agricultural 
trade. However, this changed once Thailand began to negotiate its comprehensive PTAs 
with New Zealand and Australia; both countries demanded deeper integration in the SPS 
provisions. As a consequence, Thailand had to develop a transparent method for 
facilitating Australian and New Zealand agricultural imports; including means of 
facilitating Thailand’s agricultural exports to Australia as well. Consequently, the signed 
MRA in the inter-regional PTAs enhanced Thailand’s institutional trade capacity, 
improving the negotiating capacity for MRA, and creating new institutional agencies 
responsible for the observation and implementation of SPS measures.
The enhanced institutional trade capacity also explains the analytical framework. 
Initially, Thailand’s institutional trade capacity for the health and safety standards for 
food was at the bottom left comer of the framework. The interaction with inter-regional 
PTAs acted as a forward force creating the necessary institutions which allowed Thailand 
to sign deeper integration trade agreements. This enhanced Thailand’s institutional 
capacity; as a result, moving Thailand upwards in the analytical framework matrices. 
This simultaneously provides a different outcome at the intra-regional level for Thailand. 
The kingdom is able to formulate and establish its own approach towards SPS measures 
and find ways of coming around health and safety requirements in their intra-regional 
agreements, such as STEER, which has a MRA for processed food. The same can be said 
with the ACFTA, resulting in a MRA for Thai fruits to clear Chinese customs rapidly 
without being subject to stringent inspection. As a consequence, the interaction of inter­
128 A lthough, it does not imply that Thailand has lim ited experience on the negotiating table; being active  
members o f  agricultural trade negotiations, such as the Crains Group.
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regional PTAs with deeper integration provisions, created forward forces which assisted 
a country with weak institutional capacity to enhance its own institutional capacity and 
foster an environment to develop its own methods implementing similar regulatory 
solutions in its intra-regional trade agreements.
The third example applies to both Singapore and Thailand, as initially both case 
study countries were very protective of their professional services. Traditionally the legal 
profession, for example, was not merely restricted to people with the appropriate legal 
and linguistic knowledge, it was exclusively the preserve of the country’s own citizens. 
Thus, due to the limited recognition of professional services, both countries have limited 
experience and institutional trade capacity to facilitate the liberalisation of professional 
services. Moreover, without any push from the multilateral level, there was little need to 
negotiate or find means to facilitate the recognition of professions. However, it was 
during the inter-regional trade negotiations, such as the USSFTA and the TAFTA, that 
both countries began to liberalise and create an offensive position in their professional 
services. In Singapore, Australian and American architects are permitted to apply for 
work, whereas Thailand has successfully negotiated trade agreements which allow 
service providers in the catering industry to seek employment in Australia and Japan. 
Moreover, both countries are in the process of extending similar agreements for other 
professions. Consequently, there is an upgrade in the institutional trade capacity making, 
from one which was non-existent, to the level where concrete and coherent infrastructure 
exists, such as getting the professional bodies involved in the negotiation and monitoring 
processes. As a result, both countries created an offensive position in the temporary 
movement of professional services.
Furthermore, this example also fits with the analytical framework: when countries 
with weak institutional capacity sign a trade agreement with deeper integration, they 
could possibly sign other deeper integration agreements in similar fields. Such 
developments occurred in the ASEAN recognition of professional qualifications in the 
nursing and engineering professions. The MRA allows all ASEAN engineers and nurses 
to work anywhere within ASEAN. These recent developments stemmed from the 
bilateral inter-regional PTAs, which Singapore and Thailand negotiated prior to the 
ASEAN MRAs for professionals.129 The forward forces developed from the inter­
129 This includes the failed APEC M RA for engineers, w hich both Singapore and Thailand participated in 
the negotiating process; Singapore’s M RAs with other industrialised countries, including an understanding 
with Japan on the M RA for engineers; and T hailand’s negotiations on M R A  for nurses with Japan.
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regional trade agreements fostered the environment for deeper integration for intra- 
regional PTAs. Creating experiences from trade negotiations, building necessary 
infrastructure such as bringing the professional bodies involved in the inter-regional 
process, allowed the same professional bodies to become more willing to liberalise at the 
intra-regional level.
As a consequence, the Deeper Regional PTA Integration Framework explains the 
dynamics of the second interrelated question: why have Singapore and Thailand been 
able to acpelerate their PTAs, especially their intra-regional PTAs? The two latter 
examples fit in the special case of the analytical framework: countries with weak 
institutional trade capacity, which have signed trade agreements with deeper integration, 
creates the possibly for further propelling the same trade related policy in their intra- 
regional trade agreement. When the forward forces outweigh the backward forces, the 
mobilisation from domestic institutional trade capacity will favour further trade 
liberalisation. The removal of frictional barriers in the form of facilitating trade and the 
movement of persons are important because they are key ingredients for deeper economic 
integration or regionalism. Regionalism, requires more than trade liberalisation, there 
must be both security and cultural coherence, where the movement of persons and 
harmonising regulation are the first important steps. Thus providing an alternative route 
toward regional economic integration.
However, the analytical framework is far from complete. There are other 
variables, aside from countries with weak institutional capacity and WTO-plus trade 
agreements, which foster an environment for greater economic integration. Recalling the 
example with the temporary movement of business persons, initially Thailand was at the 
bottom left comer of the matrix, after upgrading domestic institutional capacity, however, 
it failed to fit with the predictions of the analytical framework. It was able to move 
upwards towards stronger institutional capacity, but it failed to provide deeper intra- 
regional integration on similar grounds. Nevertheless, this is not the only example of a 
failure in the analytical framework.
8.2.2.5 Limitations of the Deeper Regional PTA Integration Framework 
The previous section demonstrated how the findings from the empirical chapters matched 
the predictions of the deeper regional PTA integration analytical framework. However, 
there were a few minor cases which did not fit with the analytical framework. These
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problems will become more apparent once we include other trade policy issues in 
conjunction with the analytical framework.
One of the interesting trade policies excluded from previous discussions was the 
liberalisation of financial services. During Singapore and Thailand’s engagement with 
PTAs there has virtually been no further liberalisation of financial services, with the 
exception of the USSFTA, which was hammered out in the final minutes of the 
negotiation. It would be difficult to argue that Singapore’s financial service sector was 
initially weak, given Singapore’s ability to remain immune itself from the financial crisis. 
However, domestic coordination, consultation, procedural and legislative implementation 
only took place after Singapore’s negotiation and liberalisation of financial services. In 
other words, the USSFTA locked in and accelerated Singapore’s institutional trade 
capacity in financial liberalisation, providing an example where PTAs with deeper 
integration could enhance, or at least accelerated, a country’s institutional capacity.
With respect to the analytical framework, Singapore’s domestic institutional 
capacity on financial liberalisation would initially lie closer to the bottom left comer due 
to Singapore’s limited experience in the process of liberalising financial services. After 
the implementation process, Singapore’s institutional upgrade moved it upwards along 
the vertical axis in the framework diagram. There has, however, been limited progress on 
the liberalisation of financial services in the intra-regional front. Singapore has rarely 
submitted a request for the liberalisation of financial services in negotiating its intra- 
regional PTAs. As a consequence, this example provides a case where the analytical 
framework failed to predict the outcome at the regional level.
However, there are several reasons why signing trade agreements with WTO-plus 
provisions does not necessary lead toward deeper regional PTA integration. In the 
mentioned example, sensitivity in the subject matter plays a crucial role. If we extended 
the example of financial liberalisation to Thailand, the Kingdom’s reluctant enthusiasm 
to liberalise financial services is deeply rooted in the country’s experiences in 1997. 
Moreover, prior to 1997, Thailand had weaker domestic institutions in the financial 
sector. The combination of traumatic experience and weak institution explains Thailand’s 
lack of interest in completing the TUSFTA, despite the strong insistence of the USA to 
liberalise financial services. Accordingly, with respect to the analytical framework, this 
places Thailand’s financial sector at the bottom right comer of the framework. Since the 
country has weak institutional capacity, it should seek to sign a shallow integration 
agreement, given its limited capabilities to carry out such policies. As a consequence, it is
230
unlikely include similar deeper integration provisions in its intra-regional trade 
agreements.
Consequently, this provides two distinct limitations of the analytical framework. 
Firstly, countries with weak institutions and shallow agreements, according to the 
framework, will fail to conclude intra-regional trade agreements in similar fields. 
However, if the majority of countries in the intra-regional agreement also suffer from 
similar weak institutional capacity, the chances o f such trade policy being included in the 
intra-regional agreement will also be remote. Specifically, if the majority in the alliance 
lacks the institutional capacity or the willingness to sign such regulatory provisions in 
inter-regional trade agreements, the provision should not materialise in the intra-regional 
agreement; even if the minority of the alliance have already signed and upgraded their
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institutions on this matter. This could explain why it has been a challenge to sign a 
trade agreement that accelerates financial liberalisation within ASEAN. The same story 
can be told about STEER, since Thailand, which amounts to 50 per cent of the alliance, 
was unwilling to negotiate on financial liberalisation because it lacked the will and the 
institutional capacity to implement such policies, and financial liberalisation was 
excluded from STEER altogether.131
The second limitation of the analytical framework is political will. This is an 
important variable, but only when it is combined with the majority membership variable. 
It should be an uphill battle to include the liberalisation of sensitive matters, such as 
intellectual property rights and labour standards, in intra-regional trade agreements. 
Similar to financial liberalisation, the sensitivity of the subject matter makes it difficult to 
incorporate in the trade agreement. As exemplified in Singapore’s reluctance to propose 
financial liberalisation amongst its intra-regional partners, the city state’s trade
132negotiators are aware that such an issue would never get off the ground.
Nevertheless, political will might not be the most important ingredient, at least 
not on its own. Some observers believe PTAs are not the main driver for further 
liberalisation because PTAs merely liberalised selected sectors o f the economy. In 
contrast they believe political will from home is the main driving force of further 
liberalisation. However, these analyses merely rely on domestic internal variables,
130 U n less the minority group decides to leave the intra-regional group and form their ow n alliance.
131 It w ould, however, be interesting to see whether the regional outcom e w ould differ i f  more than 50 per 
cent o f  the intra-regional members were com pelled to sign deeper integration agreem ents on contentious 
issues, such as financial liberalisation.
132 H ow ever, Singapore is a strong advocate for the liberalisation o f  investm ent in ACFTA.
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whereas the argument in this thesis relies on both external and internal forces. The 
importance of political will must be juxtaposed with the majority of the intra-regional 
dimension as well.
To illustrate, if the majority of the intra-regional members were compelled to sign 
sensitive deeper integration provisions with their inter-regional PTAs partners, it may 
provide states with institutional capacity to undertake sensitive provisions. This might 
guarantee the inclusion of sensitive topics in the intra-regional alliance because inter­
regional PTAs have made sensitive trade issues more digestible. Again, referring to the 
recognition of professional services, both Singapore and Thailand have traditionally 
viewed the liberalisation of profession services as sensitive.133 The negotiations from 
various inter-regional PTAs enhanced their institutional trade capacity by developing the 
coordination and consultation from professional bodies, lessening the protectionist stance 
on professional services; making it possible for Singapore and Thailand to assemble 
similar provisions at the intra-regional level.
As a consequence, when including the majority membership into the analysis, it is 
possible to argue that, when countries are forced to liberalise sensitive trade issues by 
industrialised economies, it easier to push these issues forward in future agreements. This 
is an example of enhanced domestic institutions with forward forces, lessening the tightly 
screwed protectionist policies, allowing such trade issues to become more accepted in 
their domestic economies. If this occurred to more than half of the intra-regional PTA 
members, it could lead towards the negotiation and acceptance o f such sensitive issues at 
the intra-regional level. As a consequence, this reduces the importance of the political 
will, because political will against the liberalisation has evaporated, either through the 
introduction of such issues from inter-regional PTAs or being outnumbered by the 
members of the intra-regional alliance.
Nevertheless, we cannot totally disregard political will, it still remains a key 
domestic determinant. It is unlikely that political will can dramatically change due to 
forward forces pushing for further liberalisation. It takes time for political will to change 
because it is entrenched in each society’s beliefs and history. However, there are other 
dominant forces that can introduce changes to political will, according to this thesis, they 
are the external forces. Given time, the dynamics and interplay between external and 
internal forces will determine regional economic outcomes.
133 Thailand’s case is different from Singapore because the form er’s strategy suddenly changed towards an 
offensive stance for its sem i-skilled professionals sim ultaneously with its engagem ent in PTAs.
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8.2.2.6 The Hypothesis and Causality
Does the analytical framework confirm the hypothesis set out in the first chapter? The 
findings appear to confirm that when states conduct comprehensive inter-regional PTAs 
they are forced to find ways to tackle these barriers. These regulatory provisions are 
rooted in the state system nurturing and enhancing domestic institutional capacity related 
to trade. Moreover, this also assists the mentioned states to create similar regulatory 
positions of their own at the intra-regional level, with the possibility of creating a catalyst 
for enhancing multilateral trade liberalisation. Thus, the finding confirms the reciprocal 
relationship between PTAs and domestic institutions. The interplay between the two 
levels leads to multiple regional outcomes.
However, the major weakness of the analytical frameworks rests on the causality. 
It is difficult to say with complete certainty that inter-regional PTAs with developing 
countries have been the sole variable that affects domestic institutional development, 
such that it encourages the deepening of intra-regional PTAs. It is equally possible to 
argue that the force driving intra-regional integration is the same domestic force that 
drives inter-regional PTAs.
Could the political will that motivated countries to join the inter-regional PTA 
bandwagon be the same force that drove intra-regional PTAs? It is unlikely to be exactly 
the same motivating force. Could the force that drove inter-regional PTAs foresee the 
liberalisation of regulatory barriers? The political will could not have foreseen the 
liberalisation of regulatory sectors by industrialised economies. It was only after 
domestic institutional developments that these countries could move to liberalise 
regulatory issues at the intra-regional level. To illustrate, the force that drove Thailand to 
complete PTAs with MRAs on agricultural products with Australia did not result in 
exactly the same agreement in the EHP with China; thus, are they the same? 
Alternatively, the force that motivated countries to jump onboard the PTA bandwagon 
did not foresee the possibility of being obligated, by industrialised economies, to 
liberalise qualified professionals; consequently, the force that led to the liberalisation of 
qualified professions in ASEAN should have been different. Finally, when Thailand 
established the one-stop visa service with inter-regional PTAs, Thailand did not achieve 
similar developments at the intra-regional level; thus, if this was the same force would 
the development at the bilateral level not have been achieved at the intra-regional level as
233
well? Consequently, we cannot say with complete certainty that the motivating forces 
behind inter-regional PTAs are the same as the intra-regional ones.
Regardless, there seems to be enough evidence to support the main hypothesis 
laid down in the introductory chapter. The interaction between domestic institutions and 
inter-regional PTAs with deeper integration provisions have, in some instances, enhanced 
domestic institutional development; providing both forward and backward forces 
propelling further development in their intra-regional PTAs. Thus, the interplay between 
the two levels can lead to multiple outcomes for regional economic integration, including 
an alternative route towards regionalism.
8.3 Contributions and Implications for the Multilateral Trading System
This section will take a step away from the analytical frameworks and discuss the 
implications of the findings. The most important implication is how the findings could 
affect the multilateral trading system. As mentioned in the introduction, due to lack of 
empirical evidence, this thesis can only speculate on the multilateral outcome.
Nevertheless, this section will also discuss the third interrelated question of the 
thesis: Is there an Asian model for PTAs? The section will argue that the varying inter 
and intra-regional PTAs have left an impressionable imprint in Singapore and Thailand’s 
PTAs, which will influence the case study countries’ implication to the multilateral 
trading system. This will be examined at both individual country level and the regional 
level. Moreover, the findings should provide some contribute to the general literature on 
PTAs, specifically, whether they are building or stumbling blocs for the multilateral 
system? However, before we begin, it would be prudent to discuss the differing and 
contending PTA models that may have influenced the case study countries and their 
behaviour towards the multilateral trading system.
Consequently, this section shall begin by outlining the differing competing PTAs 
models that may have influenced the case study countries. This is followed by an 
examination on how PTAs’, in general, influence countries’ behaviour towards the 
multilateral trading system: one from an individual country’s perspective; the other from 
a regional perspective. The former will support the building bloc argument, whereas the 
latter will lead towards the stumbling bloc argument.
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8.3.1 Competing PTA models in the Asian Region
Before generalising how the Asian region interacts with the multilateral trading 
system, we must observe the different contending PTA models which may have 
influenced the Asian region. Generally, different countries will have their own template 
or model in conducting PTA negotiations, in order to reduce their own frictional or 
transaction cost in negotiating and implementing PTAs (Sampson & Woolcock, 2003; 
Woolcock, 2006). As mentioned in the assumption of this thesis, this is especially the 
case with inter-regional PTAs which have greater bargaining power over developing 
countries. Let us examine some of the major contending PTA models that have 
negotiated with the case study countries, namely the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand, China, and Japan.
8.3.1.1 The United States
PTAs negotiations with the United States tend to focus on a broad range of issues, 
however the stronger WTO-plus issues are focused on intellectual property rights, 
liberalisation of financial services, competition and public procurements. Most o f these 
contentious issues have contributed to the delay in signing of the USSFTA and stalled the 
negotiation of the USTFTA. More importantly, most US PTAs are focused towards 
assisting US firms to establish companies in the partner country. This is especially 
problematic for most Asian economies because businesses lack industrial capacity to 
compete with US firms. Singapore was willing to liberalise its service sectors for 
competitive reason; however, certain sectors with key GLCs have not been fully 
liberalised yet. The issue of intellectual property rights, on the other hand, relates to 
problems with technocratic capacity. Several Asian countries believe there are other trade 
related issues which are perceived to have greater priority than enforcing property rights. 
Moreover, this sensitive issues also relates to the cheap production of much needed 
generic drugs for domestic consumption. Thus, there has been limited interest to divert 
resources to this trade related issue.
Nevertheless, US PTAs have generally been duplicated in most countries, 
especially in the Western Hemisphere. Singapore is the latest country to have adopted the 
US template, and there is no reason to believe why the momentum would not continue to 
spread to other Asian countries. The predominate reason why it has been so successful 
can be contributed to the US’s hegemonic dominance; despite its uneven leverage in
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negotiating trade agreements, several countries are must negotiate trade agreements with 
the superpower (Dent, 2006b; Reiter, 2006; Weiss et al., 2004).
8.3.1.2 Australia and New Zealand
Australian and New Zealand PTAs have generally been based on the Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) between Australia and New Zealand. Aside from the 
traditional liberalisation in traded goods and services, like the CER, there has been 
considerable broadenings to include the liberalisation in the movement of persons and the 
recognition in the qualification of professionals. On the other hand, the CER template do 
not provide deeper integration on issues of investment and dispute settlement, although 
informal mechanisms and understanding have always played an important role (Bisley, 
2004; Sampson, 2003a). The reasoning behind this is because both Australia and New 
Zealand have relied on their own institutions to supplement the commitments. The CER 
has broadened and deepened through protocols and understandings that have grown out 
of a review process rather than major negotiating sessions (Sampson, 2003a, pp. 220- 
222). This might be appealing for most developing countries because it does not require 
strong domestic institutions to hammer out strong trade agreements immediately. More 
importantly, for the ASEAN integration, both Australia and New Zealand have attempted 
to court the region into forming a grand regional PTA alliance for decades, thus allowing 
the possibility for an Australian-New Zealand approach to emerge in the Asian region.
8.3.1.3 China
Chinese PTAs are relatively new, which might be difficult to provide any generic 
template at this time. From the case study countries, China is more interested in trade in 
goods, especially in agricultural trade. There is also an equal reluctance to liberalise 
financial services as well. Moreover, there appears to be two main contentious points 
with China’s trade policy. Firstly, sometimes there are inconsistencies and confusion 
between the central authority and the provisional authorities in understanding the signed 
trade agreements, which has caused major delays for Thai exporters. Secondly, China has 
several regulatory barriers to trade, which has also caused grave concerns for both 
Singaporean and Thai exporters. Nonetheless, these are issues China is willing to resolve 
in their respective PTAs. Moreover, similar to the CER between Australia and New 
Zealand, China favour strengthening it’s PTAs, such as the ACFTA, through protocols 
and understandings that have grown out of a review process rather than major negotiating
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sessions (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2005). According to the ACFTA, this allows the 
existing domestic institutions to develop and apply their own methods once a problem 
has arisen.
Overall, China is a slow mover in PTAs, they are cautious in adopting and 
implementing new trade polices. Even if China is able to wield greater influence over the 
Asian region, China appears to be cautions in implementing any radical change in trade 
policy. Consequently, there are limited Chinese PTAs to analyse and construct a generic 
Chinese PTA template. However, the ACFTA, once completed, should provide be a good 
indicator for China’s template on PTAs.
8.3.1.4 Japan
Japan has been a latecomer to the PTA bandwagon, however, she has been fast in 
completing PTAs with her neighbours. From Japan’s PTAs, with the exception of 
agricultural trade, her PTAs have broaden trade related issues beyond her existing WTO 
commitments, for example the JSEPA is considered a ground braking PTA for including 
several novel WTO-plus issues (Dent, 2003a). However, Japanese has been reluctant to 
spread these novel provision to her other PTA partners, citing either caution or Japan’s 
limited interest in a genuine desire to further liberalise trade. Nevertheless, Japan’s recent 
trade agreements with the Philippines and Thailand have also included several WTO-plus 
provisions, such as the temporary movement of persons and the recognition of 
professional qualifications; predominantly because Japan has a shortage of skilled 
professionals, especially in the area of health care services.
Consequently, most of Japan’s PTAs seems to be based on strengthen its security 
in the Asian region, with the exception liberalising agricultural trade, which is what most 
developing countries desire. Nevertheless, most of Japan’s PTAs in the Asia region have 
always included financial assistance, consistent with Japan’s cheque book diplomacy 
approach (Calder, 1998). This might be a motivation for Japan to conclude PTAs with 
her neighbours, however, this would lead towards light-weight PTA template.
Overall, these are the major contending PTAs which may influence the region in 
forming their own PTA approaches or models. The US appears to be the template that is 
being widely adopted, especially in the Western Hemisphere. The Australian-New 
Zealand approach is slowing becoming accepted amongst Asian economies, however, 
Thailand has yet to complete any provisions on service trade with New Zealand at this 
time. The remaining two, China and Japan, are competing to become a hegemon in the
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region, thus they are also wielding their influence over the region by completing the most 
number of PTAs in the region as possible.
8.3.2 Individual Country’s Influence on the Multilateral Trading System 
From the case study countries, both Singapore and Thailand have undergone several 
trade negotiations, which has influenced their domestic institutional capacity, but 
simultaneously, this also affects their participation and perspective towards the 
multilateral trading system.
During the course of investigation, this thesis confirms that the number of PTAs a 
country negotiates can result in a negative impact for the individual country.134 For 
example, during the Hong Kong Ministerial, the head of the Thai delegation was invited 
to participate in the green room, the then minister responsible for trade declined the 
invitation and delegated the responsibility to his subordinate. Instead, the minister was 
dragged to another trade negotiation, a bilateral trade negotiation instead. Clearly, 
traditional criticism that PTAs divert scarce domestic resources away from the 
multilateral negotiation still remains a key weapon for the proponents, especially 
amongst developing countries (J. N. Bhagwati, 1993; Sally, 2006). This form of 
technocratic capacity deficiency (Dent, 2006b) is a serious problem for developing 
countries. Overall, several developing countries have relatively weaker domestic 
institutional capacity, as well as insufficient number of trained trade negotiators to 
undertake comprehensive PTA negotiations. Thus, for developing countries, enhancing 
institutional capacity must be undertaken.
Nevertheless, the general literature on PTAs also discusses the possibility for 
PTAs to become a testing ground for complex trade issues (Sen, 2006; World Bank, 
2005). This thesis has provided some positive empirical support to this claim, with the 
aid of the institutional trade capacity framework; providing a deeper understanding of the
134 Another concern relates to the sectoral coverage. Som e o f  the lightw eight PT A s have excluded  
politically sensitive sectors, where som e PTAs have excluded agricultural trade altogether. This is a grave  
concern for develop ing countries that rely on agricultural' trade. M ost countries in the Asian have  
concluded trade agreem ents based on the theory o f  com parative advantages, placing much em phasis on 
sectors w ith a com petitive edge and protecting sectors with lim ited com petition. A s Sally  suggested , for 
PTAs to make econom ic sense, they should have a com prehensive sectoral coverage, consistent with  
relevant W TO provisions, and preferably go beyond W TO com m itm ents (2006). Clearly develop ing  
countries cannot rely on PTA s with industrialised econom ies. According to the em pirical findings, once  
developing countries engage in inter-regional PTAs, there are limited scope for negotiations on agricultural 
trade. H ow ever, under intra-regional negotiations, they have a separate venue to negotiate and develop their 
own regulatory approach to encom pass sectors in their interest, such as agricultural trade in ACFTA. This 
is a route develop ing countries should aim to undertake, g iven  the deadlock at the multilateral level.
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developments at the domestic level by illustrating how PTAs have reformed states’ 
domestic institutions.
PTAs with deeper regulatory provisions can also act as a locking-in mechanism 
for reform (Frankel, 1996, pp. 216-217; Lawrence, 1992; J. Schott, 2003, p. ll;T om ell 
& Esquivel, 1997; World Bank, 2005, p. 7). This thesis has shown that comprehensive 
PTAs do not only lock-in reforms, they appear to go beyond locking-in domestic 
reforms. According to the institutional trade capacity framework, PTAs can exert both 
forward and backward forces, resulting in both positive and negative changes for 
countries. Countries are forced to develop new institutions and capacity to tackle 
comprehensive PTAs. More importantly, these regulatory reforms contribute towards the 
preparation of future trade liberalisation plans, whether they are other bilateral or regional 
PTAs, or multilateral trade.
As a result, some of the developments from inter-regional PTAs may lead to 
possible positive spillover effects for future liberalisation. In Singapore, more 
governmental regulating agencies were established to monitor new trade issues, such as 
financial service and movement of persons, thanks to US and CER PTAs, respectively. 
Singapore has enhanced her trade negotiating team by recruiting more legal professionals 
and accumulated experiences for their negotiating team. The city state has restructured 
agencies for trade negotiations and improved coordination. Moreover, due to USSFTA, 
Singapore has also accelerated her liberalisation plans in key sectors, such as competition 
and financial services. All the above will facilitate and provide the necessary 
infrastructure for future trade liberalisation.
Improvements in Thailand include, outsourcing of trade negotiators to the 
appropriate government agencies; enhancing coordination amongst agencies to provide 
reliable information. Due to CER PTAs, Thailand has created more government agencies 
suitable for comprehensive PTAs. Moreover, consultation with non-governmental 
agencies appears to have witnessed the greatest change: the business community, due to 
the trade agreement with China, now provides valuable input in both pre and post 
negotiating process. This also includes participation from professional bodies, which 
have been pushed by Japanese and CER PTAs. NGOs have also made significant 
impacts, pushing for more public debate before signing PTAs and successfully pressing
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for a Structural Adjustment Fund for marginalised groups of society affected by PTAs.135 
Thus, the process of deep integration encourages domestic policy reform; the positive 
effect has inspired Thailand from a country where trade policy making has traditionally 
been from the top down to become more open and adopt a more democratic processes.
Consequently, there has been developments both by government and non­
governmental agents involved with trade policy making. Interestingly, most of the 
significant developments, for both Singapore and Thailand, have been undertaken by the 
business community. The increase in industrial capacity can be seen in their willingness 
to become involved in the decision making process and providing information for 
negotiators. However, some businesses still fear competition and seek to hide behind the 
curtain of PTAs. Governments must be willing to provide technical and financial 
assistance to these groups or society, as Thailand has began to initiate, especially if PTAs 
will lead to greater competition. A balance must be struck for both government and non­
governmental agents to maximise the gains from trade. Nevertheless, opening the lines of 
communication between governmental and non-governmental agents have provided 
much improvement in trade policy making. More importantly, these developments have 
assisted the case study countries to develop their own methods at eliminating regulatory 
barriers to trade and creating their own rules.
Theoretically, by the same chain of logic, when a state’s institutional trade 
capacity has been enhanced, from bilateral PTAs -regardless from which country- this 
should allowed developing countries to engage in deeper liberalisation, both bilaterally, 
regionally, and at the multilateral level as well.
Empirically, however, due to the weakness of the project design, there are 
insufficient cases to confirm the hypothesis at the multilateral level.136 It would be 
interesting to observe, for example, whether Thailand’s new found stance for the 
recognition of semi-skilled professionals would be pushed at the multilateral level. 
Unfortunately, in reality, given the current climate, most WTO members have limited 
interests in liberalising the mobility of semi-skilled professionals. Nevertheless, it would 
be interesting to observe whether developing countries would bring the experience and
135 In the long term, the Adjustm ent Fund should be a prevention program me instead o f  a rem edy  
programme for enterprises which would suffer by trade liberalisation. The Fund w ill initia lly  be under 
U S$6 m illion and further expand to U S $ 1 5 million. Exam ples o f  sectors affected by the trade liberalisation 
negotiations were dairy products, electronic appliances, ceram ics, and autom obiles.
136 According to the W TO  w ebsite, both Thailand and Singapore have subm itted their revised offers for 
multilateral negotiations. H ow ever, both countries have made it a po licy  not to reveal their offers to the 
general public.
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approaches developed in their own regional PTAs to the multilateral negotiating table, 
thus providing an example of best practice (Woolcock, 2003, p. 338).
Overall, PTAs distract and divert countries’ scarce resource from the multilateral 
negotiations. Moreover, there are concerns that the liberalisation policies from inter­
regional PTAs, will lead to unnecessary regulatory reform for developing countries. As 
mentioned in the introduction, some of the reforms are aimed at increasing competition, 
some are aimed at protecting the rights of the suppliers and inventors. Nevertheless, there 
are concerns whether developing countries need to develop such reforms, which are not 
in their best interests, at this stage of their development. Nonetheless, PTA liberalisation 
that brings regulatory reforms, are reforms that must be undertaken in the future, at the 
multilateral level anyway. If the multilateral trading system suddenly made a break 
through, developing countries would be forced to liberalise certain sections they are 
reluctant to liberalise, in order to exchange for market access in agricultural trade. It is 
however, unfortunate that under PTAs countries must undertake these reforms earlier, 
and with an unequal negotiating stance. However, this has assisted developing countries 
to develop their own domestic capacity which may not have existed before.
From the empirical findings, perhaps some developing countries are being forced 
to build their capacity too early, and diverted valuable resource away from other trade 
related issues, however, it depends how fast developing countries are able to adapt and 
build their technocratic capacity, this maybe problematic for most developing countries. 
Nevertheless, once they have been developed, this should indirectly assist developing 
countries towards understanding their trade positions. For example, both Singapore and 
Thailand have recently discovered the strategic importance in liberalising the movement 
of persons and professionals, an aspect they would not have discovered if they did not 
undertake comprehensive PTAs.
Moreover, in the absence of multilateral negotiations, by actively participating in 
the negotiation and ongoing monitoring of deep integration agreements, developing 
countries could become important actors at the multilateral level rather than spectators, 
thus putting them in a much better position to assert their interests. This would confirm 
Birdsall and Lawrance’s statement that PTAs allow the possibility for developing 
countries to perform “rule making rather than rule taking” (1999, p. 139). This approach 
allows developing countries to participate and become involved at the multilateral level; 
ultimately supporting the building bloc argument. Nevertheless, one must also examine 
the intra-regional level and observe their implications towards multilateral trade.
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8.3.3 Regional Influence towards the Multilateral Trading System 
Traditionally ASEAN members regularly worked together, forging alliances and 
negotiating for a stronger WTO. In the contemporary era, however, most scholars believe 
this is no longer the case, predominantly because ASEAN members are distracted by 
PTAs (Sally, 2004b). However, the findings from this thesis will present an alternative 
perspective. Moreover, this perspective could provide an alternative approach towards 
Asian regional PTAs and the regional implications towards the multilateral trading 
system. This will be examined in comparison with other main contending regional PTAs. 
Previously, we only examined the contending PTA models that are conducting PTAs in 
the region, and how they may influence and shape Asian PTAs. The contending regional 
PTAs, that will be discussed here, are the dominant PTAs that have been widely adopted 
in their own region, and they are able to exert and spread their regional norms and 
approaches beyond their own regions as well (OECD, 2003b; Sampson & Woolcock, 
2003).
8.3.3.1 An Asian Approach towards Regionalism
One of the aims of this thesis focuses on intra-regional economic integration. 
Specifically, how the spillover effects from PTAs foster the deeper intra-regional 
integration, and its implications towards the multilateral trading system? Collectively, the 
differing templates from the contending PTAs have influenced the case study PTAs, 
which should contribute to developing an Asian regional PTA, which is outlined in the 
five characteristics below.
The first feature, Asian PTAs embraces the liberalisation of goods and services, 
with the exception of financial services. Despite domestic institutional development, 
most Asian countries have failed to include a provision on the liberalisation of financial 
services, with the exception of the USSFTA. The reasoning behind this could be a result 
of the scar embedded by the recent experience of the Asian financial crisis. The limited 
progress on the liberalisation of financial services and investment has resulted in the 
weak institutional capacity for this field. For example, the ACFTA made substantive 
progress in the negotiations of goods and services, however, there has been virtually no 
progress on the negotiations in investment. It would be interesting to see how long Asian 
countries plan to avoid the liberalisation of financial services, especially when US-type 
investment provisions are being accepted globally, including Singapore (Reiter, 2006).
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The second characteristic can be observed in the ROO chapters. Most of 
Singapore and Thailand’s intra-regional PTAs, and some of their inter-regional PTAs, 
have generally adopted a ROO regional value content of between 30 and 60 per cent. The 
main reasoning behind this is because AFTA adopts the 40 per cent cumulative regional 
value content to qualify for tariff concessions. As a result Singapore and Thailand found 
it convenient to duplicate this template in most o f their PTA negotiations, including the 
ACFTA. Moreover, this is particularly important for Singapore, a country with virtually 
no natural resources. Thus, illustrating how strong domestic institutions in ASEAN states 
have become, they are now agenda setters in their intra-regional agreements. Moreover, 
according to the WTO, the 40 per cent cumulative regional value content is also deemed 
one of the most acceptable average threshold for ROO range. Consequently, several 
scholars have pressed for other developing countries to adopt this template, as a sign of 
best practice (Brenton, 2003a; WTO, 2002). More importantly, this template is also being 
adopted in most of ASEAN’s trade agreements, including the ACFTA.
The third characteristic is the desire to have financial assistance built into their 
intra-regional trade agreements. This is a legacy from the Japanese PTA template which 
uses this tool to exert its influence over the region, however, other countries, such as 
China, also utilises this tool to sweeten its PTA deals. Nevertheless, unlike most PTAs, 
with the unique exception of EU-type PTAs, financial assistance in Asian PTAs has 
mainly been joint venture projects between informal, rather than formal, institutions 
(Doner, 1997). In other words, most joint ventures have been between businesses, not 
between governments. However, like other PTAs, there are also funds aimed at providing 
financial assistance towards trade facilitating infrastructures. Examples of Asian PTAs 
with financial assistance include the JTEPA, which has included financial support for the 
Thai automobile industry. Japan has shown interest in the several infrastructure projects 
in Thailand, such as financing the construction of the road link. Similarly, Singapore used 
the STEER to develop Thailand’s science parks. These illustrate cases where domestic 
institutional development is not restricted to governmental agencies, it also involves the 
private sector as well.
With respect to infrastructure building, both Thailand and Singapore, under 
ASEAN, have also agreed to provide financial assistance to the CLMV countries. 
During the ASEAN-China summit in January 2007, China pledged to implement a 
strategic transportation plan to link China and the ASEAN countries within the next ten
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to fifteen years.137 Like other non-Asian PTAs, financial assistance is seen as a 
mechanism for putting less developed members on a par with the developed members. 
The development of infrastructure, according to a Thai diplomat, is considered important 
because: “Infrastructure projects also provide a basis for forging an East Asian 
Community; the free trade area that ASEAN countries was working out with dialogue 
partners would act as a blood vessel for broader regional integration”.
The fourth striking characteristic, despite enhancement in domestic institutions by 
industrialised economies, there appears to be no change in Asian countries’ attitude 
towards the legality of trade agreements. Most intra-regional trade agreements between 
Asian countries do not appear to be de jure, but they are de facto  agreements instead. An 
example would be the EHP between China and Thailand. At first sight, the legal 
agreements can be regarded as a lightweight trade agreement, misleading observers that 
the signatory countries were not serious about eliminating barriers to trade. However, the 
empirical findings in this thesis provide an alternative view. When Thailand encountered 
Chinese NTBs, both sides sought informal procedures as a means of reducing regulatory 
delays, which signifies a genuine desire by the Chinese authorities to having a reliable 
trade agreement. Some scholars believe Chinese, and Asians in general, prefer to 
conclude a short legal text during the negotiation process, and then adopt a more 
pragmatic approach based on cooperation and reconciliation rather than legalistic 
procedures (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2005). This might explain why most the intra- 
regional agreements are MOUs, rather than the legally binding treaties. This 
characteristic can be traced from the Chinese and CER PTA template, which favours 
development and cooperation through informal procedures. Apparently, the rational 
behind this characteristic cannot be contributed solely on domestic institutional 
capacity’s; it can also be contributed to the Asian cultural and their reluctance to adopt a 
legally binding text, in contrast with the Anglo-American culture. As a consequence, it 
could be argued that Asian states prefer a de facto  trade agreement for resolving 
problems, which is more practical.
The fifth characteristic, closely linked to the previous characteristic, suggests that 
Asian countries prefer to adopt a more “practical approach” towards their trade 
agreements (Desker, 2004). An interesting example is the ACFTA, both parties in the 
trade agreement have chosen to adopt a sequential approach rather than a single
137 M oreover, China is w illing  to bankroll U S $  1.12 m illion for feasibility studies on the two sections o f  the 
Singapore-K unm ing rail link that need to be constructed inside Cambodia and Burma.
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undertaking approach.138 Some Asian countries believe they will discover a means of 
resolving contentious problems later; so it is best to push the issues that are ready to be 
implemented forward and resolve the rest later. This illustrates a practical approach in 
resolving problems. Thus, allowing the domestic institutions which are ready to 
implement to begin first and allow time for the remaining weaker institutions to catch up 
later. Thus, ensuring some form of economic integration project does occur.
In addition to the five characteristics, there is another feature which is regularly 
associated with Asian Regionalism. Several trade negotiators believe Asian PTAs have 
always and still employs Open Regionalism (Bergsten, 1997). Most trade agreements 
encourage third parties to enter their PTA, especially in most of Singapore’s PTAs. For 
example, the P4 originally consisted of three members, but later allowed Brunei in as an 
additional member. Singapore and Thailand have also adopted this approach in STEER. 
Nevertheless, several scholars today still debate what Open Regionalism truly entails, 
and whether it is relevant.
Overall this thesis has outlined five possible characteristics for Asian regional 
PTAs, which have been drawn through the analysis of institutional capacity and the 
influences from the contending PTAs. It must be understood, however, that institutional 
capacity is not the only determinant of these characteristics, but it also includes other 
factors such as historical events and cultural difference which may have been embedded 
in their society, influencing their perception towards international trade. Nevertheless, the 
contending PTA-models have been influential in assisting the Asian countries to learn 
and adopt certain regulatory practices in their advantages, leading to the five many Asian 
PTA characteristics mentioned above.
Overall, despite America’s unequal leverage in negotiating power which should 
influenced Asian PTAs; when Asian economies convene in their intra-regional PTAs 
they are less legally binding and focuses on development and cooperation through 
informal procedures. This is more a kin to the Australia-New Zealand CER and Chinese 
Approach on PTAs. The CER template may have also influenced service trade, especially 
in the movement of persons, however, Thailand has still yet to conclude a chapter on 
services with New Zealand. Nevertheless, under ASEAN, Singapore and Thailand have 
managed to move forwards with this issue at their own pace. The Chinese approach, on
138 This approach m ight be catching on, given the A SE A N -A ustralia-N ew  Zealand Closer Econom ic  
Relations have proposed a step by step negotiation, starting with trade in goods fo llow ed by services and 
then investm ent, because it is seen to appease A SE A N , and it is a strategy that will help Laos, Cambodia, 
Burma and Vietnam , which face fiscal and human resources problems.
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the other hand, focuses more on trade in goods, especially on agricultural trade, which is 
the main interest for Asian economies. Moreover, Chinese PTAs also combines the 
financial and technical assistance aspect, similar to Japanese PTAs.
Consequently, aside from the pragmatic cooperative aspects of resolving 
conflicts, there appears to be two contending models for the Asian region: one is China, 
with a focus on trade in goods and providing assistance; the other is ASEAN, with the 40 
per cent cumulative regional value content requirement and the focus on the movement 
of persons. More importantly, would either approach become a regional economic 
hegemon for the Asian region? If most Asian PTAs are centred around either PTA, that 
particular PTA could potentially become a blueprint for intra-regional Asian PTA, 
providing the dominating template for the remaining Asian country to follow and 
duplicate, thus becoming a standard as the Asian approach for regionalism, where the 
security and non-economic cooperation aspects could supplement the economic 
substance afterwards.
Interestingly, most intra-regional PTAs tend to gravitate towards ASEAN, there 
are many suitors, as seen in the ASEAN-plus PTAs: ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN- 
Australia-New Zealand FTA, ASEAN-Japan FTA, ASEAN-Korean FTA.139 However, 
ASEAN on its own does not have the leverage and capacity to become a regional 
hegemon, making it unlikely for the Asian bloc to centre around ASEAN (Sen, 2006). 
There is, however, a general consensus that China will transform into a regional PTA hub 
and its suitors, including ASEAN, will become the spokes.140 Thus, allowing the 
possibility for the Asian region to develop their own regional PTA approach. 
Consequently, given the possible emergence of an Asian PTA model, what implications 
would this have towards the multilateral trading system?
8.3.3.2 Contending Regional PTA Models and the Multilateral Trading System.
Given the current deadlock at the multilateral trading system, PTAs have now 
taken the lead in deepening international trade. Consequently, it would be of interest to 
speculate the implications of the rapid development in international trade by PTAs.
139 N ot to m ention the A SE A N -E U  FTA, where the first rounds o f  negotiations should begin in 2008 .
140 This is, o f  course, speaking from a theoretical perspective. In reality, there are a great deal o f  
im pedim ents at the regional level: the bitter nationalist rivalries, in North-East A sia, and vast inter-country 
differences in econom ic structure, developm ent, po licies, and institutions, w ill continue to be a stum bling  
block for Asian P acific  regional econom ic integration (Sakakibara & Yam akawa, 2003).
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Currently, there are concerns that the global trading system is being divided into 
two major PTA models, namely the EU-centred and the US-centred model (Woolcock, 
2003, 2006). The EU approach is based on the EU’s PTAs with accession countries. 
Generally, the EU approach has focused on competition and service trade. Moreover, the 
EU’s approach is based on mutual recognition of the service provider. In other words, 
provided the regulatory jurisdiction of the supplier approves of the sale, it can also be 
sold in other jurisdictions (Woolcock 2003). Despite difficulties in complying, the EU 
has successfully exported its norms to their potential EU member countries; however, 
MRAs are favoured partly because MRAs can be applied to certain areas, thus avoiding 
sensitive sectors completely (Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 2005).
The US centred approach, which has already been discussed above, is based on 
assisting the expansion of US MNCs by securing strong competition, investment, and 
intellectual property rights provisions in their PTAs. Generally, the US approach is based 
on the NAFTA, which is based on the host control of the local jurisdiction to uphold their 
commitments, thus ensuring non-discrimination, where market factors will bring about 
equivalence and compatibility (Woolcock, 2003). The US approach is also being adopted 
in the Western Hemisphere, and her contemporary PTA partners, such as Singapore and 
Chile.
The differing regulatory approaches amongst different regions is a most 
distressing matter; different regional PTAs will place their own regulatory approaches 
above their trading partners’ approaches. This is more worrying for developing countries 
that have less bargaining power than the EU and USA. Moreover, despite the exist divide 
amongst the Western Hemisphere and Europe, the possible emergence of an Asian PTA 
approach which also emerge. The Asian approach appears to be focused on a de facto  
and pragmatic approach, which will add to the stockpile of concerns that differential 
approaches in regulatory trade barriers may result in “regulatory regionalism” or the 
development of competing approaches in dealing with regulatory barriers to trade 
(Sampson & Woolcock, 2003; Woolcock, 2006). This should lead to confusions in the 
multilateral trading system, and ultimately leading to a divergence in trade practices that 
would diverge away from a common global approach for the multilateral trading system; 
thus supporting the stumbling bloc argument.
Strictly, speaking, from the empirical evidence gathered in this thesis, currently, 
we are unable to safely confirm the existence of the Asian model for PTAs, there are still 
insufficient empirical data to support this claim. Nevertheless, as international rule­
247
making evolves, major trading powers need to accept the increasing role of developing 
countries in rule making, and the possible emergence of an alternative PTA approach.
8.4 Conclusion: The Future of PTAs in the Multilateral System.
Currently, PTAs have become familiar features of the global trading system. Both 
Singapore and Thailand are unwilling to relinquish such policies. Singapore seeks PTAs 
with newer countries, attempting to build both security and economic bridges with non- 
traditional trading countries. In Thailand, despite the abrupt change in political regime, 
which aimed at discontinuing old economic polices, the military junta have decide to 
carry on with the Thaksin administration’s PTA policies.
From the findings in this thesis, inter-regional PTAs with deeper integration 
provisions have provoked several changes in domestic institutional capacity related to 
trade. There has been development both at the technocratic and industrial capacity, where 
most of the development has been undertaken by agents from the latter category. This 
transformation could have existed under multilateralism, however, the deadlock of the 
WTO opened a gap for PTAs push new developments in international trade policy­
making. However, there is a related matter of whether developing countries are forced to 
adopt the norms from developed countries, due to the asymmetric bargaining negotiating 
power, which would lead to unnecessary regulatory reform. Nevertheless, it has allowed 
some countries to discover their weakness, which they might have to encountered at the 
multilateral level. Nevertheless, interestingly, this has allowed developing countries to 
develop their own regulatory approaches in their intra-regional PTAs, and thus, allows 
the possibilities for developing countries to transform from rule takers into rule makers, 
participating more at the multilateral negotiations, and supporting the building bloc 
argument.
The interesting question is what type of regulatory approach would Asian PTAs 
adopt? This still remains to be seen. The main concern here is whether the region will 
take on an approach that is entirely different from the rest of the world? Would the 
institutional developments from PTAs result in Asian countries establishing their own 
regulatory approaches on customs procedure, health and safety regulations, and 
movement of persons, as seen in ACFTA and STEER? Would this result in another 
regional hub, which is different from the rest of world? If so, this could lead to more
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confusion at the multilateral level, resulting in different regions adopting their own 
regional approaches, resulting into a stumbling bloc.
Some scholars argue that the emergence of major regional hubs could be a 
possible solution for the multilateral trading system. Collier argues, given the current 
deadlock in the WTO, as the deepening of trade rules becomes more problematic, it will 
become more difficult to introduce a sudden extension of international rules to all the 
WTO members. Alternatively, it might be less problematic to gradually introduce 
regulatory economic rules to differing regions according to their appropriateness. Once 
the rules have been accepted, the WTO could improve those rules in order to become 
more accommodating for the global system. In other words, once rules are in place by the 
minority, they can be adapted and adopted for the majority, thus providing an alternative 
process for the building bloc arguments (2006, pp. 1434-1435).
However, there are two major concerns with this system: firstly, this approach 
might result in a two-tier system: there will exist one group prepared to kickstart the 
regulatory agreement, and the remaining group which has to take a back seat (Baldwin, 
2006). The second concern comes from academics who realise that if a rule is adopted by 
the majority of countries, the remaining countries will be compelled to adopt those rules, 
especially when they involve environmental and labour standards. The main question is 
what will happen if no progress was made in the WTO? Would the differing regions 
adopt their own differing approaches, resulting in the separation of the global system into 
differing economic blocs?
Regardless, it must be remembered that PTAs are here to stay, suggesting that 
plurilateralism might be the best approach. Consequently, a reform of the multilateral 
trading organisation will be required. Since differing regions will develop their own 
intra-regional approaches towards regulatory barriers to trade, the WTO must become the 
central authority that coordinates and decides best regulatory practice that should be 
dispersed though its members. Without any coordination from a central organisation, 
PTAs will most likely spread in a sporadic pattern, resulting in regulatory regionalism 
and chaotic bewilderment for the multilateral system. Only with careful coordination can 
we regulate the spread of PTAs in an efficient manner.
To summarise, according to the literature, PTAs are at most a second best option, 
whereas multilateral trade is without a doubt the first best option because it has a wider 
coverage and liberalisation applies to all the members. As one Thai trade negotiator said: 
“Even if we signed free trade agreements with every country, it is not a substitute for the
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WTO”. Unfortunately, PTAs is the name of the game, and countries must learn to live 
with them by jumping onboard the PTA bandwagon. Nevertheless, as this thesis has 
pointed out, a dynamic relation exists between PTAs and domestic institutions. PTAs act 
as a testing-site in increasing countries’ readiness for regulatory issues. Domestically, 
they have fostered an environment for countries to develop their own regulatory 
approaches in their intra-regional PTAs. More importantly, these regulatory approaches 
can provide best practices, which may assist future trade liberalisation, both at the 
bilateral and multilateral level. It is, however, equally possible that PTAs may cause a 
divergence between different regional models, creating an even greater complication in 
the global system. What will be required, in the long run, is to create a stronger 
multilateral organisation, such as the WTO, not only to monitor but also to regulate the 
disparities of PTAs in a more efficient manner that can strengthens the global trading 
system.
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Appendix A- List of Interviews
Singapore:
Chief Negotiator of the Korea-Singapore FTA,
Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Head, Import and Export Division,
Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority of Singapore.
Deputy Director, Directorate B, Trade Division,
Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Assistant Director, Directorate B, Trade Division,
Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Economist, Economics and Strategy Division,
Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Manager of International Relations Unit,
Ministry of Manpower.
Executive Director,
Singapore International Chamber of Commerce.
Thailand:
Former Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Commerce,
Chief Negotiator of the EFTA-Thailand FTA.
ASEAN Chair for the ASEAN China FTA Negotiations,
Deputy Director General of Department of Trade Negotiations, 
Ministry of Commerce.
Thailand’s Chief Negotiator of JTEPA,
Deputy Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Executive Director of Thai JTEPA Office,
Deputy Director General of International Economics Department, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Deputy Secretary-General, Office of Agricultural Economics, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.
Former Deputy Director General of Bureau of Industrial Promotion, 
Ministry of Industry.
Director of Bureau of International Cooperation,
Ministry of Education.
Tax Specialist, Customs Department,
Ministry of Finance.
Trade Officer, Bureau of Trade in Services, Department of Trade Negotiations, 
Ministry of Commerce.
Trade Officer, Department of Trade Negotiations,
Ministry of Commerce.
Legal expert,
FT A-Watch Group.
Chairman of NTB and ROO Committee,
Federation of Thai Industry.
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Appendix B' Singapore’s Negotiation Team in USSFTA
Issues Negotiators
Market Access for Goods Ministry of Trade & Industry
Rules of Origin Ministry of Trade & Industry
Customs Administration Ministry of Finance and 
Customs and Excise Department
Textiles and Apparel Chapter Ministry of Trade & Industry 
(Consultant)
Technical Barriers to Trade Ministry of Trade & Industry 
(Consultant)
Safeguards Ministry o f Trade & Industry
Cross-border Trade in Services Attorney-General’s Chamber
T elecommunication Info-Communications Development 
Authority
Financial Services Ministry of Finance
Temporary Entry of Business Persons Attorney-General’s Chamber
Anticompetitive Business Conduct, Designated 
Monopolies, and Government Enterprises
Ministry of Finance
Government Procurement Ministry of Finance
& E-Commerce Info-Communications Development 
Authority
Investment Ministry of Trade and Industry
Intellectual Property Rights Attorney-General’s Chamber
Labour Ministry of Manpower
Environment Ministry of Environment
Transparency Attorney-General’s Chamber
Administration and Dispute Settlement Attorney-General’s Chamber
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Appendix C- Thailand’s N egotiation Team in JTEPA
Issues Negotiators
Trade in goods Ministry of Commerce
Rules of Origin Ministry of Finance
Customs Procedures Ministry of Finance
Paperless Trading Ministry of Finance
Mutual Recognition and Standard and 
Conformity Assessment
Ministry of Industry
Competition Policy Ministry o f Commerce
Intellectual Property Rights Ministry of Commerce
Government Procurement Ministry of Finance
Trade in services Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Investment Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Movement of Natural Persons Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Financial Services Cooperation Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Information Communication and Technology Ministry of Information 
Communications and Technology
Science, Technology, Energy and Environment Ministry of Science and Technology
Education and Human Resource Development Ministry of Education
Tourism Ministry of Tourism and Sports
Small and Medium Enterprise Office of SMEs Promotion
Trade and Investment Promotion Board of Investment
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives
Improvement of Business Environment Board of Investment
Dispute Avoidance and Settlement Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Appendix D- Thailand’s N egotiation Team in TUSFTA
Issues Negotiators
Market Access for Industrial Products Ministry of Commerce
Market Access for Agricultural Products Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives
Market Access for Textiles and Apparel Products Ministry of Commerce
Trade Remedies Ministry of Commerce
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives
Technical Barriers to Trade Ministry of Industry
Rules of Origin Ministry of Finance
Customs Administration and Procedures Ministry of Finance
Cross Border Services Ministry of Commerce
Financial Services Ministry of Finance
Investment Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mobility of Business Persons Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Labour Ministry of Labour
Environment Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment
Intellectual Property Rights Ministry of Commerce
E-commerce Ministry of Information 
Communications and Technology
T elecommunication Ministry of Information 
Communications and Technology
Government Procurement Ministry of Finance
Competition Policy Ministry of Commerce
Science and Technology/ R&D Ministry of Science and Technology
Capacity Building/SME Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dispute Settlement Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Transparency Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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